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ABSTRACT
THE KNOWLEDGE OF JESUS CHRIST IN THE THEOLOGIES OF HANS 
URS VON BALTHASAR AND RAYMOND BROWN
Callahan, Kyle David
University of Dayton, 1993
Advisor: Fr. Johann G. Roten, S.M.
The issue at hand in this work is the knowledge Jesus Christ had of
his own mission and identity during his life and ministry on earth. It is an
extremely important issue, as one's theology is certainly influenced by how
one answers the question of the degree of knowledge Jesus had of his own
identity as the Word of God and of his mission on earth. Within this study,
we will examine two views on this question: Hans Urs von Balthasar, within
the realm of dogmatic theology, and Raymond E. Brown, within the scholarly
world of modern biblical exegesis. Each of the first Two Chapters estab­
lishes the theological sources of each author, respectively, and moves on to 
a general discussion of their christological views. The Third Chapter is a
critical comparison of the two scholars' views of Jesus' Knowledge of his 
mission and identity. A summary and this author's evaluations conclude.
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INTRODUCTION
"So Jesus cried out in the temple area as he was teaching and said, 
‘You know me and also know where I am from. Yet I did not come on my 
own, but the one who sent me, whom you do not know, is true. I know 
him, because I am from him, and he sent me.’"1 So says Jesus to the 
crowd of listeners to differentiate his knowledge of himself and his mission 
from the type of knowledge possessed by his audience. What these words 
mean to modem theologians, however, can differ due to the point of view, 
the context and the purpose of each individual.
The dogmatic theologian might look at these words in the context 
of what the rest of Scripture had to say on the issue, what the tradition has 
said in relation to the issue, and what best fits into his/her overall 
conception of how God relates with humanity. On the other hand, the 
biblical exegete may examine these same words in the context of form 
criticism, historical criticism, literary criticism and didactic criticism of the 
text itself. It would be compared to the rest of Scripture, but with the 
primary purpose of determining who might have written it, when it was
1 John 7:28-29, the New American Bible translation of the New Testament.
1
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written, why it was written, to whom it was written, and what its sources
were.
This study will attempt to examine two scholars’ views on the subject 
of the knowledge of Jesus Christ, one a dogmatic theologian, Hans Urs von 
Balthasar2, the other a scholar of biblical exegesis and criticism, Raymond 
E. Brown. We will see how the two authors attack the problem, what 
conclusions they come to (if any), and how the two opinions compare and
contrast.
Above, I refer to the knowledge of Jesus as a "problem." This 
deserves a word of explanation. In this author’s view, the issue of what one 
believes Christ to have known (or not known) about who he was and what 
his mission was, will determine the person’s entire worldview and theology. 
Given that Jesus Christ rose from the dead, if he was truly surprised when 
it occurred and did not foresee any ultimate victory or rectification of his
2 Dogmatic theology seeks to present and explore all major doctrines 
in Christian thought. If we define "systematic theology" as a process of 
laying out a complex, complete and exhaustive method of theological 
inquiry, this title could also be used to describe the work of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar. If, on the other hand, "systematic theology" is defined more 
specifically as the defending and expounding upon scholastic and neo­
scholastic theology, then the title would not apply to von Balthasar. 
However, since the former definition of "systematic theology" is a broader 
term than "dogmatic theology," and can include moral theology, fundamen­
tal theology and apologetics, I will opt for the term "dogmatic" to describe 
von Balthasar’s work in order to be as accurate as possible.
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situation, that says a lot about one’s theology. If, on the other hand, one 
holds that Jesus, while in Mary’s womb, knew what time of day he was 
going to participate in the resurrection and what it would be like, that says 
something very different about the implicit world view of the individual. 
In theological terms, the former has an extremely low christology while the 
latter, a very high christology. The entire question seems to stem from the 
enigma of an individual who is, through the hypostatic union, fully God and 
fully human, and to what extent (if at all) each author emphasizes one of 
those natures over the other. At the foundation of this thesis, then, is the 
question of how different authors deal with the reconciliation and 
relationship between these two natures within the one man, Jesus Christ. 
The working hypothesis of this thesis is that, although these two authors 
use the five sources3 of scholarly work (which we will develop later) very 
differently, their conclusions on the knowledge of Jesus of his mission and 
identity are very similar, and are both considered theologically moderately 
conservative. We are not trying to force these two authors different
3 The five sources to which I refer are Scripture, Patristics, Dogmatics, 
philosophical presuppositions and psychological aspects. They were chosen 
as five common sources upon which dogmatic theologians and biblical 
exegetes draw for their work. Granted, von Balthasar and Brown will use 
these sources differently and in different degrees. The important thing 
here, though, is to see how they treat the five sources I have chosen. 
Hence, in this context, when I refer to them as "theological sources," I am 
using that term in the broadest sense which would include dogmatic 
theology as well as biblical exegesis.
Callahan -- 4
scholarly worlds into one field. Instead, we are simply examining what 
happens when two different scholars address the same topic concerning 
Jesus’ knowledge of his mission and identity.
It is important for me to make note of the way in which I use the 
term "knowledge." I do not wish to enter in-depth into a philosophical 
discussion of the term "knowledge." It is not my purpose or my area of 
strength, so I shall leave it to others more qualified than myself. For the 
purposes of this study, I will define Jesus’ "knowledge" of his mission and 
identity as his awareness of who he is and what he is called to be doing.4 
Obviously, the way in which I limit my definition of knowledge will certain­
ly affect my conclusions concerning Jesus’ awareness of his mission and 
identity. Not wanting to continue without an historical look at what some 
reputed thinkers have had to say on the issue of Jesus’ knowledge, 
however, let us examine briefly the views of Thomas Aquinas, Karl Rahner, 
and Bernard Lonergan.
St. Thomas was chosen because of his influence on Catholic thought 
as a Doctor of the church and one of its greatest thinkers. Any examina­
4 As well as the term "knowledge," the term "consciousness" is also 
used to describe the same phenomenon; namely what Jesus knew of his 
mission and identity. In the same manner as the former term, however, the 
latter is extremely complex in the different meanings various authors 
ascribe to it. For this reason, with the exception of the three brief 
examples of Aquinas, Lonergan, and Rahner, I will not enter any further 
into a philosophical discussion on the topic.
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tion of a major theological question such as that of Jesus’ knowledge needs 
to at least briefly look at St. Thomas’ thought since, "he was the first one 
to completely formulate Christian belief on a rigorously consistent 
metaphysical basis; for this he has been credited with founding theology as 
a science."5 As a complement to and a natural development of St. 
Thomas’ strong Aristotelian view, Karl Rahner was chosen because of his 
monumental task of following Joseph Marechal’s footsteps in combining 
Kantian a priori transcendental methodology with Thomistic epistemology 
(concerning God as the fundamental orientation of the human intellect). 
Rahner’s influence in Catholic thought and especially on the documents of 
the Second Vatican Council made him another necessary person to 
examine when discussing Jesus’ knowledge. Finally, Bernard Lonergan was 
chosen because of his major contributions to Christian theology in the 
areas of neo-Thomistic epistemology and theological methodology. This 
method is based "on an analysis of the way in which every human mind 
necessarily operates,"6 and consists of eight steps in which the human 
mind assimilates, investigates, interprets and judges different knowable 
things. For these contributions to Catholic theology, these specific
5 Herr, William A. Catholic Thinkers in the Clear: Giants of Catholic 
Thought from Augustine to Rahner. Chicago: The Thomas More Press, 
1985, p. 100.
6 Ibid., p. 260.
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theologians were chosen to be examined for how each views the knowledge
of Jesus.
Following a look at these three major Catholic theologians’ views of 
Jesus’ knowledge in general, we will set forth the criteria we will use in this 
thesis as the basis for comparing Brown’s and von Balthasar’s views of 
Jesus’ knowledge of his mission and identity. These criteria will come from 
the International Theological Commission’s document entitled, "The 
Consciousness of Christ concerning Himself and his Mission."7 8 The 
purpose of the examination of these three authors, some of Catholic 
theology’s greatest, is to introduce the reader to some very general 
information concerning Jesus’ knowledge. The examination of the 
International Theological Commission (I.T.C.) document which follows, 
serves the purpose of introducing some of the specific problems on the 
topic of Jesus’ knowledge of his mission and identity. It is these issues, in 
turn, that we will come back to in the third chapter in order to have a 
common set of criteria with which to compare von Balthasar and Brown.
First, let us briefly take a look at St. Thomas’ conception of the 
knowledge of Christ as seen in his Summa Theological from the section
7 International Theological Commission. Texts and Documents: 1969 - 
1985, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989, pp. 305 - 318.
8 Aquinas, Saint Thomas. Summa Theologica. 1st complete American 
ed., New York: Benzinger, 1947-1948, pp. 2082-2097.
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titled, "The Mystery of the Incarnation," Pars Tertia, Questions 9-12. 
Rather than launch into a full-blown discussion of St. Thomas’ christology 
(which is obviously beyond the scope and purpose of this thesis), we will 
look at his basic conclusions concerning Jesus’ knowledge.
On the topic of Question Nine, Christ’s knowledge in general, St. 
Thomas posits that Christ’s divine knowledge did not belong to his human 
soul (nature). He goes on to assert that the two lights of knowledge in 
Christ are in two different classes, therefore the greater does not dim the 
lesser, but instead, human knowledge is heightened in the Soul of Christ 
by the light of divine knowledge. This assertion is backed up by St. 
Thomas’ position that while the Godhead is united in the manhood of 
Christ in person, it is not united in the manhood of Christ in essence or 
nature. In this way, St. Thomas asserts that there is no interference 
between Christ’s infused and beatific knowledge, but the former is a means 
to beatific knowledge and is strengthened by it. Finally, in this Ninth 
question, St. Thomas contends that Jesus did acquire human knowledge 
through discovery but not through being taught.
Question Ten, which deals with Christ’s beatific knowledge, holds
that while Jesus did see the divine essence of God in the beatific vision, he 
could not comprehend it fully. St. Thomas asserts that God knew the 
essence of the Godhead better than Christ did. Also, Jesus did know all 
things in the Word, but only when "all things" is defined as "all that is," and
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not when "all things" is defined as "all things that are and could be." With 
regard to Christ knowing infinite things, St. Thomas states that, "knowledge 
primarily and essentially regards being in act, and secondarily regards 
being in potentiality."9 In regard to the first, Jesus did know infinitely 
because there will never be an infinite number of actions. But, with regard 
to the latter, Christ did not know all things in potentiality. Finally, in 
comparing Christ’s beatific vision with the angels and other Blessed, St. 
Thomas contends that since Christ is more closely joined to the Word, he 
sees the vision more perfectly than others.
In Question Eleven, dealing with Christ’s infused (imprinted) 
knowledge, St. Thomas makes the case that Christ did have the knowledge 
of all things and that, through this divinely imprinted knowledge, Christ 
knew "whatever can be known by force of a man’s active intellect," and "all 
things made known to man by Divine revelation."10 With this imprinted 
knowledge, asserts Thomas, Christ could know using phantasms, but did 
not need them, as he could also have knowledge through intelligible 
species, since his soul is the same nature as ours, but in a different state 
of more complete comprehension. As well, St. Thomas goes on to point 
out that since Jesus had a rational soul, he had comparative knowledge as
9 Ibid., p. 2008. Pt. Ill, Q. 10, Art. 3.
10 Ibid., p. 2090. Pt. Ill, Q. 11, Art. 1.
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far as its usefulness went, but not as far as it was used to gain knowledge 
from cause to effect (since his knowledge was perfect). Finally, Thomas 
asserts that Jesus did have habitual knowledge, since his soul was like other 
humans’, but while he was below angels where death was concerned, his 
infused knowledge was greater than theirs.
The last question in this section, Question Twelve, deals with the 
acquired (empirical) knowledge of Jesus. St. Thomas holds that Jesus had 
to know all things via this empirical knowledge since everything in Jesus 
was perfect. Next, St. Thomas affirms that because of direct and indirect 
experience (vicarious), Christ knew all things via his experience; through 
what Christ did sense he could deduce all other sensible things, and 
therefore in this empirical knowledge, Christ did know all knowable things 
as far as human active intellect goes, but not their essences, which belongs 
to his infused knowledge. St. Thomas then contends that while Christ did 
not advance in beatific or infused knowledge (because it was perfect and 
came from an infinite power), he did acquire empiric knowledge step by 
step and thus did advance. It is important to follow that assertion with 
Thomas’ contention that since Jesus was the Master, he taught and could 
not learn from humans because teaching and learning do not belong to the 
same nature. Thomas goes on to say that Jesus’ questioning the doctors in 
the Temple was simply his way of teaching via questioning. Thomas agrees 
that Jesus learned from sensible things created by God, but not from other
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people. Finally, Thomas asserts that while Jesus’ body was subject to 
heavenly bodies such as angels, his soul was not, therefore he could not 
have been taught by angels.
Karl Rahner’s view on the knowledge of Jesus in some ways is like 
St. Thomas, and in some important ways, is different. He asserts early on 
the difference between his work and the work of the exegete. He claims 
that, while the two different types of scholars must work to be compatible,
the two fields are nevertheless different:
when we make a dogmatic statement about the 
knowledge and self-consciousness of Jesus, right 
away our only intention relative to the exegete 
is to arrive at a view compatible with his find­
ings, and to do this as well as we possibly can - 
but nothing more. For to do more is neither 
necessary nor possible.11
In this way, he makes it clear that his purpose is to make dogmatic 
statements about Jesus’ knowledge and consciousness that are compatible 
with exegetical findings and the teaching of the magisterium.
Rahner points to Jesus’ professed ignorance on certain occasions 
and the fact that he was a product of the understanding of his age as two 
reasons that hold out in opposition to some traditional views of his 
consciousness which posit complete and perfect knowledge about all things.
11 Rahner, Karl. Theological Investigations, Volume V: Later 
Writings. Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966, p. 199.
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Rahner goes on to posit four basic presuppositions before directly
addressing the issue of Jesus’ knowledge. The first is that...
knowledge has a multi-layered structure: this 
means that it is absolutely possible that in 
relation to these different dimensions of con­
sciousness and knowledge something may be 
known and not known at the same time.12
This distinction is necessary because of the insufficiency of the model of 
tabula rasa when applied to Jesus.
The second point is Rahner’s concept of human consciousness, which
he posits as "an infinite, multi-dimensional sphere."13 Within this sphere,
there are different types of knowledge. In addition, even though Rahner
asserts that the different types of knowledge should be thought of as
different ways to know a reality and not necessarily ways of possessing
objective knowledge. While he makes assertions concerning some of the
basic differences in which something can be known, he does not wish to get
caught up in a detailed discussion of the multiplicity of ways reality can
exist in human knowledge:
it cannot be our job to draw up an empirico- 
psychological or transcendental scheme of these 
different ways in which something may be 
present in consciousness.14
12 Ibid., p. 199.
13 Ibid., p. 200.
14 Idem.
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The third presupposition follows directly, and affirms that there is, 
in human beings as spiritual entities, a form of unobjectified, unthematic 
knowledge about ourselves, which cannot be expressed but is known 
nonetheless. Finally, the fourth presupposition is that, in opposition to the 
Greek model, some degree of nescience in human beings is actually not a 
weakness, but instead makes possible our true humanity and true freedom, 
which would be diminished if we (or Jesus in this case) knew all things. 
Nescience is humanity’s reason for desiring the transcendence from finite
to infinite.
In direct response to the question of Jesus’ knowledge, Rahner
affirms the assertion that Jesus did in fact have a direct consciousness with
God (a visio immediata), but questions the contention that the knowledge 
Jesus possessed should be called "beatific.” He goes on to point out that 
while the extrinsic view posits the visio immediata as an addition to Jesus’ 
being and not part of the hypostatic union, the intrinsic view sees the visio 
immediata as an internal element of the hypostatic union, and determined 
thereby. In this view of the hypostatic union, we find the heart of Rahner’s 
view of the knowledge of Jesus.
For Rahner, the hypostatic union "implies the self-communication 
of the absolute Being of God...to the human nature of Christ which thereby
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becomes a nature hypostatically supported by the Logos.”15 Since human
nature contains self-consciousness, and Jesus was human, Jesus had to have
been self-conscious of his identity within his hypostasis. Finally, then, given
the above assertions at the heart of Rahner’s christology, he contends that
the hypostatic union must be understood in a different way:
only in such a subjective, unique union of the 
human consciousness of Jesus with the Logos - 
which is of the most radical nearness, unique­
ness and finality - is the Hypostatic Union 
really present in its fullest being.16
To conclude, Rahner discusses how we should conceive this
consciousness of Jesus which is in direct union with God. He posits that
most view it as an object of Jesus’ mind’s eye, but he questions whether or
not that can possibly be an accurate assumption of the consciousness of the
historical Jesus of the New Testament who, ’’doubts, learns, is surprised, is
deeply moved,...who is overwhelmed by a deadly feeling of being forsaken
by God?"17 This consciousness is in the form of the unobjectified
consciousness that all humans have concerning who they are. So Jesus, is
just like the rest of humanity, and possesses:
this inescapable, conscious and yet in a sense 
not-known state of being lit up to oneself, in 
which reality and one’s consciousness of reality
15 Ibid., p. 205.
16 Ibid., p. 207.
17 Idem.
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are still unseparated from each other, (and 
which) may never be reflected upon.18
This situation, contends Rahner, is not only in keeping with the teaching
of the magisterium (that there is a visio immediata between God and Jesus),
but is also a position which exegetes can find compatible. In conclusion,
on the topic of Jesus’ consciousness, Rahner points to the importance of
the hypostatic union (and within it, the visio immediata which is intrinsic to
that union), and contends that...
it is then legitimate to be of the positive opin­
ion that such an interpretation can understand 
the vision of God as a basic condition of the 
created spiritual nature of Jesus, a basic condi­
tion which is so original and unobjective, unsys­
tematic and fundamental, that it is perfectly 
reconcilable with a genuine, human experience; 
there is no reason why it should not be perfect­
ly reconcilable with a historical development, 
understood as an objectifying systematization of 
this original, always given, direct presence of 
God, both in the encounter with the spiritual 
and religious environment and in the experi­
ence of one’s own life.19
Possibly the most concise and clear example of Bernard Lonergan’s 
view on the knowledge Jesus had of his mission and identity comes in a 
chapter of his Collection called "Christ As Subject: A Reply."20 It was
18 Ibid., p. 208-209.
19 Ibid., p. 215.
20 Lonergan, Bernard. The Collection, edited by Frederick Crowe and 
Robert M. Doran. 2nd ed., rev. and aug. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press for Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, 1988, pp. 153-184.
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written as a correction and clarification in regard to what Fr. Angelo
Perego had written about his christology.21 In Lonergan’s eyes, this is a
clarification that desperately needs to be made:
As the position imputed to me, both in the 
presentation and in the critical evaluation, is 
one that I fail to distinguish from heresy, I feel 
called upon to supplement Fr Perego’s animad­
versions and, at the same time, to correct his 
imputation.22
The version of Christ’s knowledge (consciousness) found in this reply is 
also somewhat simplified since Lonergan is answering the charge that his 
notions in this area (of consciousness and subject) are incomprehensible. 
Before briefly explicating his revised contentions concerning the conscious­
ness of Christ, it is important to note that his arguments are driven by a 
strong belief:
(he has a) conviction that the physical pain 
endured by Jesus Christ has a significant bear­
ing on theological accounts of the consciousness 
of Christ.23
To summarize Lonergan’s main points on the issue of Jesus’ 
knowledge, it is important to understand his assertion of the parallelism 
between Jesus’ person and his consciousness. For Lonergan, the relation­
21 Ibid., p. 153. The article to which Lonergan writes his reply is: 
Angelo Perego, "Una nouva opinione sull’unita psicologica di Cristo," 
Divinitas 2 (1958) 409-24.
22 Idem.
23 Idem.
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ship starts with the contention that "a subject is a conscious person."24 In 
the man Jesus Christ, then, there is one person with two natures - human 
and divine; and one subject with two consciousnesses -- human and divine.
Lonergan goes on to assert that these two entities, Jesus’ person and 
consciousness, have parallel attributes. The distinctness of the two natures 
in the person of Jesus parallels the distinctness of the two consciousnesses 
in the subject of Jesus. The person of Jesus is not more important than the 
subject of Jesus, since, "as the person, so also the subject is a divine 
reality."25
For our purpose in this brief outline, Lonergan sums up the
parallelism and relationship between the two consciousnesses concisely:
As there is a great difference between ‘being 
God’ and ‘being a man,’ so also there is a great 
difference between ‘being conscious of oneself 
as God’ and ‘being conscious of oneself as 
man.’ As the former difference is surmounted 
hypostatically by union in the person, so the lat­
ter difference is surmounted hypostatically by 
union in the subject.26
Finally, Lonergan discusses that while the ontological arguments behind the 
discussion of the two natures in the one person of Christ have Conciliar 
and Church authority, the psychological arguments behind the discussion
24 Ibid., p. 182.
25 Ibid., p. 183.
26 Idem.
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of the two consciousnesses in the one subject of Christ are not as 
theologically evolved and thus do not carry the same authority.
Lonergan posits three points as to why the psychological discussion 
of the two consciousnesses in the subject of Christ should be included in 
the authoritative ontological discussions concerning the two natures in the 
person of Christ. The first point is that, since the psychological and 
ontological arguments are not mutually exclusive, if one can set aside their 
differences, logic would dictate that if the ontological arguments are true, 
then the parallel psychological arguments would be true as well. The 
second point is that contrary to many discussions on psychology and the 
subject of Christ (and his consciousness), Lonergan’s position is that the 
psychological theories of Christ’s consciousness should coincide and be 
reconciled with what the Church believes (the faith of the masses, "what 
everyone believes").27 Only in this way can they be true to what the Apos­
tles’ Creed asserts concerning the person and natures of Christ (and their 
parallel counterparts of the subject and consciousnesses of Christ). Finally, 
Lonergan appeals to tradition, and asserts that his account of Jesus’ 
consciousness as subject, "fits easily into the framework of Aristotelian and 
Thomist thought."28
27 Idem.
28 Idem.
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Now, having discussed three important Catholic thinkers’ views 
concerning some major aspects of the general knowledge of Jesus Christ, 
we will move on to the more specific issue of Jesus’ knowledge of his 
mission and identity. In this introduction, we want to introduce and 
explain the four major issues as found in the I.T.C.’s document on Jesus’ 
knowledge of his mission and identity.29 Later, in the third chapter, we 
will come back to the I.T.C.’s four propositions as we compare von 
Balthasar and Brown. The focus of this thesis, then, is a comparison of 
how each author would answer each of the four major considerations of the 
of the issue of Jesus’ knowledge of his mission and identity as established 
by this church body.
The I.T.C. explains its own hermeneutic on the issue of Jesus’ 
knowledge of his mission and identity. They stress that the reason they 
feel the need to comment on the issue is because the debate among those
who do historical criticism about Jesus’ consciousness of his mission and
identity create controversies that are important to the understanding of the 
Christian faith and are not going away. The I.T.C. contends that Jesus 
must have had some degree of knowledge of his mission and identity, and
29 The fact that von Balthasar was a member of the I.T.C. from 1969 - 
1985 does not detract from the document’s value as an objective, compara­
tive tool with which to compare and contrast von Balthasar’s and Brown’s 
views because of the many other theologians who comprised the I.T.C.. 
Thus, while von Balthasar certainly had an influence on the I.T.C.’s 
documents, it was diluted by other theologians.
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because of the negative soteriological implications of a Christ in which 
there is no knowledge of his identity, they assert the importance of the 
issue: "It is clear, then, that the Church attaches maximum importance to 
the problem of the awareness (consciousness) and human knowledge of 
Jesus."30
According to the I.T.C., there are two sets of issues that come up 
when discussing the theological and pastoral implications of the knowledge 
of Jesus. The first concerns the exegesis of the biblical material which, as 
the Second Vatican Council pointed out, serves the purpose of trying to 
find out exactly what the NT writers’ intentions were. This search for the 
original meaning of the different texts of Scripture are extremely important 
according to the I.T.C., asserting that the interpretation of Scripture needs 
to take into consideration the wealth of the unity of the entire Scripture
itself as well as consider the tradition of the faith of the church. If this is
done, then the I.T.C. agrees with Vatican Il’s assertion that "the study of 
Sacred Scripture should be "the soul of all theology"."31
The second problem centers on the I.T.C.’s assertion that the 
tradition of the church is historically bound to specific philosophical 
understandings and models of each epoch of Christian history. For this
30 International Theological Commission, Texts and Documents: 1969 -
1985, p. 306.
31 Ibid., p. 307; quoted from OT, 16; cf DV, 24.
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reason, they assert that their treatment of the issue of Jesus’ knowledge of 
his mission and identity will not accept any one philosophical set of 
language to be definitive of the truth, but instead will try to see this issue 
in light of faith in Jesus. At the same time, however, the I.T.C. recognizes 
that the mystery itself cannot be put into any human conception of words
anyway.
In keeping with their previous articulation of their positions, the 
I.T.C. asserts that they will examine the issue of Jesus’ knowledge of his 
mission and identity from what the faith has always believed about Jesus 
Christ. In addition, they contend that they are not attempting to give 
theological explanations of their conclusions, but instead that they are 
going to limit their study of the issue to "some statements of what Jesus 
was conscious of with regard to his own personal mission."32 They do this 
through a presentation of four propositions followed by their commentary. 
The commentaries themselves are in three stages: 1. apostolic preaching 
concerning Christ; 2. what a critical study of the synoptic Gospels will yield 
concerning the knowledge of Christ of his mission and identity; and 3. the 
more explicit testimony of John’s Gospel, which, the I.T.C. contends, does 
not contradict the other Gospels, but is just written from a different 
perspective.
32 Ibid., p. 307.
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The first proposition of the I.T.C. is:
The life of Jesus testifies to his consciousness of a 
filial relationship with the Father. His behavior and 
his words, which are those of the perfect "servant", 
imply an authority that surpasses that of the ancient 
prophets and belongs to God alone. Jesus drew this 
incomparable authority from his unique relationship 
with God, whom he calls "my Father." He was 
conscious of being the only Son of God and in this 
sense of being God himself33
The apostolic teaching that Jesus was the Son of God is evident in the 
most ancient formulations of the earliest hymns and confessions (Rom 1:3; 
Phil 2:6). St. Paul asserted that he was teaching about Jesus, the Son of 
God (Gal 1:16; 2Cor 1:19). Also, the mission statements about Jesus being 
sent from God are important keys to this understanding. Jesus’ divine 
sonship of God is at the center of the apostolic preaching and "can be 
understood as an explanation, in the light of the Cross and Resurrection, 
of the relationship of Jesus with his own "Abba”."34
The I.T.C. points out that the synoptic Gospels show us that Jesus 
did in fact call God, "Father". Not only that, but Jesus also called God, 
"Abba," which implied a very special relationship between him and God. 
In addition, when Jesus taught his disciples how to pray, the I.T.C. 
contends that there is a difference in the way he uses "my Father," and
33 Ibid., p. 308.
34 Idem.
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"your Father," (Lk 11:2). These aspects of the synoptics lead the I.T.C. to 
the following assertion:
before the mystery of Jesus was revealed to 
men, there was already in the consciousness of 
Jesus a personal perception of a most sure and 
profound relationship with the Father. From 
the fact that he called God "Father", it follows 
by implication that Jesus was aware of his own 
divine authority and mission.35
The I.T.C. goes on to claim that since Jesus knew he was the one who 
knew God perfectly, he also knew of his mission as the "bearer of God’s 
definitive revelation to men."36 Because of this consciousness, contends 
the I.T.C., Jesus exercised his unique authority to act for God (especially 
in forgiving sin, binding the devil, and performing miracles).
In the Gospel of John, the explicit origin of the authority is given
with Jesus’ statements that "the Father is in me and I in the Father"
(10:38), and "the Father and I are one" (10:30). In these claims, the I.T.C. 
asserts that Jesus was illustrating that his "I" and the "I" of Yahweh are the 
same. Finally, the I.T.C. concludes the commentary on this first proposi­
tion with this assertion:
even from a historical point of view we have 
every reason for stating that the earliest apos­
tolic proclamation of Jesus as Son of God is 
based on the very consciousness that Jesus
35 Idem.
36 Idem.
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himself had of being the Son and emissary of 
the Father.37 38
The second I.T.C. proposition states that:
Jesus was aware of the purpose of his mission: to 
announce the Kingdom of God and make it present 
in his own Person, in his actions, and in his words, 
so that the world would become reconciled with 
God and renewed. He freely accepted the Father's 
will: to give his own life for the salvation of all 
mankind He knew the Father had sent him to 
serve and to give his life "for many" (Mk 14:24)J*
The I.T.C. stresses the importance of the apostolic preaching of Jesus’ 
divine sonship to the Christian concept of soteriology. Christ’s whole 
mission through his incarnation, life, teaching, death and resurrection are 
all designed to allow us to be lifted up with him and share in his divine
sonship:
Such a sharing in the divine sonship, which 
comes into being in faith and is especially 
expressed in the prayer of Christians to the 
Father, presupposes the consciousness Jesus 
himself had of his own Sonship.39
In fact, the I.T.C. points out the importance of this consciousness to the 
whole of Christian thought: "the entire apostolic preaching is based on the 
conviction that Jesus knew he was the Son, the Father’s emissary; and
37 Ibid., p. 309.
38 Idem.
39 Idem.
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without such a consciousness christology and soteriology as well would lack 
foundation.”40
On the basis of the synoptic accounts of Jesus’ life, the I.T.C. claims 
that since Jesus’ consciousness of his unique relationship to God as his Son 
is the entire foundation for his mission, we can also argue the other 
direction (from mission to consciousness). To this end, the I.T.C. points 
out that the synoptic Gospels show Jesus as one who knows he has been 
sent to announce and bring about the Kingdom of God (Lk 14:43; Mt 
15:24; Mk 1:38). Since Jesus knew he had been sent and knew what he had 
been sent for, then he must also have known that he was sent from the
Father, which would presuppose a unique divine relationship. In other 
words, if there is one sent, then there had to be a sender.
As the I.T.C. illustrates, the Gospel of John’s "mission Christology" 
makes explicit this relationship between the one sent and the one who 
sends. In John, Jesus knows that he has come from the Father (5:43; 8:12; 
16:28). This mission is not imposed on his from an outside source, but 
instead is intimately tied to his being and identity. Finally, this coming 
from God implies that he was always, until that time, with God (1:1).
In conclusion, the I.T.C. contends that John shows us that Jesus’
consciousness of his mission also involves his consciousness of his
40 Idem.
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preexistence. This relationship between the Father and son is (in Jesus’ 
consciousness as well) always guided by the Holy Spirit. In this relation­
ship, Jesus is guided by the Holy Spirit as he knowingly gives up any 
impediments to his fulfillment of his mission through obedience to the 
Father. Thus Jesus refuses to call upon legions of angels for help (Mt 
26:53), chooses to grow in wisdom and grace as a human being (Lk 2:52), 
learns and obeys (Heb 5:8), faces temptations (Mt 4:1-11), and allows 
himself to suffer. According to the I.T.C.,
None of this is incompatible with the affirma­
tions that Jesus "knows all" (Jn 16:30), that "the 
Father has shown him all his works" (Jn 5:20;
13:3; Mt 11:27), if these affirmations are taken 
to mean that Jesus receives from the Father all 
that enables him to accomplish his works of 
revelation and of universal redemption (Jn 
3:11-32; 8:38-40; 15:15; 17:8).41 42
The third I.T.C. proposition concerning the knowledge of Jesus of
his mission and identity is that:
To realize his salvific mission, Jesus wanted to unite 
men with the coming of the Kingdom and to gather 
them around himself With this end before him, he 
did certain definite acts that, if taken altogether, can 
only be explained as a preparation for the Church, 
which will be definitively constituted at the time of 
the Easter and Pentecost events. It is therefore to 
be affirmed of necessity that Jesus willed the foun­
dation of the Church
41 Ibid., p. 311.
42 Idem.
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With these assertions in mind, the I.T.C. points out that the unity between 
the Church and Christ make them inseparable. This unity has the Holy 
Spirit as its unifying principle. According to apostolic teaching, beginning 
with Paul, the Church is in Christ, Christ is in us (and we are the Church) 
(ITh 1:1, 2:14; 2Th 1:1; Gal 1:22; Rom 8:10; 2Cor 13:5). This unity 
between Christ and Church is rooted in his giving of his life on the Cross. 
This Church, as the Body of Christ, is unified and takes its origin from his 
crucifixion and resurrection. "In the eyes of the apostolic preaching the 
Church is the very purpose of the work of salvation brought about by
Christ in his life on earth."43
Next, the I.T.C. contends that in the synoptic Gospels, Jesus’ 
preaching of the Kingdom of God has as its primary purpose the inclusion 
of all people to come into the Kingdom. This is seen in his relationship 
with his disciples, whom he called and to whom he was the shepherd. "The 
parables of Jesus and the images he uses in describing those he came to 
call as followers involve an "implicit ecclesiology"."44 The point is not that 
Jesus had the specific institutional structures of the Church in mind as 
much as it is that Jesus wanted to give his followers a structure which 
would remain until the full realization of the Kingdom. The disciples, with
43 Ibid., p. 312.
44 Idem.
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Peter as their head, are the first community which share in the mission of
Christ, but also his fate (Mt 10:25). The Church, then, receives the act of
his supper, which is the center of the New Covenant (Lk 22:20) and kept
the community unified in the breaking of bread (Lk 22:19):
Christ was conscious of his saving mission. This 
brought with it the foundation of his Church, 
that is, the calling together of all mankind into 
"God’s family". In the last analysis the history 
of Christianity is founded on the intention and 
the will of Christ to found his Church.45 46
This is echoed by the I.T.C.’s comments on the Gospel of John,
which sees the paschal mystery of Jesus as the foundation of the Church,
based on Jesus’ claim in Jn 12:32, "And I, when I am lifted up from the
earth, will draw all men to myself." In this way, John sees the unity of the
believers and Jesus. Through Jesus’ freely giving of his life for all
humankind, he is drawing all people into unity with him.
The fourth and final proposition the I.T.C. puts forth concerning
Jesus’ knowledge of his mission and identity is:
The consciousness that Christ had of being the 
Father's emissary to save the world and to bring all 
mankind together in God's people involves, in a 
mysterious way, a love for all mankind so much so 
that we may all say: "The Son of God loved me and 
gave himself up for me" (Gal 2:20)*
45 Ibid., p. 313.
46 Ibid., p. 314.
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The I.T.C. asserts that from the very beginning, apostolic preaching taught 
that Jesus came to save us from our sins, to redeem us, to give himself for 
us, to die for all people to be saved, and thusly died for each of us (ICor 
15:3; Gal 1:4; Rom 4:25, 5:8). And even more specifically, because he 
loved us, Christ died for each and every one of us, in an individual way 
(Eph 5:2, 5:25; Rom 14:15; ICor 8:11).
The synoptic witness shows us that this love of Jesus comes to us 
through all history: "The "preexistent" love of Jesus is the continuing 
element that characterizes the Son in all these "stages" -- preexistence, 
earthly life, glorified existence."47 48We see the expression of this love in 
the life of Jesus, when he expresses his life on earth as one of service. This 
love of Jesus’ found its fullest expression in his willing death on a cross and 
his teaching of total self-abnegation. Jesus’ was a truly unique service, in 
that he serves as our model, but also that only he could give us the love of 
God in such an intimate way, since he was the Son of God. Jesus’ service 
was "a service of love that links God’s deepest love with the love, full of 
self-abnegation, of one’s neighbor (Mk 12:28-34).,,4S This love of Jesus 
transcends the bounds of his own generation and becomes universal in
scope.
47 Ibid., pp. 314-315.
48 Ibid., p. 315.
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For the Gospel of John’s input on this fourth proposition, the I.T.C. 
points to the self-gift of God in the giving of Jesus as seen in John 3:16. 
Also, the I.T.C. points to Jn 10:11, in which the shepherd cares so deeply 
for his sheep that he is willing to lay down his life for them. The I.T.C. 
points to the importance of this issue: "this mystery is at the heart of our
Faith: the inclusion of all mankind within this eternal love with which God
so loved the world that he gave his own Son."49
The I.T.C.’s conclusion of the fourth proposition asserts that because 
Christians have experienced the love of Christ (and God through Christ), 
they have dedicated themselves to loving each other and those around
them: the least of the brothers and sisters of Jesus.
The purpose of examining these four propositions of the I.T.C. 
concerning the knowledge Christ had of his mission and identity has been 
to set the stage for the rest of this thesis. Though we will not come back 
to these four points specifically until the comparison in the third chapter, 
it is still good to keep them in mind while going through the body of this 
thesis. In such a way we will have accomplished our task of setting forth 
comparative propositions, examining how both authors’ utilize five basic 
scholarly sources and arrive at conclusions, and coming full-circle by 
returning to these four propositions in order to conduct our comparison of
49 Idem.
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von Balthasar’s and Brown’s views of the knowledge of Jesus of his mission 
and identity.
There is one final issue I would like to cover before beginning the 
exploration and explication of the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar. It 
may appear to some that comparing a dogmatic theologian with a biblical 
scholar runs the risk of the proverbial "comparing apples to oranges". To 
that point I would respond by saying that it is not the two authors, nor the 
two diverse manners of using scholarly sources which I wish to compare, 
but their conclusions concerning Jesus’ knowledge of his mission and 
identity as guided by the International Theological Commission’s docu­
ment. In fact, both authors make certain their audience knows that they 
do not pretend to tread into the others’ territory. Most importantly, 
however, is that we keep the focus on the knowledge of Jesus Christ in 
terms of his awareness of his mission and identity. About this, both von 
Balthasar and Brown have much to say. And even though their means are 
different, their end conclusions concerning the four propositions of the 
I.T.C. are extremely similar.
On another level, it could be argued that dogmatic theology and 
biblical exegesis are intertwined in such a way that they become interde­
pendent in purpose. Both methods of study, though different in the way 
they are carried out, are similar in that they focus on the Person of Jesus 
Christ. On a practical level, it needs to be asserted that dogmatic theology
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must in some way utilize the critical exegesis of the biblical material if it 
is to be valid. As well, Brown points out in his work that much of what he 
does is for the purpose of providing a strong biblical basis upon which 
dogmatic theologians can build. In this way, Brown’s and von Balthasar’s 
chosen fields of study are intimately intertwined. The way in which they 
use theological sources and their methods are very different, but ultimately 
they both use their different means to speak about the person of Jesus 
Christ and his knowledge. Therefore the basis for comparing Brown’s and 
von Balthasar’s christological views on Jesus’ knowledge lies in the 
similarity of their conclusions as they become clear when placed against the 
backdrop of the I.T.C.’s document on the knowledge of Jesus of his mission 
and identity.
CHAPTER 1
THE CHRISTOLOGY OF HANS URS VON BALTHASAR
Bom in Lucerne, Switzerland in 1905, Hans Urs von Balthasar is one
of the great dogmatic theologians of our age, according to the admiration
of John Saward who expresses his feelings:
(my) gratitude -- first of all to Father Balthasar 
himself, for what he has done for the whole 
Church as her greatest theologian of this centu­
ry, and for what he did for me, as for countless 
other individuals, by his spiritual counsel and 
great kindness.1
Louis Roberts also posits von Balthasar’s importance in the modem era:
Although not as well known in the English- 
speaking world as Yves Congar, Henri de 
Lubac, or Hans Kiing, Balthasar is one of the 
European theologians who has helped shape 
contemporary theology.2
1 Saward, John The Mysteries of March, Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1990, p. xi.
2 Roberts, Louis, The Theological Aesthetics of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
1987, p. 3.
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After receiving his doctorate in German Literature in Zurich in 1928, von 
Balthasar entered the Society of Jesus on the 31st of October, 1929, was a 
novice at Feldkirch until 1931, and was ordained to the Priesthood on July 
26, 1939. Between 1929 and 1940, he made contact and had theological 
dialogue with Erich Przywara, Henri de Lubac, Hugo and Karl Rahner, 
Karl Barth, and Adrienne von Speyr.
In 1950, von Balthasar left the Society of Jesus and was incardinated 
as a secular priest in the Swiss Diocese of Chur. For the next decade, he 
was active within the Community of St. John as a theological writer, 
publisher and speaker.
In 1969, von Balthasar was appointed by Pope Paul VI to the 
International Theological Commission. Three years later, in 1972, he 
helped to found the theological journal "Communio: International Catholic 
Review." In the next 15 years of his life, he was given many esteemed 
honors from the theological community. In 1984, Pope John Paul II 
presented him with the Pope Paul VI International Prize. In 1987, he was 
awarded the Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart Prize in Salsburg because of his 
dedication to the work of Mozart. Finally, before his sudden death in June 
of 1988, von Balthasar was named as a Cardinal by Pope John Paul II.
By examining von Balthasar’s work and theological sources, the stage 
will be set for an understanding of his christology, especially the knowledge
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of Christ? Though most of the christology in this present work will come 
specifically from von Balthasar’s development of a christology in Theo- 
Drama Volume III, it should briefly be placed into its context within von 
Balthasar’s trilogy as a whole. Though the amount of his scholarly output
is by any standard impressive, by listing the three parts of his Trilogy, we 
can begin to see the scholarly intent of his writings and work:
Part One: The Glory of the Lord (Aesthetics)
Volume 1: Seeing the Form
Volume 2: Studies in theological style: clerical
Volume 3: Studies in theological style: lay
Volume 4: The Realm of Metaphysics in Antiquity
Volume 5: The Realm of Metaphysics in the Modem Age
Volume 6: Theology of the Old Covenant
Volume 7: Theology of the New Covenant
Part Two: Theo-Drama (The Good): The Doctrine of the 
Human Person’s openness to God’s Historical 
Action (which is a transition from aesthetics 
to drama)
Volume 1: Prolegomena 
Volume 2: Dramatis Personae: Man in God 
Volume 3: Dramatis Personae: Persons in Christ 
Volume 4: The Action
Volume 5: The Last Act
Part Three: Theo-Logic (Truth/Logic of Theology): The 
truth of the Divine Action in History
Volume 1: Wahrheit der Welt 
Volume 2: Wahrheit Gottes
3 However, it must be pointed out that the examination of how von 
Balthasar (and later, Brown) uses these five sources is not meant to explain 
his christological stance as such, but instead it is meant to simply give a 
more developed view of the characterization of von Balthasar’s and 
Brown’s work.
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Volume 3: Der Geist der Wahrheit4
Since this present work is comparing the conclusions of a dogmatic 
theologian and a biblical exegete , it would be helpful to briefly examine 
how von Balthasar differentiates his scholarly task versus that of the 
biblical exegete. We find a clear articulation of this view in the preface to 
his third volume of Theo-Drama. Although von Balthasar asserts that 
entering into some type of biblical exegesis is important to his theology, he
makes his intent clear:
I am not an exegete; I do not aspire to enter 
into the increasingly subtle discussions conduct­
ed in exegetical circles -- discussions that are 
practically inaccessible to the layman.5
Von Balthasar does not simply dismiss exegesis as unimportant to dogmatic 
theology. Instead, because of dogmatic theology’s dependence on the 
Scripture, von Balthasar feels that exegesis does play a role, which is to 
further explain the biblical material which dogmatic theology discusses.
Von Balthasar goes on to contend that, even though he feels he 
must enter into the arena of biblical exegesis on some level, because it 
serves as one of the main sources of dogmatic theology:
4 These titles are in German because they have not yet been translated 
into English.
5 Balthasar, Hans Urs von. Theo-Drama Volume III: Dramatis 
Personae: Persons in Christ, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992, p. 11.
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It is not so important whether or not my at­
tempts at exegesis are regarded as successful, 
for ultimately this survey proceeds a priori on 
the basis of the total deposit of New Testament 
Christology, which is normative as far as the 
Church is concerned.6
Von Balthasar asserts that it is on this ground that conclusions about Jesus 
are drawn. On the topic of Jesus’ awareness of his mission and identity, 
von Balthasar posits his basic position along with a warning concerning a 
potential danger of overzealous exegesis: He contends that Jesus "must 
have realized the meaning and scope of his task,”7 but he goes on to 
assert that many exegetes assume a very weak and tiny connection between
Jesus’ awareness of his mission and its fulfillment in Post-Easter events.
If this connection breaks, von Balthasar contends, "we would once again 
find ourselves in a schizophrenic dichotomy between the Jesus of history
and the Jesus of faith."8
Although this is just a brief examination of von Balthasar’s general 
view concerning biblical exegesis, we will go into further detail in the 
Scripture section of his theological sources below. Along with Scripture, 
we will look at some other sources of his theology that should serve to 
further clarify not only his scholarly intent, but help us to characterize the
6 Idem.
7 Idem.
8 Ibid, p. 12.
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nature of his work. It is important to point out, however, that the five 
theological sources chosen to establish the basic theological position of von 
Balthasar (and in the next chapter, Brown) are only five possible aspects, 
and do not claim to be exhaustive. The choice of the following five 
theological sources (which will also be used with Brown) does not tell us 
everything about the two authors, but instead gives us a common ground 
on which to see how each of them deals with five common theological 
sources. Choosing only five does imply limitations to the comprehensive­
ness of my examination of both authors, but it gives us a basis of compari­
son, which serves the purpose of this thesis.9
9 It may be argued that the five sources of theological work used here 
are adequate for von Balthasar but not for Brown, since he is an exegete. 
While this criticism is valid inasmuch as I do not use purely exegetical 
sources to discuss Brown’s work. However, my purpose here is to examine 
what I feel are five common theological sources necessary for my 
discussion of the knowledge of Jesus of his mission and identity. And while 
Brown claims to not be a theologian, he nevertheless makes assertions 
concerning Jesus’ knowledge of his mission and identity, which opens his 
work up to an examination of his theological sources. In this way, the fact 
that Brown does not have as much to say concerning some of these sources 
does not make the issues invalid, but instead it gives us insight into what 
aspects of the five sources listed are important (or not important) to him. 
Finally, since the basis of my comparison in the third chapter is each 
author’s conclusions on the knowledge Jesus had of his mission and 
identity, the specifics of how Brown critically examined the biblical 
material in order to arrive at his conclusions are not as important to this 
study as are the theological implications of the sources he uses (or does not 
use) and the conclusions themselves.
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Von Balthasar's Use of Five Common Sources
of Scholarly Work in Theological Fields 
Before moving on to five specific sources of von Balthasar’s
theology, namely Scripture, Patristics, Dogmatics, philosophical presupposi­
tions, and psychological aspects, it seems prudent to first briefly discuss 
some of his background to provide an adequate context in which to place 
the rest of his theology.10 Key to von Balthasar’s approach to
theology are tenets that to some seem anti-progressive:
Rather than "dehellenize" Western thought,
Balthasar demands a basic return to this classi­
cal tradition. He insists upon a thoroughly 
grounded metaphysics, study of patristics, and 
solid exegesis of the literary text.11
The Greco-Roman culture from which much of the Church Fathers’
writings originated represents one of the keys to von Balthasar’s thought. 
According to von Balthasar, this tradition does not yield itself to a 
reinterpretation, but instead calls for a total integration into contemporary
10 NOTE: Although the book from which much of the following 
information comes is about von Balthasar’s Aesthetics, the Louis Roberts’ 
detailed examination of von Balthasar’s background is useful regardless of 
which part of the Trilogy is being examined. It is important to note, 
however, that Roberts’ work is not a comprehensive examination of von 
Balthasar’s Theo-Drama.
11 Roberts, Louis The Theological Aesthetics of Hans Urs Von 
Balthasar, p. 9.
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theology, since it contains a vast amount of truth and insight into Christian 
theology.
Finally, before examining specific sources of von Balthasar’s 
theology, Roberts asserts the importance of von Balthasar’s scholarly
context:
Balthasar’s theological work is set in the con­
text of his studies of German Idealism, classical 
literature, patristics, especially Origen, Gregory 
of Nyssa, and Maximus the Confessor, and the 
field of European literature and drama.12
Of these sources, perhaps his study of Patristics was the most important 
guide for how he pursued his theological queries. Guided by Henri de 
Lubac, von Balthasar began to see "a neglected source for innovative 
theological development,”13 within the writings of the Church Fathers.
Scripture
Since von Balthasar was a dogmatic theologian, Scripture was very 
important to him, but his interpretation of it served more as a starting 
point for his theology, whereas for Brown, as we will see, Scripture is more 
the subject matter itself. This is not to say that von Balthasar does not 
value Scripture. Quite the opposite, this implies that he not only values
12 Ibid, p. 12.
13 Ibid, p. 15.
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Sacred Scripture, but in addition, Church Tradition, Patristics and the
Saints and Mystics of the Church:
The sources of his theological thinking and 
speaking lie not only - as is quite common 
today -- in sacred scripture, modem philosophy, 
modem theological movements, and the investi­
gations of the human sciences, but above all in 
the great tradition of the church...the writings 
of the church fathers and the great saints and 
spiritual masters of the church are for him 
more than a presupposed background of his 
theology.14
According to Medard Kehl, the above emphases of von Balthasar’s 
theology partially caused him to be labeled as a conservative theologian.
The other reasons he received that label were his criticisms of Rahner and
Kung, which appeared to some as anti-progressive. As Kehl points out, 
however, some of the positions von Balthasar assumed on the questions of 
women’s ordination, priestly celibacy, the religious life, etc. seemed 
indicative of the four major currents he had written out against, which, as 
summarized by Kehl are:
1. Christianity becoming too worldly.
2. Theological pluralism which diminishes the 
unity of the whole,
3. A fixation on historical I critical demyth­
ologization of the faith; and
4. The spread of an anti-Roman feeling which 
separates the mystery of the Church from
14 Balthasar, Hans Urs von. The Von Balthasar Reader, Medard Kehl 
SJ., and Werner Loser S.J., eds. NY: Crossroad, 1982, p. 5.
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concrete Papacy.15
In his Theo-Drama. von Balthasar gives more clues for how
Scripture fits into his theology. Before he begins to explicate the topic of
freedom in Jesus Christ, von Balthasar asserts that we must first recall the
importance of Scripture:
it is only from the Bible that we know of that 
interplay between absolute and finite freedom 
that is the precondition for all theological 
drama...furthermore, it is only from the New 
Testament that we learn of that perfect Epito­
me in whom finite freedom indwells absolute 
freedom.16
This signifies a trend in von Balthasar to use Scripture as the definitive
source for his theology. In other places, he asserts that valid christology
must come from the Scripture:
The step from negative or inchoate Christology 
to a fully developed Christology can only be 
taken on the basis of an acceptance of the 
biblical testimony.17
In conclusion, von Balthasar has the highest regard and respect for 
Scripture as the definitive Word of God. The emphasis simply appears to 
be different from that of biblical exegetes since he uses other sources as 
well. This is the significant difference between his dogmatic theology’s use
15 Paraphrased from Ibid., p. 4.
16 Balthasar, Hans Urs von. Theo-Drama Volume Three: Dramatis 
Personae: Persons in Christ, pp. 17-18.
17 Ibid, p. 42.
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of Scripture and an exegetical use of Scripture, which primarily studies 
Scripture as the complete subject matter, with the preponderance of the 
emphasis therein, while von Balthasar emphasizes the Scripture, Patristics, 
church tradition, and the Saints in his theology.
Patristics
The study of Patristics is so integral to the theology of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, it is a difficult task to isolate the specific influences this source 
had on his work. In the present work, much has already been said to 
indicate its influence, and as well, the remainder of this chapter will 
contain the same type of references. Briefly, however, it is necessary to 
explain the explicit influences this source had on von Balthasar’s work.
The attitude von Balthasar brought to the study of Patristics was one 
of admiration and faith: "(he) claimed that study of the Fathers divorced 
from an attitude of belief is meaningless."18 According to Louis Roberts, 
it is this attitude of faith and emphasis on his spiritual theology that caused 
von Balthasar to sometimes mistakenly be labeled as non-scholarly. While 
this criticism may in some ways be valid because of his somewhat 
subjective faith-stance, von Balthasar is candid about his desire to do 
theology from the position of belief and admits that while his works on
18 Roberts, Louis. The Theological Aesthetics of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, p. 32.
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Patristics are scholarly, they are not completely objective. As evidence of 
this fact, Roberts uses words of von Balthasar himself as he described his 
work on Maximus the Confessor: "That which is given here is not a 
historically neutral, complete presentation of the life and work of this
man.”19
Von Balthasar’s study of Patristics was more in the same vein of 
Henri de Lubac and Jean Danielou, which constituted the middle ground 
between "a purely historical study and a dedicated support for 
dogmatics."20 As opposed to those that would classify von Balthasar’s 
Patristic work as non-scholarly, Roberts asserts that "A historical-critical 
study which asks about this contemporary relevance (of the Fathers for 
present-day theology) summarizes Balthasar’s approach."21 Finally, within 
von Balthasar’s emphasis on the inclusion of all things in Christ, Roberts 
sums up von Balthasar’s view of Patristics: "The attempt to discover the 
relation of individual Fathers to Christ is the task of patristic scholarship 
as Balthasar sees it and practices it..."22
19 Ibid., p. 33 (Quote from Kosmische Liturgie, p. 12).
20 Ibid, p. 33 (From the idea of Via Media by Joseph Ratzinger, in "Die 
Bedeutung der Vater fur die gegenwartige Theologie," in Thomas Michels, 
ed., Geschichtlichkeit der Theologie (Salzburg / Munich, Kosel Verlag 1970), 
pp. 63-81.
21 Ibid., p. 34.
22 Ibid., 35.
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Dogmatics
More difficult than discussing the specific influences of Patristics on 
von Balthasar’s work is to attempt to briefly expound on his view of 
dogmatics. This is mainly so because dogmatic theology is the nature of 
his work. His trilogy is a systemization of the whole Christian message, 
bringing together the different strands of tradition with the witness of 
Scripture. In this way, von Balthasar’s dogmatic theology goes beyond to 
more systematic (comprehensive) approach.23 The content of his dogmat­
ic theology will be explicated within the section on his specific christology 
as it fits into his theology. However, we can at present briefly mention a 
couple of aspects concerning how von Balthasar views dogmatic theology 
and to what extent dogmatics are used.
Within von Balthasar’s dogmatic theology, the Bible (and especially 
the New Testament) provide the sources and the authoritative support. In 
addition, he examines how the Church Fathers and early Christian writers
23 Von Balthasar could also be considered a systematic theologian in 
one sense. In the sense of a systematic theology built on neo-scholastic 
principles, von Balthasar would not call himself a systematic theologian. 
However, in the sense that systematic theology is a general, comprehensive 
theological method built around basic precepts and fundamental theologi­
cal principles, it could be used to describe von Balthasar’s work. (Source: 
Fr. Johann G. Roten, S.M., Director, International Marian Research 
Institute).
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relate to the Christ of the New Testament. Von Balthasar then studies
what all of the above means in the context of the present day.
As mentioned above, this process is not a re-examination of the 
early Christian writers. It is more of a total integration of how they 
envisioned Jesus and His teachings. Von Balthasar sees nothing wrong 
with the Greco-Roman setting in which the writings are packaged. He 
contends that theology should take advantage of any and all cultural 
contributions to Christianity, since Christianity supersedes all traditions, 
but is formulated in each according to context. For his dogmatic theology, 
it is first important how the early writers and Patristics saw Jesus in their 
context. When that is fully understood, it can be integrated into the 
contemporary period by the examination of what those truths mean within 
our own context. Thus, by looking at the world around us, we can begin 
to see more clearly what the Jesus of the Scripture and his influence on the 
early writings of Christians mean to us. The specifics of how we are all 
included in Jesus and what that means for salvation history follows in the 
christology section of this chapter.
Philosophical Presuppositions
As will be made clear in the next chapter, Hans Urs von Balthasar’s 
philosophical presuppositions are easier to identify and discuss than are 
Raymond Brown’s. Von Balthasar’s work is steeped in the works of
Callahan - 46
Patristics and other ancient authors. His philosophical presuppositions are 
much more explicit than Brown’s, and are largely dependent on his own 
literary criticism, St. Thomas, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and psychological 
theorists (which we will go into in the next section).
Though it is not germane to our purpose to fully develop all of the
philosophical presuppositions that guide von Balthasar’s theology, there are
a few that need to be explicated to provide the underpinnings upon which
his theology evolves. Though, as Louis Roberts points out, von Balthasar
would claim to belong to no specific philosophical school of thought: "this
Swiss thinker is thoroughly classical, and his metaphysics springs from the
Greeks."24 Roberts goes on to explain von Balthasar’s use of metaphysics:
Balthasar takes metaphysics in its most compre­
hensive sense, not separated from sacred (myth­
ical) knowledge. It includes the transcendental 
aspects of the one, true, good, and beautiful.25
This sense of metaphysics is at the heart of his Trilogy. It also helps to 
explain how the three major parts are related. Roberts gives a concise
summary:
In the aesthetics worldly beauty and divine 
glory share an analogous relation; in the "dra­
matics" limited worldly and unlimited divine 
freedom are discussed. The "theo-logic" consid­
ers the relation between the structure of divine
24 Ibid., p. 28.
25 Idem.
Callahan -- 47
and created truth and asks whether divine truth 
can be expressed within the structures and di­
verse forms of created truth.26
In addition, in the first volume of his Theologie, von Balthasar stresses the 
importance of philosophical underpinnings and states that, "without 
philosophy, no theology."27
Finally, before moving on to a discussion of psychological sources, 
we shall summarize Balthasar’s five reasons which "we may take as 
presuppositions influencing Balthasar’s thought and his approach to the 
Fathers."28 In short, von Balthasar asserts that 1. he allows the "truth 
contained in myth and the study of history of religions to be revealed 
precisely as the wholly other of biblical revelation;"29 2. this view "re- 
spects...those who take seriously the call of Scripture for penance and 
conversion, for immediate hearing of the Word;"30 3. it unites theological 
aesthetics and dramatics in its understanding of the "scriptural view of the 
decisive illumination of the glory of being in that event (the cross) wherein
26 Ibid., p. 29.
27 Idem. (Quoted from Balthasar, Hans Urs von. Theologie, Vol. 1, 
Preface, p. 1. In addition, for an in-depth examination of von Balthasar’s 
philosophical presuppositions, see his Wahrheit in Wehl, 1948.
28 Ibid., p. 30. (These five reasons, which are found in von Balthasar’s 
Herrlicheit, vol. 3, pt. 1, Introduction, are summarized by Roberts on pages 
29-30.
29 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
30 Ibid., p. 30.
Callahan -- 48
every form becomes formless;”31 4. it is Christian and Catholic, promising 
"gospel freedom without at the same time wholly discarding ecclesiastical 
and theological tradition;"32 and 5. it recognizes the "blindness of the 
modem world for the beauty and glory of reality (the reflected glory of 
God)."33
Psychology
As von Balthasar sees it, an examination of modem and classical 
psychologies is important insofar as they help to posit the importance of 
each individual person:
modem psychology is prepared to take the 
individual seriously with all his distinctive 
characteristics and peculiarities, and particular­
ly in the disparity between his "I" and his social 
role.34
The psychology discussed here is not a source of von Balthasar’s theology 
per se. Instead, he works in-depth with this material, but he not really 
influenced by it in the creation of his theological work. The examinations 
listed below are in the anthropological context of "who am I?" type
31 Idem.
32 Idem.
33 Idem.
34 Balthasar, Hans Urs von. Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic 
Theory, Volume I: Prolegomena, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988, p. 
505.
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inquiries into different models of human reality. The three psychological 
theorists whom von Balthasar discusses are Sigmund Freud, C.G. Jung, and 
Alfred Adler. While being different, von Balthasar points out that they are 
all generally connected: "in all cases they see the "I" as resting upon and 
oriented toward a vital substratum that governs and sustains it."35 Thus 
by examining Freud, who posits "I" as the facade of the building, Jung, who 
"ultimately leads the individual...to acceptance,"36 and Adler, who pulls the 
"I" up from its uniqueness to establish it in its rightful place in society, von 
Balthasar traces important psychological thought as it relates to the 
individual person as it is limited and as it exists in relation to its society. 
Von Balthasar’s study of these psychologists’ ideas on the concept of the 
self will be apparent in the third chapter, in which von Balthasar will
discuss the self-consciousness of Jesus.
Freud, according to von Balthasar, is described as one who created 
suffering in his life via his pessimistic view of the meaning and value of 
life, which he contended do not really exist. Von Balthasar goes on to 
discuss Freud’s view that religion and analysis were diametrically opposed 
and that eventually the latter would overcome and destroy the former. In 
this context, Freud sought after the "I" of his patients, which at one time
35 Idem.
36 Idem.
Callahan -- 50
were self-sufficient but at birth entered an unsure world. This "clash with
the reality of the external world, in which the monad breaks out of its
isolation,"37 formed the subject matter of Freud’s psycho-sexual stages.
Freud goes on to explain the "I" as expressed by eros (the general power
of love), full of the libidinal energy of the monad, though "the conscious "I"
is only a fragment of the former monad or totality."38 It is therefore this
relationship between the "I" and the external world that is at the root of
Freud’s psychoanalytic theory and his analysis itself:
Freud described the goal of his analysis as 
"simply that of the higher harmony of the ‘ego’" 
and its task as that of "mediating successfully 
between the demands of the instinctual life (the 
‘id’) and those of the external world, that is, 
between inner and outer reality."39
From Freud’s concept of the limited "I" in relation to the outer 
world, von Balthasar moves to discuss the contributions of C.G. Jung on 
the topic. Even before entering what he terms the "labyrinthine work of 
C.G. Jung,"40 von Balthasar cautions that to keep from getting lost, we 
must only deal with the specific topic at hand, the "problem of "I" and the
37 Ibid, p. 508.
38 Ibid, p. 509.
39 Ibid, p. 513. Quoted from Freud, Sigmund. Briefe 1873-39, 2d ed, 
selected and edited by Ernst and Lucie Freud (Zurich, 1960), p. 410f.
40 Ibid, p. 514.
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"role”.”41 To this end, von Balthasar examines Jung’s concepts of the ”1", 
the persona, the process of individuation and the self, while leaving behind 
Jung’s theories on the conscious-unconscious, the ego-shadow, the animus 
and archetypes.
Jung’s psychology, as von Balthasar points out, "renounces recourse 
to anything lying outside the psyche,"42 while at the same time, "he 
believes that he is bringing to life again the lost treasures of the mythico- 
religious world of symbols (which is indispensable for human civiliza­
tion)."43 This occurs through psychic experience rather than metaphysical 
philosophy and church-related dogma and liturgy, which are all but dead. 
Psychotherapy in Jung’s work, then, is geared toward healing individual’s 
psyche in order to help them to establish themselves as healthy individuals. 
This is done by examining the whole person, and not just certain aspects.
For Jung, the "I" represents "a particular configuration of numerous 
collective elements of the stream of life...(which) emerges like an island in 
the ocean."44 The identity of this "I" "can only be defined by a process,
41 Idem.
42 Ibid., p. 515.
43 Idem.
44 Ibid., p. 517. Quoted from Jung, C.G. Psychology and Religion, New 
York, 1938, p. 100.
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namely, the process of "individuation", the result of which.Js the self."45
In this framework, the idea of the persona "is the mode in which the ego
presents itself in the collective."46 This view is translated into theological
terms by Jung’s assertion that "psychologically speaking, it is contradictory
to speak of an "absolute" God, that is "cut loose" from relationship with the
world."47 Christologically, this implies that, "through God’s becoming
man, Christ has become a historical archetype."48 For Jung, then,
reaching the highest state of completeness is the "I"’s goal:
Christ (is)...the "highest symbol of the self’, and 
"embodiment of the archetype of the self'.
Thus we should not "follow" him externally but, 
as his "mystical members", allow him to live in 
us. Christ must necessarily be history and myth 
(archetype) at one and the same time, so that 
he can be both a unique incarnation and an 
event taking place everywhere.49
In conclusion, von Balthasar points out that Jung stresses the importance 
of striving for a balance between the self and the outer world, never
45 Idem.
46 Ibid., p. 518.
47 Ibid., p. 519.
48 Idem.
49 Ibid., p. 521-522. Excerpts quoted from (respectively), Jung, C.G. 
Psychology and Alchemy, London, 1953, p. 35; Aion: Researches into the 
Phenomenon of the Self, London, 1959, p. 49; and Psychology and 
Alchemy, p. 19.
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allowing the self to become too important, and always realizing that we are 
all part of something that is vastly bigger than ourselves.
The aspect of Alfred Adler’s psychological theory von Balthasar
discusses is "called "individual psychology" ...(which) means that each
individual has his unique psychic constellation and is an "indivisible
individuality"."50 Within this theory, the individuality of each person is not
compromised by using types, which only serve as general guidelines and
could never fully encompass each person’s individuality. Against the
backdrop of two of Adler’s underlying presuppositions:
man’s initial situation, one of tension between 
individuality and community, and his free, goal­
seeking behavior that leads to the building up 
of "character",51
von Balthasar identifies Adler’s basic insight, namely that "man...conceals 
from himself his deepest ambition, the blueprint of his understanding of 
life and corresponding law of action."52
In this manner, von Balthasar describes Adler’s concept that the 
individual is constantly striving for an ideal, as an individual and as a 
member of a larger community of other individuals. These ideals 
(mastering life, relationships, etc.) cannot be grasped, yet they are to be
50 Ibid., p. 523. Quoted from Adler, Alfred. The Practice and Theory 
of Individual Psychology, London, 1940, p. 16.
51 Ibid., p. 525.
52 Ibid., p. 524.
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striven for with zeal. Therefore the person can define their individuality 
as it exists in itself and as it exists as a part of a much larger whole. 
Socialization within the community of individuals is the goal of Adler’s psy­
chology. This is done via the individual’s striving for unattainable ideals, 
which allows for development never to come to a conclusion, and 
consequently allows growth to always continue.
While von Balthasar ultimately rejects much of the psychological 
theories above, it is nonetheless important to see how he treated them, 
which allows us to understand more fully his anthropological backdrop 
upon which he posits the drama of Jesus Christ.
The Christology of Hans Urs von Balthasar:
The Drama of Universal Inclusion in Christ
Because of the christological importance of von Balthasar’s Theo- 
Drama, even though our examination of his christology will include other 
sources, firstly and most importantly we are concerned with the christology 
he develops within the Theodrama, Volume Three.53 It is in this work 
that von Balthasar lays out his view of Jesus in its fullest form: ’’here as
53 For an excellent general view of von Balthasar’s Christology see 
Saward, John. The Mysteries of March: Hans Urs von Balthasar on the 
Incarnation and Easter, Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1990.
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nowhere else one can find the systematic elaboration of his Christology, 
Mariology, ecclesiology, anthropology and trinitarian doctrine."54
After outlining von Balthasar’s christological arena in which all 
theological drama takes place, we will stop short of an in-depth discussion 
of the Jesus’ knowledge of his mission and identity. Instead, we will move 
on to a discussion of the christology of Raymond Brown. Then, in Chapter 
Three we will have the opportunity to examine Brown’s and von Balthasar’s 
views on the knowledge of Jesus side by side.
The christology von Balthasar establishes within his Theo-Drama
Volume III begins with a strong assertion about the basis of the Church’s
normative New Testament Christology:
we draw conclusions about the being and con­
sciousness of Jesus: our view is that he whom 
God commissioned to reconcile the world to 
him must have realized the meaning and scope 
of his task.55
Key to the christological model being presented here is that all humans are 
included in the person of Christ. It is on this basis that von Balthasar 
builds an anthropological doctrine of man that "is only possible...within the 
context of an overall Christology".56 At the root of this assertion exists
54 Balthasar, Hans Urs von. Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic 
Theory: Volume III: The Dramatis Personae: The Person in Christ
[quote from jacket cover].
55 Ibid., p. 11.
56 Ibid., p. 13.
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von Balthasar’s concept that all humanity and extra-human powers and
authorities must define themselves in the context of Christ. Von Balthasar
spends a good deal of time describing the nuanced meanings of what he
means by "in Christ," but to begin the discussion, he gives this insight:
It is clear, however, that what is thus encom­
passed, even if it possesses freedom, is funda­
mentally determined by the encompassing 
reality; and since the latter too, both in its 
divine and its human aspect, is free, a dramatic 
element is already signaled in the relationship 
between them.57
After giving this explanation in theoretical terms, von Balthasar explains 
it more clearly:
The encompassing reality, the concrete figure of 
Jesus of Nazareth, is himself man, whereas the 
human beings he encompasses are in part 
determined by his being and his destiny.58
In other words, simply by existing, Jesus Christ as human and divine 
affects all of creation. For this reason, the "characters in theo-drama can 
only be defined on the basis of the action already under way."59 There­
fore all humanity is in some way "determined" by the person of Jesus Christ 
because it is in and through him that God opens up the acting area in
which the drama of interaction between God and humans can thus ensue.
57 Idem.
58 Idem.
59 Idem.
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Von Balthasar’s subtitle of "Persons In Christ" therefore is meant to
designate that Jesus is the encompassing framework within which all 
humans act: "(it) is both the ground of their being...and also that which 
facilitates their acting thus or acting differently."60
With any theological discussion including the word "determined," 
there must be some type of qualification to alleviate the initial knee-jerk 
negative reaction. The next section, Freedom in Christ, will discuss in 
depth humanity’s freedom in Christ, but for now it is important to note von 
Balthasar’s distinction between human freedom (created) and divine 
freedom (absolute). In this christological framework, the first serious 
question to arise is that of compromised human freedom, if in fact, we are 
all thusly "determined." The key to the problem for von Balthasar 
manifests itself in a comparison of God’s freedom and humanity’s freedom. 
The interaction of these two types of freedom illustrates that even though 
God’s perspective on the entire play (in the final judgment) will be that it 
is good, this perspective "by no means compels the free actor to act in one 
way and not in another."61 In other words, specific aspects of history did 
not have to occur the way in which they did for the entire play of action to
60 Ibid., p. 14.
61 Idem.
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eventually work out in a way that is pleasing to God. It is this freedom, 
however, that distinguishes the characters from the actions themselves.
To more fully understand the mode in which all humanity is 
included in Christ, we must look at von Balthasar’s development of Jesus 
as the Alpha and the Omega, the Second Principle which informs and 
makes possible the first. For von Balthasar, this originates in St. Paul, who 
asserts that Adam is the first man while Jesus is the second man (Cf I Cor 
15:45 and Gal 4:4). This assertion is based on the idea that "God’s plan 
for the world is to unite all cosmic reality, in heaven and on earth, in 
Christ, who is the Head (Eph l:10)."62 Within this plan, Jesus is both 
determined by the drama from below, since he is a human bom into a 
human environment, and not determined by the drama since he alone is 
from above and existed before the drama began.
All creation was formed and brought into existence with Jesus in 
mind. In more explicit terms, von Balthasar describes how Jesus is the 
Alpha and the Omega:
Thus an initially puzzling reciprocal causality 
seems to operate in his concrete person: he is 
caused by the world and its history; and the 
world and its history are caused by him. Under 
the first aspect, he is the world’s Omega; under 
the second, its Alpha. Thus, between these two
62 Ibid., p. 15.
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ends, which are identical in his person, the 
whole drama of the world is acted out.63
Von Balthasar uses Jesus’ dual concept of time to further illustrate
the reciprocal causality at work within his person. On the one hand, as far
as Jesus knew his identity as the only Son of God, his particular time is
"measured by his acceptance of the Father’s will concerning his particular,
all-embracing mission."64 On the other hand, however, as far as Jesus
authentically became man, he became subject to time: "not only to general
human and historical time but also to that modality of time that is marked
by universal sin."65 This distinction raises the question which points to the
most difficult aspect of the divine-human identity of Jesus Christ: how
could Jesus enter the modality of time marked by sin and still obey the will
of God the Father?
To address this question, von Balthasar describes the central 
christological paradox of the mission of the divine-human person of Jesus
Christ:
to combine the freedom of the "descent" with 
the unfreedom of the existence that results 
from it; the intuitive knowledge of the Father 
with the veiled nature of an exemplary "faith"’ 
the unity of the divine and the human will in 
himself with the - "economically" necessary -
63 Idem.
64 Idem.
65 Idem.
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clash between perfect obedience and instinctive 
horror in the face of the task of bearing sin.
The dramatic essence and constitution that 
make Christ both Alpha and Omega infuse 
drama into every aspect of his being, his action 
and his conduct.66
Further, in discussing the dramatic aspect of the person of Jesus, von 
Balthasar asserts that the destiny of all individuals is intimately tied to the 
destiny of Jesus Christ, who constitutes the drama in which all humanity 
finds itself as players:
Every human being is unique in his endow­
ments, but he only becomes the unique person 
he is through the free development of these 
endowments in the chance medium of the world 
that surrounds him.67
For von Balthasar, this medium of the world that constitutes our environ­
ment is the freedom we have which is dependent upon Jesus’ ultimate 
exercise of his freedom, which forms the basis in which our freedom takes 
root.68 Who and what we as human beings become, then, is in some ways 
dependent upon the divine context of the drama which Jesus makes 
possible.
66 Ibid., p. 16.
67 Idem.
68 This freedom in Christ is discussed in the following section, Freedom 
in Christ.
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To answer the question concerning how this person Jesus can make
such a difference for the world and the cosmos, von Balthasar goes on to
describe the ultimate singularity of Jesus’ destiny:
For in God’s "idea’’, he is something no other 
man can be, God’s ultimate (end-giiltig, "finally 
valid") Yes to the world; he is the Word in 
whom God resolved to reveal himself, in an 
unsurpassable manner, to the world.69
This leads to a paradox within the person of Jesus Christ, namely that
there are two senses of who Jesus was as the Word of God: one in which
he is the man, Jesus of Nazareth, a mortal man who makes the Word of
God known, and the other sense in which Jesus is the ultimate Word of 
God as the definitive Yes to relationship with the world and all of the
cosmos.
Within this dramatic action, von Balthasar stresses the importance 
of Jesus’ death and the fact that, as a man, Jesus had "no power over his 
destiny beyond death."70 This power only belongs to God, who utters the 
final Word on the matter. Hinting to what Jesus knew of himself and his 
mission on earth (and also what his powers and limitations were), von 
Balthasar asserts the importance of his death and resurrection in communi­
cating the Word of God:
69 Idem.
70 Idem.
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Now, insofar as the raising of Jesus from the 
dead to eternal, divine life is God’s last word 
on the meaning of life and death, this word 
extends beyond all the dimensions of his world­
ly existence; consequently, what Jesus was able 
to say and do as an earthly and mortal being 
was not the entirety of the Word of God - 
which at the same time he knew and pro­
claimed himself to be.71
This illustrates the paradox of Jesus as the Word of God and his words, 
utterances, etc., of which the latter are only one aspect of his totality as 
God’s Word, but this Word is only total since it came from finite, human 
action. Having briefly posited Jesus’ position within the drama, von 
Balthasar goes on to discuss what is to some an unsurmountable problem: 
how we as human beings can truly be free if in fact we are determined by 
the person of Jesus Christ. We must address this issue before moving to 
a discussion of Raymond E. Brown’s christology in the next Chapter.
Freedom in Christ
Von Balthasar attempts to reconcile the seeming disparity of the 
idea that human beings are most free when bound to the singular destiny 
of Jesus Christ. The enigma centers on the paradox of freedom which 
guarantees the possibility of any and every action and the restriction that 
all that happens takes place in Jesus Christ, thus in some ways is deter-
71 Ibid., p. 17.
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mined by his existence. For von Balthasar, the answer to this enigma is 
found in being...
able to show that this "in Christ Jesus" gives us, 
a priori, the greatest opportunity and the widest 
possible framework for the interplay of both 
forms of freedom (absolute and created).72
As a prerequisite to this discussion, von Balthasar points out that the 
assertion must first be made that only in the Bible can we see this interplay 
of theological drama and freedoms at work. Further, it is only in the New 
Testament that "we learn of that perfect Epitome in whom finite freedom 
indwells absolute freedom."73 Hence, as mentioned in the previous 
section, Scripture is the starting point and the source for von Balthasar’s 
concept of freedom in Christ through the drama he began and thusly deter­
mines.
There are two questions von Balthasar posits to address the issue of 
ultimate freedom in Christ. The first question is whether the fact that the
ultimate and concrete form of God’s divine Will finds its manifestation in
the Person of Jesus Christ takes away all human freedom and at the same 
time compromises God’s infinity. Secondly, von Balthasar asks himself if 
it is fair that every person’s use of their freedom is the basis for God’s 
judgment pertaining to how they knowingly or unknowingly relate to the
72 Idem.
73 Ibid., p. 18.
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person of Jesus Christ. Ultimately the question at hand is this: in 
choosing Jesus Christ to be the definitive Word through which God 
interacts with human beings, did God’s initiative to set up the drama in 
such a way simply squelch humanity’s true use of their freedom? In other 
words, can human freedom be bound to the person of Jesus Christ and still
be called "freedom"?
This questioning process of von Balthasar’s is common to theology’s 
dealing with the idea of predestination. Is there any use in humans’ acting 
at all if in fact we are really so many puppets on so many strings? For the 
subject at hand, it is important to examine how von Balthasar answers this 
difficult problem. He examines the issue from three perspectives: God’s, 
humanity’s, and Christ’s.
The issue of freedom from God’s perspective centers on the 
following fact: "God’s free will, with which he eternally affirms himself, can 
only be infinite in itself."74 Since humanity is not infinite while the divine 
free will is infinite, it must seem finite to finite creatures, even though its 
appearing finite is a matter of the creatures’ perception and not constitu­
tive of the reality of God itself. Thus, von Balthasar goes on, what are 
seen by humans as commandments are actually finite presentations of the 
infinite divine will as God interacts with humanity. Therefore, the divine
74 Idem.
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will must take on a finite manifestation for God’s creatures to understand
it in an intelligible way. Finally, von Balthasar concludes that God’s 
infinite being imparts to the creation some infinite quality, allowing the 
creatures to strive after something (not fully understandable) beyond their 
present existence. "As such...it is the offer of grace — the grace of selfhood 
in God ~ and, at the same time it creates genuine space for the crea­
ture."75
From humanity’s point of view, von Balthasar points out that in our 
finite being, we cannot know our freedom is finite, for it seems infinite to 
us. He discusses human death as the example which illustrates most fully 
from the human point of view how it is within God’s freedom that 
humanity’s freedom finds its fullest expression. Contending that death is 
an integral part of what it is to be human, and also what connects humanity 
with the rest of the universe, von Balthasar stresses the importance of body
and soul:
To remove man from the cosmos and reduce 
him to a mere immortal soul, so that death only 
affects his body, is a solution that, while it 
evinces an awareness of man’s transcendence, 
actually tears his being apart. Only the offer 
addressed to him by God, that is, to attain 
eternal life as a full human being within the 
sphere of God’s freedom, can open up to his 
empty transcendence a sphere in which he can 
develop positive hopes of fulfillment; he can
75 Ibid., p. 19.
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direct his divergent possibilities to converge 
toward this sphere.76
Hence, von Balthasar points out in this example concerning human death, 
that freedom from the human point of view does find its fullest manifesta­
tion within God’s freedom.
The main objection von Balthasar speaks to in discussing freedom
from Christ’s point of view is one which holds that since God chose Jesus
and Jesus died on the Cross, there is not anything left in the acting arena
because the drama has been acted out already (between God and Jesus,
with humanity watching). In response, von Balthasar stresses that the
person of Jesus Christ does not, in fact, narrow the acting area between
God and humanity, but instead expands it:
he (Jesus) simultaneously opens up the greatest 
possible intimacy and the greatest possible dis­
tance (in his dereliction on the Cross) between 
God and man; thus he does not decide the 
course of the play in advance but gives man (all 
people) an otherwise unheard-of freedom to 
decide for or against the God who has so 
committed himself.77
Hence Christ, through establishing the full availability of the choice for or 
against God gave humanity more freedom than ever before. While von 
Balthasar holds that in this process, Christ does not specifically manipulate
76 Ibid., p. 20.
77 Ibid., p. 21.
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the three fundamental tensions of individual/community, body/spirit, and
female/male, there is an extent to which we are determined by Jesus:
Christ, through his existence, does not leave 
everything in indifference - an indifference 
dangerously heightened by him: he directs 
world history, which, left to itself is stagnant, 
and causes it to flow toward fulfillment.78
This fulfillment, "toward the hoped-for and divinely willed conclusion,"79 
is carried out through the Church, the saints, the sacraments and the Bible.
Obedience to the Triune God
Finally, for von Balthasar, in a discussion of human freedom and 
inclusion in Christ, it is important to address the way in which Christ lived 
to help point the way. Reverting to the classical view of the Trinity, von 
Balthasar stresses that Jesus did not envision himself as the center, but 
instead constantly stressed himself as the one sent from God the Father. 
As well, Jesus stressed the coming of the Holy Spirit upon the people in 
order that the works he (Christ) performed on earth could be understood 
more fully and that greater works would be accomplished through the Holy 
Spirit: "he must leave the stage that he has widened in order that, within 
the work he has accomplished, the "greater works" (Jn 14:12) may be 
done."80
78 Ibid., p. 21.
79 Idem.
80 Idem.
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In the person of Jesus Christ, then, God shows humanity what can
be understood of the Trinity (Godhead) in human (finite) terms, and also
the proper attitude of humanity: "namely, the attitude of service that goes
to the lengths of self-forgetfulness so that God’s "talents" may bear fruit in
the world."81 In Jesus, then, not only is the universal drama of the
relationship between God and humanity being widened and at the same
time directed (by the existence of the person of Christ), but also, in the
concrete person of Christ, there is the partial revelation of who and what
God is in relationship to humanity and a practical guide with which
humanity can more fully understand the manner of self-forgetfulness which
is the proper attitude to manifest before God. In summing up his basic
christological principles82, especially concerning the inclusion of all things
in Christ while maintaining the highest possible manifestation of human
freedom, von Balthasar writes:
In christological terms, the creature’s obedient 
distance from his Creator and Master becomes 
transparent, revealing that "distance" within the 
Godhead, in the Spirit, between the Son and 
the Father. It is this profound, self-renouncing 
service that ushers the activity of absolute
81 Ibid., p. 22.
82 The basic christological principles of von Balthasar that are set forth 
within this paper are understandably not exhaustive. The tremendous 
volume and depth of his christological work is so overwhelming, it is only 
possible to give a brief outline here, since an exhaustive appraisal of his 
christology itself could be (and has been) the topic of many books.
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freedom into the creaturely world... The fact 
that the drama is grounded in Christ is no 
hindrance to it: on the contrary, from every 
angle, it is what makes it possible.83
Conclusion
Before moving on to the next chapter, we should first conclude with a few 
of von Balthasar’s assertions, which seem to sum up his basic christology:
1. In the face of attempts to highlight one 
aspect or another of Jesus’ life at the expense 
of other aspects, von Balthasar holds that Jesus 
is much bigger than any human attempt to 
channel him into a source to suit their own 
needs.
2. Jesus’ sense of mission and claim of who he 
was were radical, universal and despite the 
efforts of some individuals, have found no peer.
3. Paul’s view supports this radical christology, 
of which von Balthasar posits that "there can be 
no question of Jesus’ words regarding himself in 
the Gospels being dependent on Paul."84
4. Jesus’ words and authoritative actions, which 
will outlive heaven and earth, are proof of the 
unique way in which he must have regarded 
himself for him to have such an impact on the 
world.
83 Theo-Drama, Vol. Ill, p. 22.
84 Ibid, p. 27.
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5. What Jesus said and did was so revolution­
ary, it was the cause behind his death on the 
Cross, which in turn was the primary manifesta­
tion of how he drew all things unto himself.
6. Jesus was the Word of God, and "Every 
man’s final destiny will be determined by his 
attitude to Jesus (Mk 8:38).M&5
7. While Jesus’ "in person" earthly influence 
was stopped at the Cross, God, in the resurrec­
tion, transformed "this ruin into the great, 
perfect success of his mission."85 6
8. Jesus’ influence today cannot be manifested 
in a direct response to his call (as with the 
disciples), or in actual discipleship with him 
(historically). Instead, Jesus’ influence today is 
manifest through his example of "allowing 
something to happen, in letting himself be 
plundered and shared out in the Passion and 
Eucharist."87 It is this example, plus his call to 
us to allow ourselves to be pruned to bear more 
fruit (which is transethical and thus accessible 
to us today), in which the contemporary force 
of Jesus’ continuing influence can be felt.
9. Since this influence affects individuals at the 
personal, spiritual level, the statistical Church 
and its history cannot show adequately Jesus’ 
influence on the world; thus the distinction 
between salvation history and world history.
85 Idem.
86 Ibid., p. 28.
87 Ibid., p. 29.
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10. Since Jesus Christ is the Alpha and the 
Omega, he (as the second principle) embraces 
and includes the first principle of Adam, since 
the first principle was conceived with its fulfill­
ment only possible in Christ, who is the ground 
of all being.
11. Jesus Christ established the acting area in 
which God and humanity could interact, for "it 
is only when "the Word becomes flesh" that a 
concrete area comes into being for the interac­
tion of God and man."88
12. The initiative for the drama comes from 
God, "the involvement of God has always been 
there, right from the start, in Jesus Christ; this 
means that, on the theodramatic stage, man has 
also been shown the area in which his freedom 
can lead to his self-fulfillment in God."89
13. The resurrection for von Balthasar, "reveals 
who Jesus Christ in reality was, that he had a 
just claim to appear in the name and with the 
authority of his divine Father and that he was 
empowered to take the world’s sin upon himself 
and expiate it."90
14. As far as human responsibility to respond to 
Jesus goes, "In the acting area Christ opens up 
as the fruit of his Resurrection, each individual 
is given a personal commission; he is entrusted 
both with something unique to do and with the 
freedom to do it."91
88 Ibid, p. 41.
89 Ibid, p. 43.
90 Ibid, p. 51.
91 Idem
Callahan - 72
15. This commission does not imply that hu­
mans are puppets following a line already 
traced for them, "but it does mean that absolute 
freedom has ’’prepared” a personal path for 
each one of us to follow freely, a path along 
which our freedom can realize itself."92
16. Finally, the central theme of the theo-dra- 
ma, as von Balthasar sees it, is "in implement­
ing this (above) plan, God takes the first step in 
surpassing love and utterly free grace, by en­
abling man to act authentically in Christ’s 
acting area and so respond to God’s prior act-
92 Ibid., p. 52.
93 Idem.
CHAPTER 2
THE CHRISTOLOGY OF RAYMOND E. BROWN
Bom in New York City on May 22, 1928,1 Raymond E. Brown 
attended St. Charles College in Catonsville, Maryland from 1945 to 1946. 
He received his BA (1948) and his MA (1949 in Philosophy) from the 
Catholic University of America. From 1949 to 1950, Brown attended the 
Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome, earning his S.T.B.. Afterwards, 
he received his S.T.L. (1953) and his S.T.D. (1955) from St. Mary’s 
Seminary in Baltimore. Next, Brown earned his Ph.D. in Semitic Languag­
es from Johns Hopkins University. Finally, he received his S.S.L. in 1963
from the Pontifical Biblical Institute in Rome.
Raymond E. Brown entered into the Society of St. Sulpice (S.S) and 
was ordained into the priesthood on May 23,1953. He has done work with 
the Fellowship of American Scholars of Oriental Research in Jerusalem 
and with the Dead Sea Scrolls. From 1959 to 1971, Brown was a professor 
of Sacred Scripture at St. Mary’s Seminary in Baltimore. Then in 1971,
1 Biographical Information taken from the American Catholic Who’s 
Who, edited by Elder Benedict, Washington, D.C.: NC News Service, 
1980-1981.
73
Callahan -- 74
Brown went to Union Theological Seminary as the Auburn Professor of 
Biblical Studies. He currently holds the post of the Auburn Distinguished 
Professor Emeritus in Biblical Studies at Union Theological Seminary.
Much of Brown’s work has been ecumenical. He was the first
Catholic to address the Faith and Order Conference of the World Council
of Churches in Montreal, 1963. He was also the only American Catholic 
member of the joint Roman Catholic I World Council of Churches 
Committee on Apostolicity and Catholicity in 1967-1968. He was a 
member of the National Committee for Theological Discussions between
the Roman Catholic Church and the Lutheran Churches of the U.S. from
1965 to 1974. In addition, he was also a consulter to the Vatican 
Secretariat for Christian Unity from 1963 to 1973. Finally, he was the only 
American member of the Roman Pontifical Biblical Commission, 1972-
1978.
Brown has been a guest lecturer at many U.S. and foreign colleges 
and universities. A prolific author, he won the National Catholic Book 
Award and the Christopher Award (for Volume Two of his Gospel 
According to John, of the Anchor Bible Series, 1970), and also the 
National Catholic Book Award on two other occasions (for his Jerome 
Biblical Commentary (1968) and The Virginal Conception and Bodily 
Resurrection (1973) ). Brown was a member of the editorial boards of the 
"Catholic Biblical Quarterly," the "Journal of Biblical Literature," and "New
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Testament Studies." He also served as the Vice-President of the Catholic 
Biblical Association (1962-1963), and later its President (1971-1972). In 
addition to being a member of the American Theological Society, Brown 
was the President of the Society of Biblical Literature from 1967 to 1977. 
He was then the President of the Society of New Testament Studies from
1986 to 1987.
Brown has also been distinguished with several prestigious awards, 
including the Cardinal Spellman Award from the Catholic Theological 
Society of America in 1971. Among his 23 honorary doctorates are ones
from:
-Edinburgh,
-Uppsala,
-DePaul,
-The Louvain, 
-Boston College 
-Glasgow,
Scotland
Sweden
Chicago
Belgium
Boston
Scotland
Finally, making the crossover from theological and religious 
recognition, Brown has also made an impression on the world at large as 
"probably the premier Catholic Scripture Scholar in the U.S." --Time 
Magazine.
The vast amount of learning and scholarly experiences that have 
filled Brown’s life illustrate vividly his ability and authority to speak 
critically about biblical exegetical matters, which for many years had been
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all but closed to Catholic authors due to the condemnation of modernism
in 1907.2
A brief examination of Brown’s works illustrates his scholarly intent 
and how it is manifested. His studies are almost exclusively concerned with 
the New Testament, and historical studies of the context of NT Palestine. 
Though the most influential sphere of Brown’s work has come in the areas 
of the commentaries on the Gospel of John and the infancy narratives, 
some of his works deal with the Blessed Mother, some with specific Gos­
pels, some others with specific passages of Scripture. In addition, there are 
a substantial number of books and articles written about Jesus Christ, His
office, His life and times, His Passion, Death and Resurrection, and His 
awareness of his own Identity and Mission. In this respect, it is apparent 
that he pursues a Gospel Christology based on his exegesis of the 
Scriptures.
Occasionally in his writing, Brown will make his theological and 
scholarly purpose clear. Critical biblical exegesis is very important to 
Brown, and he has made it his life’s work. However, he sees it as part of 
the larger work of theology as a whole, and not simply an isolated field of 
study. When discussing the issue of the omniscience of Jesus, Brown
2 For an excellent historical work which discusses the issue of 
Modernism, see Nichols, Aidan, O.P. From Newman to Congar: The Idea 
of Doctrinal Development from the Victorians to the Second Vatican
Council, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990.
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asserts that the solution cannot be found solely in the field of Scripture,
but that modem biblical exegesis will help to inform the discussion:
Hopefully, this biblical evidence will not only 
serve as the raw material from which to formu­
late a solution but will also color and shape the 
solution.3
Later in that same work we uncover Brown’s understanding of the 
role biblical exegesis plays in modem theology. Once again on the topic 
of Jesus’ knowledge, Brown contends that although dogmatic theologians 
were the major proponents in the modem discussion of the knowledge of 
Jesus, ’’Nevertheless, the discussion is going on, and for the exegete not to 
participate would be a neglect of duty."4 Brown goes further to assert the 
reason it is necessary for biblical exegetes to carry on with their methods 
of critical scholarship:
the biblical evidence does not decide the theo­
logical problem or conclusively support one 
theory over another. Yet the theologians who 
are trying bravely to establish the possibility of 
new answers must have available to them 
competent critical surveys of the New Testa­
ment evidence in order to see how their theo­
ries can be best reconciled with the evidence.5
3 Brown, Raymond E. Jesus, God and Man, NY: Macmillan, 1967, 
p. xiii.
4 Ibid, p. 39.
5 Ibid, p, 42.
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Having posited Brown’s scholarly intent as seen in his writings, now we will 
move on to an examination of how he uses the five common sources of
scholarly theological work we have established in order to better under­
stand the characterization of his work. Once again we should note that the 
positing of these five sources is not supposed to be comprehensive or 
suggest that they are the only possible ones, but instead to give us a 
common understanding of how von Balthasar and Brown treat some of the 
major sources of Christian theology (in the broad sense).
Brown’s Use of Five Common Sources of Scholarly Work
in Theological Fields
Just as with the description of von Balthasar’s sources, the five areas 
which will be discussed are Scripture, Patristics, Dogmatics, philosophical 
presuppositions, and psychological aspects. By examining to what extent 
and for what purpose Brown uses these five sources in his scholarly work, 
we will be able to better characterize his theology.
Scripture
This source of Brown’s work is the most obvious and most impor­
tant. His idea of what Scripture is and how it is to be used becomes 
evident when we look at the fact that he is primarily a biblical exegete, 
studying the New Testament under the scholarly lens of historical criticism. 
For Brown, then, Scripture represents the subject matter from which
Callahan -- 79
dogmatic theology eventually flows. It presents truths that, throughout 
time, are translated and re-translated according to each historical period’s 
conceptual framework. Rather than using dogmatic statements and then 
reading them back into the New Testament, Brown begins with the text 
itself, and through the application of historical and literary critical 
methods, he attempts to determine who said what and to whom. For 
Brown, as a biblical exegete, the guiding questions to use when examining 
Scripture are: to whom the specific passages were written, by whom they 
were written, under what historical context they were written, and for what 
purpose they were written. For it is only when we understand these 
different aspects of the context of Scripture that we can understand the 
meaning it had for the first and second century audiences. Likewise,
Brown asserts that not until we understand what it meant for them will we
understand what it means for us today. In this way, Brown tries to isolate 
the truths in Scripture as they exist apart from the contexts in which they 
arose. Thus with greater accuracy and understanding we can apply those
timeless truths to our own situations and our own lives.
Brown also contends that for us in the present age to fully under­
stand the biblical texts, we must understand first the particular problematic 
and context of the individuals for whom the Scripture was written. In that 
vein, the NT authors’ purposes in writing for their audiences come into 
play, since to understand what the passages mean to us today, we must first
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understand what it meant for the early Christians in their context. When 
Brown comes to a text, therefore, he keeps in mind that "the same formula 
uttered at different times may have different meanings," and also that he 
must "take into account the limited perspective of the men who formulated 
them (as well as our own limited perspective in investigating the prob­
lem)."6 This stance of Brown’s is in opposition to what he calls the 
fundamentalist perspective, which believes nothing can be added to the 
dogma which was given in Apostolic times, and that all "development of 
doctrine consists merely in drawing forth from the deposit of faith."7 
According to Brown, however, this view does not take into account 
historical context, and is thus not as thorough. In fact, at the heart of the 
way in which Brown views the purpose and meaning of Scripture, he has 
this to say:
a new formulation (of a pre-stated truth) means 
at least a new precision that was not there 
before; and to that extent one’s thought is 
different from, even if in continuity with, the 
thought of the past.8
Finally, let us look at a good piece of advice he gives for the reading 
of the Gospels. This advice, which he gives in the context of his discussion 
of the difficulty in discerning the knowledge of Jesus, states that "The
6 Ibid, p. xi.
7 Idem.
8 Ibid, p. xii.
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Gospels were written to tell us what w should know about Jesus, not what 
he knew of himself."9
Patristics
Here, unlike von Balthasar, this source in Brown’s work is not nearly 
as explicit. Part of the reason for this is the nature of his work. While von 
Balthasar is working directly from Scripture, Tradition, Patristics and 
Church documents, Brown is working mainly from Scripture as seen 
through the different traditions within the New Testament. Therefore,
Brown does not base his work on Patristics to the same extent as von
Balthasar. It is important to note, however, that Brown does not discredit
the Fathers for their particular views, even if he does not agree with some
of them. Instead, he respectfully reminds himself and his readers to
examine the particular time and contextual situation in which the early
Church Fathers lived in order to understand their theological assertions:
Therefore, to understand what was being af­
firmed at any past era it is not enough simply to 
recite the formulas of that era; one must know 
what those formulas meant to the men who 
uttered them, realizing that the same formula 
uttered at different times may have different 
meanings.10
9 Brown, Raymond E. Responses to 101 Questions on the Bible, NY: 
Paulist Press, 1990, p. 100.
10 Brown, Raymond E. Jesus, God and Man, p. xi.
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As was mentioned above in the "Scripture" section, he maintains that all 
critical biblical exegesis must take into account the particular situation and 
the limited perspective of the authors being read as well as our limited 
ability to read and understand the problem ourselves.
Brown does not dismiss Patristics, but he does not possess the sense
of awe many have at the work of the Church Fathers. Instead, he assumes
the Fathers had the most of the same basic content of the writings that we
have today, and interpreted them to the best of their abilities, which were
no greater or lesser than the abilities of careful exegetes today. This
middle view allows Brown to honor Patristics with the proper respect, while
understanding that they had no claim to the truth that was inherently
greater than ours today, which is to be found in Scripture:
To judge how much truth those formulas (of the 
Fathers) contain one must take into account the 
limited perspective of the men who formulated 
them (as well as our own limited perspective in 
investigating the problem.11
Dogmatics
From what we have stated thus far, it is obvious that Brown sees 
himself, not as a dogmatic theologian, but instead as one who prepares 
solid biblical understanding upon which dogmatic theologians can build. 
On the specific topic of the knowledge of Jesus, Brown contends that,
11 Idem.
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"dogmatic theologians, not exegetes, had led the way in the modern 
discussion of Jesus’ human knowledge."12 One reason for this is because 
while dogmatic theology has been encouraged for most of Catholic history, 
critical biblical exegesis has only been allowed and "encouraged" by the 
Holy See for a relatively short period of time.13 What this means in real 
terms is that Brown sees the importance of dogmatic theology, and makes 
a distinction between exegesis and theology, since his work is not 
technically even called "theology." In addition, Brown asserts the 
importance of biblical exegesis as the tool with which dogmatic theology 
can work to create biblically sound theological premises.
In conclusion, Brown does not discredit dogmatic theology, nor does 
he claim biblical exegesis’ superiority. Instead, what Brown does assert is 
that his object of study is not dogmatics. More importantly, he goes on to 
hold that dogmatic theology and biblical exegesis are interrelated in such
12 Ibid., p. 39.
13 Per our subject at hand, the knowledge of Jesus, Brown sums up the 
brevity of the history of Catholic Biblical exegesis: "Exegetical studies by 
Catholics of the problem of Jesus’ knowledge have been relatively few; yet 
it is just such study that would be of most help to the (dogmatic) theolo­
gians. One reason for the paucity of these studies is that truly critical New 
Testament exegesis has, with some important exceptions, been a reality in 
Catholic circles only in the past few years; and only critical exegesis would 
see the limitations attributed to Jesus in the earliest layers of New 
Testament tradition. Another reason, however, has been the repercussions 
that such studies might bring upon their writers, for they leave the writers 
open to the charge of denying the divinity of Jesus." Jesus, God and Man, 
p. 41. See footnote # 2.
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a way as to make each necessary for the other’s existence and validity. On 
the one hand, sound biblical exegesis makes the relationship between 
dogmatic theology and Scripture by substantiating dogmatic theology’s 
claims with biblical evidence. On the other hand, without dogmatic 
theology to build upon its foundation, biblical exegesis would be a form of 
empty criticism on ancient literature.
Philosophical Presuppositions
It is a more difficult task to isolate and discuss the philosophical 
presuppositions of Raymond Brown than it was for von Balthasar. This is 
so mainly because, since von Balthasar is a dogmatic theologian, his work, 
at least in part, is based on the specific philosophical underpinnings of the 
Church Fathers, Aristotle and others. There are, however, a few 
philosophical presuppositions that can be gleaned from a close reading of 
Brown’s work. His pledge to literary and historical criticism is his most 
clear philosophical presupposition. This leads to his understanding of 
Scripture, which is probably better designated as a theological presupposi­
tion.
For Brown, the Sacred Scripture in general, and the New Testament 
in particular, contain the truths of God and information written for us to 
understand God’s relationship with the world. The way Brown understands 
the Bible is his strongest philosophical (theological) presupposition, or that
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upon which his work is based. For Brown, the Bible is not to be under­
stood as a book of literally true stories, but instead as a book containing 
God’s truths that can come to us on many different levels. This under­
standing of the Bible can be traced back to Blondel, Loisy and Tyrrell 
among others, who strove to study the biblical literature in a scientifically 
responsible way.14
Due to the nature of Brown’s work, he does not explicitly hold to
any specific philosophical presuppositions, other than those which assert
that the study of history is a positive thing, critical scholarly biblical
exegesis is not harmful to the Word of God (but instead, helpful for
understanding it), and that scientific methods of study can and must be
used in theological fields. In fact, when speaking of the knowledge Jesus
had of himself, Brown asserts the need for his work to be objective biblical
exegesis which is not tied to a specific philosophical viewpoint:
Without attaching myself to the theology of any 
one author and without getting involved in the 
more abstract expressions of systematic theol­
ogy, I think it is fair to say: By being who he 
was, Jesus knew who he was.15
14 See footnote # 2 for more information concerning the Modernist 
movement, of which Brown would be a descendent because of its emphasis 
on the critical study of Scripture.
15 Brown, Raymond E. Responses to 101 Questions on the Bible, p.
101.
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Thus beyond the philosophical presuppositions concerning his views on 
scholarly exegesis (and therefore Scripture itself), Brown consciously tries 
to avoid other philosophical and theological presuppositions for fear they 
would contain pre-made interpretations of the biblical material which he
uses as the basis for his work.
Psychology
While the study of psychological theorists is very important and very 
evident in the work of von Balthasar, Raymond Brown’s scholarly work 
does not seem to be explicitly informed by any specific school of psycholo­
gy or theorist. Nor does he seem to even deal with psychology in any of the 
works which were examined in my research.16 Raymond Brown’s work, 
however, is of a different type; one which does not necessarily weigh 
current psychological sources, unless to speak generally about the 
psychology of the times in which the biblical material was written. In this 
area alone, Brown examines the basic psychology of different cultures of
the different communities of the writers of the New Testament. Since the
focus of his work is primarily on analyses of the Scripture and not on 
dogmatic formulations, if Brown does utilize the theories of psychology, it 
is not evident or explicit in the works used for this study.
16 Which is not to say that Brown has never written about psychological 
theories. I just did not come across any such information in my limited 
research.
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The Christology of Raymond Brown: An
Examination of his Gospel Christology Classification System
Having briefly discussed some of Brown’s sources for his scholarly 
work, the next task is to focus on his christological stance. Toward that 
end, we will examine some questions that will yield an overall view of 
Brown’s christology. It should be noted here that Brown’s christology is 
not easy to discern since he does not work in a dogmatic theological 
manner. For this reason, this section will not be as explicit as the parallel 
chapter on von Balthasar, but will nevertheless attempt to explain to some 
extent what Brown’s basic christological views are.17
A foundational key for understanding Raymond Brown’s christology 
is found in a published version of an address given to the National 
Convention of the College Theology Society on June 1, 1974.18 In his 
discussion of modern scholarship on Gospel Christology, Brown describes 
the gamut of different theological viewpoints concerning the person of
17 We will go into more of an in-depth examination of Brown’s 
christological views in the third chapter’s section dealing with his assertions 
concerning the knowledge Jesus had of his mission and identity. This 
section was intended to briefly discuss some of the basics of his christolo­
gical thought as seen in his Gospel Christology Classification System. 
Because this system was developed by Brown, it shows us what he thinks 
of the different possible views concerning Jesus Christ, therefore providing 
with the basics we needed for this chapter.
18 Brown, Raymond E. “"Who Do Men Say That I Am?” - Modem 
Scholarship on Gospel Christology," Horizons: The Journal of the College 
Theology Society, Volume 1, Number 1, Fall 1974, pp. 35-50.
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Jesus Christ. Though purposely vague in asserting his own position, it is 
possible to define certain points of Brown’s christology by paying special
attention to his words.
Although strongly based in biblical exegesis, Brown asserts his belief 
about the heart of theology early in the paper: "Christology was, is, and, I 
suspect, always will be the single most important question in Christian 
theology."19 To illustrate the importance of Jesus to Christianity, Brown 
goes on to point out that, although there are three religions based in the 
biblical texts, Judaic and Islamic identity are not based on one person, 
while Christianity’s identity is founded upon the person of Jesus Christ. As 
well, Brown posits that the Gospel Christology he considers is only one 
aspect of christology, and does not represent the entire field of study. As 
a further distinction, he contends that his evaluation of Gospel Christology 
is not just Jesus as the Christ, but in addition, it includes a broader sense 
of any way Jesus is portrayed in the Gospel accounts (ie. the various titles 
of Jesus).
Brown posits the purpose of his paper as the examination of how 
Jesus evaluated himself as compared to how the New Testament (especially 
the Gospels) evaluates him. Toward that end, in the rest of the paper, he 
presents a survey of modem christological views as they address the
19 Ibid., p. 35.
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question of Jesus’ self-evaluation versus the evaluation presented in the 
New Testament. Two important distinctions he makes before moving into 
his survey concern the definitions he uses to categorize the basic christolo­
gical views. He admits that the categories are general, "such a catego­
rization oversimplifies and does at least minor injustice,"20 but stresses 
the importance of the comparison, since "misunderstandings over christo­
logy are a very divisive force in Christianity today."21
The first clarification concerns the definition of "scholarly" versus 
"non-scholarly" christological views, which are used to describe positions 
that are held by reputable scholars who publish their findings (scholarly), 
and positions that are held by individuals whose writings are not to be 
counted within the scholarly publications, etc. Secondly, he defines 
conservative versus liberal positions of christology as a function of the 
continuity between Jesus’ self-evaluation and the New Testament’s evalua­
tion^):
A conservative christological view, for me, is 
one that posits a real relationship between the 
christology of Jesus’ ministry (or self-evalua­
tion) and the christology of the NT writings - 
a relationship that may run the gamut from 
identity to varying degrees of continuity. A 
liberal christological view is one that denies any 
real relationship or continuity between the
20 Ibid., p. 36.
21 Idem.
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evaluation of Jesus during his ministry and the 
way he was later preached by the Church.22
Based on the above distinctions, the five opinions he surveys are, from left 
to right, 1. non-scholarly liberalism, 2. scholarly liberalism, 3. Bultmannian 
existentialism, 4. scholarly conservatism, and 5. non-scholarly conservatism. 
The brief explanation of each description that follows helps us to 
understand more fully the way in which Brown understands christology.
Starting from the right extreme, Brown’s discussion of non-scholarly 
conservatism centers on the assertion that it is outside scholarly thought, 
it leaves room for absolutely no development from Jesus’ ministry to the 
New Testament’s proclamation, and it posits a total identity between the 
self-evaluation of Jesus (the way he sees himself) and Gospel Christology 
(the way he is presented in the Gospels). According to Brown, however, 
it does not account for the differences (diversity) in Scriptural texts. Since 
it is in some ways a reaction to biblical criticism, Protestants have been 
dealing with it longer than have Catholics. This is so because, as Brown 
points out, biblical criticism has only been allowed (encouraged) in 
Catholic circles for a relatively short period of time.23 This relatively new
22 Ibid., p. 37.
23 Brown attributes this change in Catholic theology to the writing of 
the papal encyclical Divino Afflante Spiritu (1943) and The Historical 
Truth of the Gospels (1964) of the Pontifical Biblical Commission. For 
more information on Modernism and its plight, see footnote # 2 above.
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field of approved study in Catholic circles has created "a defensiveness
among Catholics who persist in holding onto a simplistic approach to the
Gospels."24 This confusion is not made any better since priests trained
before the 1960’s were taught very differently about biblical criticism than
were priests after 1964:
people often hear contradictory things about 
the Gospels from the pulpit, with the accompa­
nying warning that the opposing view is, respec­
tively, either "out of date" or "dangerously 
novel."25
Brown points out that part of the solution can be found in the way 
college students are now being educated about biblical criticism - with 
respect for more strict views, but also with the knowledge to dialogue with 
family, friends, and priests concerning the newly approved view of the 
Church (concerning critical biblical exegesis).
From one extreme to the other, Brown next discusses the non- 
scholarly liberal view of christology, which is also outside modern 
scholarship. This view is likely to be held, contends Brown, by rebounding 
non-scholarly conservatives who study the Scripture for themselves, find 
that their position is lacking, and swing too far in the opposite direction, 
to the other extreme of the pendulum:
24 Brown, Raymond E. ""Who do Men Say That I Am?" -- Modem
Scholarship on Gospel Christology," p. 40.
25 Idem.
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If, through study, an extreme conservative 
comes to realize that the Gospels are not literal 
accounts of the ministry of Jesus and that there 
has been development, the reaction is often to 
ask not "How much development?" but "How do 
I know that any of it is true?"26
Unfortunately, this reaction will often lead to the opinion that Jesus was 
an ordinary man and that there is no continuity at all between Jesus’ self- 
evaluation and the New Testament’s proclamation of who he was.
This view is considered non-scholarly by Brown because it simply
dismisses the New Testament Christology as unimportant. The importance
of Jesus is transformed into an overemphasis on one aspect of his
existence, as a great moral teacher, who taught only love. Brown points
out that while love is certainly an integral part of Jesus’ teaching, it is also
a part of many other religions. The emphasis should be on the basis for
love, and not simply love in and of itself:
Christians remain those who base their love on 
a confession about Jesus...Every NT proclama­
tion of the Gospel involves an evaluation of 
Jesus, his person and his ministry.27
Next, Brown moves to a discussion of scholarly liberalism, which 
differs from the non-scholarly version on a few important notes. It does 
not simply dismiss New Testament Christology, instead, it sees New
26 Ibid., p. 42.
27 Ibid., p. 43.
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Testament Christology as incorrect and posits that actually there is no real 
continuity between Jesus’ self-evaluation and the New Testament’s
evaluation of Jesus:
For liberals, the christology of the NT is a 
creation, nay, a creation ex nihilo\ and scholarly 
liberals have sought to trace this creative pro­
cess by a careful methodology.28
Though they dismiss the New Testament Christology as a creation, 
Brown does insist that their methodology is a major asset and a contribu­
tion to theology that now is used in some form or other in most scholarly 
biblical criticism. From this group of authors comes the birth of historical 
and linguistic criticism of the New Testament Scripture, which is widely 
used today. The discoveries of ancient texts (Dead Sea Scrolls, etc.), more 
stringent critical analysis of the New Testament texts, the study of ancient 
languages and civilizations, plus the study of comparative religions create 
the foundation on which the scholarly liberals base their methodology.
Brown is quick to distinguish what he sees as the positive contribu­
tions of scholarly liberalism from the subjective conclusions drawn therein: 
"the liberals’ methodological plotting of the development of christology is 
one thing; their value-judgments on that development is another thing."29 
Scholarly liberalism further asserts that the New Testament Christology of
28 Ibid., p. 43.
29 Ibid., p. 44.
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Jesus as the Christ was created to keep his memory and teachings alive. 
Ultimately, then, scholarly liberalism commends the creation of New 
Testament Christology for keeping the memory of Jesus alive, but has a 
major qualification:
such a christological crutch was necessary to 
keep the memory of Jesus operative, in the 
judgment of the liberal scholars the crutch 
could now be discarded. Twentieth-century 
scholarship could detect the real Jesus and hold 
onto him without the christological trappings.30
Before moving on to the next viewpoint, Brown asserts that while 
this subjective opinion of scholarly liberalism ultimately dismissed New 
Testament Christology as a creation, he wanted to make an important
clarification:
Scholarly methodology enables one to recognize 
the development but does not settle the ques­
tion of whether such a development was a 
falsification or a deeper perception.31
Moving further to the right, Brown discusses the impact and 
implications of Bultmannian existentialism, which arose in reaction to 
scholarly liberalism and World War I. Brown asserts that while scholarly 
liberalism stressed the importance of Jesus’ teachings concerning how to 
live, "the tragic war created a need for a more traditional Christianity
30 Ibid., p. 45.
31 Ibid., p. 44.
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based on God’s salvation of man in Jesus.”32 The emphasis now shifted
from the acts of humans to the act of God in Jesus Christ.
Rudolf Bultmann offered strong resistance to the scholarly liberal 
viewpoint, affirming their use of methodology while categorically rejecting 
the conclusion that New Testament Christology was simply a creation. For 
Bultmann, "there is afunctional equivalence between the Church’s christolo­
gical proclamation and Jesus’ proclamation of the kingdom of heaven."33 
This contention is based on the assumption that it is God’s action which 
represents humanity’s only hope for escaping futile, meaningless existence. 
Bultmann stressed what "God has done for man, rather than on what man 
can do for himself."34 Jesus came to present God’s offer of the kingdom 
of heaven. The Church that came after Jesus offered him as the Way to 
the kingdom of heaven:
Thus, while the christology of the NT may not 
stand in demonstrable continuity with the 
christology of Jesus’ ministry, the challenge 
offered by its christology stands in continuity 
with the challenge offered by Jesus’ proclama­
tion of the kingdom of heaven.35
32 Ibid., p. 45.
33 Idem.
34 Ibid., p. 46.
35 Idem.
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The importance, according to Bultmann, is not necessarily to what 
extent Jesus used Messianic titles for himself, but instead that "the Church 
did give a christological evaluation when it demanded that men accept
Jesus as Messiah and Lord.”36
Finally, Brown enters a brief discussion of moderate conservatism, 
in which he places most modem scholarship. This view, to the right of 
Bultmannian existentialism, is a scholarly view which asserts that "there is 
a discernible continuity between the evaluation of Jesus during the ministry 
and the evaluation of him in the NT writings."37 Coupled with this 
assertion of discernible continuity are the affirmations of development and 
scholarly methodology which the scholarly liberals offered.
Within this category, Brown distinguishes between those who view
this discernible continuity in an explicit versus an implicit manner; the
former "evaluating Jesus in terms of the titles known to the Jews from the
OT or intertestamental writings,"38 the latter asserting that...
Jesus did not express his self-understanding in 
terms of titles or accept titles attributed to him 
by others. Rather he conveyed what he was by 
speaking with unique authority and acting with 
unique power.39
36 Idem.
37 Idem.
38 Ibid., p. 47.
39 Idem.
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While the explicit belief asserts that Jesus used and accepted low 
christological titles for himself (Son of Man, Messiah, Prophet, Servant of 
God), most in that category would not conversely assert that Jesus used the 
high christological titles for himself (God, Son of God). The implicit 
christological side of this category, however,40 contends that Jesus 
probably did not use or accept titles for himself but was not without visible 
signs of his authority:
By his deeds and words he proclaimed that the 
eschatological reign of God was making itself 
present in such a way that a response to his 
ministry was a response to God.41 *
Brown then asserts his belief that contemporary scholarship will
most likely swing back and forth to and from explicit and implicit
christology. Before closing, Brown makes it clear that simply because
theologians in the implicit christological category do not accept that Jesus
used and accepted titles for himself, it does not infer in any way that these
same theologians are playing down the importance of Jesus:
the ultimate tribute to what and who Jesus was 
may have been that every term or title in the 
theological language of his people had to be
40 Richard P. McBrien, in his book Catholicism: Study Edition, when 
describing these categories of Brown’s, tentatively places Brown in the 
category of implicit moderate conservatism (McBrien, Richard P. 
Catholicism: Study Edition, Minneapolis, MN: Winston Press, 1981; p. 403.
41 Brown, Raymond E. ""Who Do Men Say That I Am?" - Modem
Scholarship on Gospel Christology," p. 47.
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reshaped by his followers to do justice to him, 
including the title "God" itself.42
Brown ends the article by asserting that Jesus’ question concerning 
who men said he was will never be fully answered until Jesus comes again.
Before moving from general thoughts on christology to the more 
specific topic of the knowledge of Jesus of his mission and identity, it is 
important to look at an example in which Raymond Brown draws a 
conclusion from his biblical exegesis. This example deals directly with the 
knowledge of Jesus and can serve as a transition from generalities to the 
specific topic of this thesis. When talking about the arguments surrounding 
the use of the title "Messiah” for Jesus, Brown contends goes to the heart
of the issue:
the question is not whether Jesus knew he was 
the Messiah; Jesus intuitively knew who he was, 
and the question is whether "Messiah," as that 
title was understood in his lifetime, satisfactori­
ly described who he was.43
Here we have Brown’s assertion that Jesus intuitively knew who he was. 
This quote gives us an idea where Brown places himself on the christolo­
gical scale, namely moderate conservatism. Because Brown’s writings are 
mainly of a biblical exegetical type, excerpts like the one above are 
extremely valuable, yielding insight into his conclusions, which usually are
42 Ibid., p. 48.
43 Idem.
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implicit within his exegesis, if discernible at all. For this reason, the next 
chapter’s examination of Brown’s christological exegesis as seen in Jesus 
God and Man will be complemented by his conclusions found in Responses
to 101 Questions on the Bible.
Having examined the background christological viewpoints of both 
von Balthasar and Brown, we can now move into a specific discussion of 
the knowledge of Jesus Christ as it pertains to his mission and identity. 
The stage has been set, and now we will examine the two authors together 
in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3
TWO VIEWS OF JESUS CHRISTS KNOWLEDGE OF
HIS MISSION AND IDENTITY
In this, the final and most important chapter of this work, we will 
attempt to lay out in a clear, concise manner, two views of the knowledge 
of Christ concerning his mission and identity. Having previously estab­
lished some of the basic theological tenets of both von Balthasar and 
Brown, it is now time to move ahead as the subject matter becomes at once 
more metaphysical and speculative, and at the same time more basic for 
the foundation of the Christian faith in the person of Jesus Christ.
Toward that end, we will examine von Balthasar’s ideas on the 
matter, followed by Brown’s thorough exegesis of the biblical texts 
concerning Christ’s knowledge. Finally, we will conclude by discovering 
how truly similar their positions are, through a critical comparison of their 
conclusions concerning Jesus’ knowledge of his mission and identity. 
Though other texts may be utilized, the primary texts in which these 
authors put forth their thoughts on the knowledge of Jesus will compose 
most of the subject matter of this examination. Once again, before
100
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examining both authors’ views and then identifying similarities and differ­
ences, it is important for me to point out that the study in this thesis is 
limited by the works I chose to examine. When a few works are chosen 
from authors who have written vast amounts, it necessarily means that 
some works will be left out. This is not done on purpose, but at the same 
time, in a way it is. In other words, for a thesis of this scope, it would have 
been impractical (if not impossible) to read everything von Balthasar and 
Brown have ever written, or even to narrow down their writings to those 
that deal with christological themes. Because of this, I have chosen a few 
works of each, especially what I believe to be their major christological 
works concerning the knowledge of Jesus of his mission and identity. As 
has been pointed out before, Brown’s Jesus, God and Man and von
Balthasar’s Theo-Drama Vol. Ill are what I believe to be the most direct
works dealing with the topic of this thesis.
This does not mean, however, that they do not discuss the knowl­
edge of Jesus in other places. It simply means that, within the scope of this 
work, I have chosen what I have chosen. This explanation is here to make 
it clear that I understand the limitations choosing certain works and not 
others involves. Had this thesis been much more specific and not spent so 
much time explaining the background sources of both authors’ works 
(which I firmly believe were necessary), I would have most definitely
examined works such as Brown’s Birth of the Messiah and von Balthasar’s
Callahan -- 102
Maximus the Confessor, in which there is a wealth of information 
concerning methodology and christology. There are other works that have 
been left out as well, but with the understanding that I limited my 
conclusions because of the necessary specificity of my sources, let us move
on.
There is one final point which must be briefly mentioned, and that 
is the difference made by the two authors’ intentions. I do not wish to go 
into great detail here, but it needs to be pointed out nonetheless. The
main difference in the intentions of the two authors here is their focus
(which once again is in some way dependent upon which text(s) I chose to 
examine). Raymond Brown writes Jesus, God and Man to address a very 
specific question, namely the debate concerning the knowledge of Jesus of 
his mission and identity. This will become even more clear as we examine 
his treatment of the specific issue in this chapter. On the other hand, Hans
Urs von Balthasar wrote his Theo-Drama, Volume III as one section of a
much larger systematic effort, in which he discusses all major tenets of 
Christian theology in an orderly and systematic manner. Thus, while it is 
quite easy to find Brown’s conclusions in Jesus, God and Man, von 
Balthasar’s conclusions do not lend themselves to such easy identification. 
As well, while von Balthasar does not do much with some topics (such as 
biblical exegesis) in Theo-Drama, Vol. Ill, he does discuss them in other 
places, either in his massive work as outlined in the very beginning of
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Chapter One or in some of the other books and articles he has also 
written. The point here is simply to keep in mind that von Balthasar and 
Brown are writing from two different perspectives and are also addressing 
two different levels of specific questions. Whereas Brown tries to include 
most aspects of his answer in Jesus, God and Man, von Balthasar had no 
such intention (to answer a specific question), hence his "answer" is 
scattered throughout many other places.
View One: Hans Urs von Balthasar
Using the concept of Jesus’ mission as his guiding christological 
criterion, Hans Urs von Balthasar calls this area of his work his christology 
of consciousness. Crucial to an understanding of von Balthasar’s christo­
logy is the assertion of total identity between the person and mission of 
Jesus Christ. Thus, through an understanding of Jesus’ mission, his person
becomes more clear as well.
Jesus had a strong sense of mission, asserts von Balthasar, which 
"was eschatological and universal."1 Jesus took on and completed this 
mission while working within his limits and existence as a human being. 
This gave him a totally unique mission and identity as the One sent from 
God the Father. Von Balthasar points out that the New Testament most 
often looks at Jesus’ function rather than his nature, thus examining the
1 Balthasar, Hans Urs von, Theo-Drama, volume III, p. 149.
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work of his mission leads one to the question of his person, of who he is. 
In fact, the two are so closely related, it is difficult to distinguish between 
Jesus’ identity and his mission.
Von Balthasar’s desire to answer the question of christology ‘from
below’ leads him to look in depth at Jesus’ mission according to the New
Testament. Before moving on to his examination of the New Testament
texts, it is important to mention what von Balthasar means when he
discusses christology ‘from below’:
We are not asking, for instance, about the 
contents of Christ’s knowledge, let alone the 
kind of personality he had, but about the condi­
tions that made it possible for what empirically 
took place in him.2
In von Balthasar’s thought, Jesus’ mission is one with his person, and the 
two are thusly fused together.
In the New Testament, Jesus’ mission as the Son of God differenti­
ates him qualitatively from all other prophets and people who had 
missions. The important fact that Jesus is the One sent implies that God 
is the One who sends. This comes through in Paul’s assertion in Romans 
8:3-4 & 32 in which the sending of Jesus establishes his life as a mission, 
which "supersedes the entire Old Testament order, precisely because he is 
God’s "own Son", together with whom God has given us "all things" (Rom
2 Ibid., p. 150.
Callahan - 105
8:32)."3 Von Balthasar lists examples from Hebrews to illustrate Jesus’ 
preeminence and superiority over others who were sent before him due to 
his Sonship and unique relationship to God the Father. This superiority 
takes the form of the qualitative difference in divine inspiration: ’’the 
prophet’s mission with its allotted measure of divine inspiration has given 
way to a divine mission that knows no measure.”4
While this mission christology finds its strongest roots in the Gospel 
of John, von Balthasar points out that it is certainly evident as well in the 
synoptics, primarily in the form of Jesus’ claim that if individuals receive 
him, they were also receiving the One who sent him (Mt 10:40, Lk 9:48, Lk 
10:16, Mk 9:37, and Jn 13:16, 20). In addition, von Balthasar contends that 
the New Testament notions of sending and coming are closely related, both 
finding their point of departure in God. It is especially in the Gospel of 
John that this coming of Jesus is equivalent to the sending from God the 
Father, hence Jesus’ mission.
Jesus’ mission is both soteriological and trinitarian: "the intimate 
relationship between the One sent and the One who sends him takes the 
form of obedience within the Father’s act of self-surrender."5 This
obedience is Jesus’ ultimate manifestation of his mission as the One sent
3 Ibid., p. 151.
4 Idem.
5 Ibid., p. 153.
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to open a window of salvation for the whole world. This relationship 
between Jesus and God is analogous to our relationship to the triune God 
as well: God sent Jesus out with the intent that Jesus would return to him; 
just as we, as Jesus’ followers, are sent out to return to God as well. 
Before going into further metaphysical detail about what Jesus’ mission 
(and his consciousness thereof) entailed, von Balthasar points out that the 
Gospel of John’s christology of mission is in the other Gospels as well. 
The unique aspect of this mission which some scholarship has denied 
coming from the mouth of Jesus must have been alive in Jesus’ awareness. 
For the problem with asserting that this unique mission was created by the 
evangelists brings up the question of "how can we envisage this faith 
coming into existence if Jesus did not have such a self-consciousness?"6
In his quest to explain the concept of mission as the central and 
guiding aspect to his christology of consciousness, von Balthasar discusses 
Jesus’ sense of mission as one in which he took place in the processes of 
being and becoming. In an important point, he establishes how he
differentiates Jesus’ sense of his own mission from other individuals who
have been called to a particular mission as well:
In speaking of a "sense of mission" -- whether 
we realize it or not - we imply a distinction 
between the one who is aware of his mission 
and the one who sends him. Someone may
6 Ibid., p. 154.
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have an unshakable inner conviction that he 
must do or propose something, but he cannot 
say that he has a mission. No one can give 
himself a mission. On the other hand, where a 
person is entrusted with a substantial mission 
that summons him to put his very existence at 
its disposal, the person thus sent...can, as a 
result, become (to a degree) identified with the 
mission.7 8
God can give someone a sense of mission at any point in their lifetime (ie. 
Abraham, Jacob, and Simon-Peter). Using John the Baptist as an example 
of this, von Balthasar asserts that it did not matter who he was before God 
called him and gave him a mission; it is the calling forth which is impor­
tant. For God, then, Abram was always intended to be Abraham; Jacob, 
Israel; Simon, Peter.
In the same way, Jesus received his mission from the One who sent
him. When God gave Jesus his mission, along with that he was giving him
his being, or person. It is through Jesus’ mission that the unity of being
and becoming manifests itself:
Now a mission can only be carried out within a 
time span, and, particularly in the case of Jesus’ 
mission, the final phase, the "hour", has the 
greatest significance for its execution. Conse­
quently, Jesus’ existence-in-mission manifests a 
paradoxical unity of being (and a being that has 
always been) and becoming.3
7 Ibid., p. 154.
8 Ibid., p. 157.
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This mission, being identical with the person of Jesus, could only find 
fulfillment on the Cross. This being and becoming of Jesus implies a 
certain amount of development in his person. In fact, for von Balthasar, 
the union of divine and human in Jesus underwent a process of develop­
ment in order for Jesus to be perfectly (and completely) human. The 
interplay of Jesus being God (part of the Triune God) and also becoming 
through a relationship with God the Father, expresses a single being, both 
human and divine: "The dramatic dimension that is part of the definition 
of the person of Jesus does not belong exclusively to the worldly side of his 
being; its ultimate presuppositions lie in the divine life itself.”9
The eschatological aspect of Jesus’ destiny lies in the fact that his
mission was universal but could only be fulfilled by going beyond that
which is mortal, thus the chasm between the two natures is seen in the
human development of his "self*. To illustrate this point, von Balthasar
goes to Gregory of Nyssa, who asserts that Jesus’ human nature was one
thing that became another through a process:
human nature could "progress toward perfec­
tion", specifically as a result of the great change 
from the first state (the humiliation) to the 
second (the exaltation): "It is possible to say 
with all truth that he who was raised from 
human estate and exalted to the level of God,
9 Ibid., p. 159.
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who was one thing and thus became another, 
became Christ and Lord (Acts 2:36).10
Through this process, as seen specifically in Jesus’ statements concerning 
himself as the Son of Man, von Balthasar points out that "we must bear in 
mind that the earthly Jesus was aware of his eschatological and universal
mission."11 Jesus’ identification with the Son of Man shows that the
eschatological dimension of his mission was assumed into his self-con­
sciousness unlike any other human being. Von Balthasar illustrates this 
point by stating that the big difference in self-consciousness of mission 
could be seen in understanding that, unlike John the Baptist, Jesus’ 
consciousness of mission was always in him, with no conceivable starting 
point, whereas John was called at a particular point in time.
This leads von Balthasar to one of his strong assertions pertaining
to the consciousness of Jesus concerning his identity and mission. He
contends that while Jesus’ fully exalted state (status exaltationis) is not
directly accessible to him as a human being on the earth,
this will not prevent him from having an un­
shakable awareness, from before all time, of his 
mission. Nor is he only aware of part of it, the 
part that is to be implemented during his earth­
ly life: he is aware of its totality, even if, as we 
shall show, an essential aspect of its implemen-
10 Ibid., p. 160; quoted from: Gregory of Nyssa, C. Eunom VI (PG 45, 
736B).
11 Ibid., p. 160.
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tation is his ignorance of the "hour" of its 
decisive phase.12
Important to this formula, however, is the strong assertion that, about the 
specific hour, Jesus needed not to know for his perfect, salvific obedience 
to be genuine. It was not necessary because Jesus had received his mission 
from his Father and had faith that it would be fulfilled. At the same time, 
Jesus realized that it was not up to him to maintain the union between his
exalted state and his human state.
This cycle which Jesus shows us is key to understanding the theo- 
drama as a whole. Jesus is in between these two states, bearing the brunt 
of all evil and experiencing the hell of God-forsakenness, and thusly is 
exalted and given a name above all other names: "In this way, in this 
collapse and rebirth, he maintains his identity; and so, as the matrix of all 
possible dramas, he embodies the absolute drama in his own person, in his 
personal mission."13 Through Jesus, we can imitate his personal mission 
and thusly participate in the drama he began.
Having thus fully explicated how the concept of mission guides his 
christology of consciousness, von Balthasar moves into a direct and explicit 
explanation of Jesus’ own consciousness of his mission (and, therefore, 
person):
12 Ibid., p. 161.
13 Ibid., p. 162.
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The "Christology of consciousness" simulta­
neously addresses the work (soteriology) and 
the person of Christ. In his mission, Christ 
knows that he is unique; he knows that he is fit 
for this task and dedicated to it. Once more, 
therefore, we find that the identification of the 
person satisfies the theodramatic require­
ment.14
Concerning Jesus’ consciousness of his mission, von Balthasar points 
out that if we accept Paul’s claim that the Cross and Resurrection of Jesus 
are at the center of his mission, we must conclude that this mission is part 
of Jesus’ self-consciousness. Von Balthasar asserts that Jesus did, in fact, 
know why he was giving up his life in total self-sacrifice: "it is impossible 
to suppose that God could use this death to reconcile the world to himself 
if the one who died it was unaware of its significance."15 Moreover, this 
consciousness did not come through a study of the Suffering Servant 
passages in Isaiah, since Jesus surpassed all titles and attempts at 
explanation found in the Old Testament.
More than anyone else, Jesus was driven by the Spirit and empow­
ered therewith. This presence of the Spirit in Jesus’ life manifested itself 
in his ability to forgive sin and his ability to bind the devil, both of which 
belonged exclusively to the Triune God. To finish this section on von 
Balthasar before moving to a discussion of Raymond E. Brown’s assertions
14 Ibid., p. 163.
15 Ibid., p. 164.
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concerning Jesus’ consciousness of mission and identity, we will look at
what von Balthasar calls the four aspects of Jesus’ consciousness which are
interconnected in an intimate way, "This structure of Jesus’ consciousness
of mission is inviolable: it cannot be fragmented:"16
(a) How to get nearer to a concept of mission- 
consciousness that is absolute, that is, coincid­
ing with the person; (b) how it is possible to 
reconcile the historical shape of this conscious­
ness with the fact that it existed from before all 
time; (c) its presuppositions in the "economic"
Trinity; (d) mission as the measure of Jesus’ 
knowledge and freedom.17
The first aspect von Balthasar discusses, the quest for an absolute 
consciousness of mission, is tempered with a gentle warning: "It is both
ridiculous and irreverent to ask what it must have been like to be God 
incarnate."18 In other words, the absolute identity of consciousness and 
mission can only be followed to a certain point and we cannot know exactly 
where the two come together in the incarnate Word of God. In addition 
to that, there is no explicit way to understand the existential and formal 
identity of person and mission.
16 Ibid., p. 165.
17 Idem.
18 Ibid., p. 165; quoted from E.L. Mascall (no citation as to location).
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Von Balthasar reiterates that if the mission Jesus had was, in fact, 
universal and from God (as Paul and John assert), then he had to have
been aware of what it was all about:
This means that, in the individual human con­
sciousness of Jesus, there is something that in 
principle always goes beyond the purely human 
horizon of consciousness. A more-than-human 
mission -- to reconcile the whole world with 
God - cannot be a secondary and accidental 
development of a human consciousness, howev­
er much room we must leave for a growing 
clarity of mission-consciousness.19
As well, von Balthasar points out that Jesus’ consciousness of mission (and 
thus person) justifies both aspects of being and becoming: "Jesus’ 
fundamental intuition concerning his identity...: "I am the one who must 
accomplish this task." "I am the one through whom the kingdom of God
must and will come.""20
With direct reference to an absolute consciousness of mission, von 
Balthasar explains how this mission consciousness is intuitive and limiting
in the life of Jesus:
Jesus is aware of an element of the divine in his 
innermost, indivisible self-consciousness; it is 
intuitive insofar as it is inseparable from the 
intuition of his mission-consciousness, but it is 
defined and limited by this same mission con­
sciousness. It is of this, and of this alone, that
19 Ibid., p. 166.
20 Idem.
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he has a visio immediata, and we have no reason 
to suggest that this visio of the divine is supple­
mented by another...over and above his mis­
sion.21
The paradox arising from this complete identity between person and 
mission is that, unlike the Law (of the Old Testament) which was imparted 
from without, Jesus’ mission is identical with his "I" (self) and this makes 
him different from anything in the Old Testament. Since his mission is 
himself, it has always been in his consciousness as mission (a sending of 
God).
According to von Balthasar, there are two important aspects of 
calling Jesus’ mission a sending from God: one is the importance of the 
inherent relationship between the One sent and the One who sends 
(interrelated, but not identical); and the other is the mission’s future, which 
is now in human hands, thus it is subject to human frailties and limitations 
as well as human free will. In this relationship, God the Father is behind 
the mission, but does not compel Jesus, which is the purpose of his mission. 
Asserting that "it is as if the Father’s freedom points to the mission’s 
necessity and as if the Son’s freedom is oriented to the latter," von 
Balthasar shows that the mission itself is a revelation of "a decision freely 
made in concert by the whole Trinity."22 Because of Jesus’ existence as
21 Idem.
22 Ibid., p. 168.
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part of the Triune God, he knows that he is the One sent and conversely 
understands that he is sent by the Father.
The relationship between Jesus and God the Father is important, 
and von Balthasar points to prayer as an important aspect of Jesus’
awareness: "the more the Son unites himself with the Ground from which
his person and mission simultaneously spring forth, the better he under­
stands both his mission and himself."23 This uniting takes place through 
prayer, which von Balthasar asserts is part of "the activity of mission, (...Lk 
22:32; Jn 11:41)" and that "mission is also the subject matter of prayer (Jn 
17)."24
Following from this, von Balthasar establishes the relationship 
between prayer and faith in the person of Jesus. Prayer and faith are both 
necessary because of the nature of Jesus’ awareness of mission and person,
which is...
all the more evident in the fact that the mission 
is not open to his gaze in its entirety; it is to be 
implemented step by step according to the 
Father’s instructions (in the Holy Spirit).25
Since Jesus always has been and will be his mission, his faith is qualitative­
ly different from ours. This concept of faith is one of the most difficult to
23 Ibid., p. 169.
24 Ibid., p. 170.
25 Idem.
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reconcile with the discussion of his awareness of mission and person. Von 
Balthasar discusses the definition of faith that may be applied to Jesus in
relation to his mission-consciousness as follows:
Insofar as he does not know (and does not wish 
to know) the paths God sets before him for the 
fulfillment of his mission, but has the certainty 
that the Father will bring it to its conclusion, 
we can apply to him the definition of faith 
found in the Letter to the Hebrews: "Now faith 
is the assurance of things hoped for, the convic- 
tion...of things not seen" (Heb 1L1).26
This, however, does not pretend to infer that Jesus is a non-actor, allowing 
God to do all of the work of completion of mission. Instead, since he is 
conscious of his mission, he realizes that he has to throw himself into it 
and actively follow it to its completion.
Von Balthasar’s final estimation concerning Jesus’ absolute mission
consciousness emphasizes that Jesus’ awareness was centered on actively
carrying out this mission that God the Father had given him, not introspec-
tively musing about who he was:
The task given him by the Father, that is, that 
of expressing God’s Fatherhood through his 
entire being, through his life and death in and 
for the world, totally occupies his self-con­
sciousness and fills it to the very brim. He sees 
himself so totally as "coming from the Father" 
to men, as "making known" the Father, as the 
"Word from the Father", that there is neither
26 Ibid., p. 171.
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room nor time for any detached reflection of 
the "Who am I?" kind.27
The second aspect of Jesus’ consciousness von Balthasar discusses 
is that of reconciling his God-consciousness which always existed with the 
fact that as a human, Jesus was an historical being. Von Balthasar sees the 
issue as being one of how the child Jesus could ever have not known 
exactly who he was if his self-consciousness and mission-consciousness were 
identical. A strong tradition, championed by St. Thomas, contended that 
ignorance in Jesus (even the child Jesus) was not really ignorance, but a
conscious decision to withhold information. Von Balthasar’s answer to this
comes in the form of Mariology, in which he contends that self-conscious­
ness cannot form on its own and that Mary was the "other" (the "Thou) for 
Jesus, which gives her a unique relationship with him.
Mary would not have explicitly known all of her child’s mission, but 
her virginal conception and birth would have given her at least a basis for 
some amount of understanding. This does not imply that Jesus’ conscious­
ness of mission or self came from without: "the Child’s inner initiation, 
under the guidance of his eternal Father, shall take place in harmony with 
his external, historical initiation in the world of men."28 In so doing, Mary 
hands on the religious tradition of her day to her son: "(which is) sufficient
27 Ibid., p. 172.
28 Ibid, p. 176.
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to awaken the sense of mission latent in the Child’s person,”29 which, in 
turn, becomes his external initiation as he continues to have contact with 
the world around him. Von Balthasar strongly asserts that the physical and 
spiritual roles of Mary were crucial to Jesus’ development: "Without this 
spiritual handing-on, which takes place simultaneously with the bodily gift 
of mother’s milk and motherly care, God’s Word would not have really
become flesh."30
As a key example of Jesus’ historical knowledge, von Balthasar
points to Jesus’ temptations, in which he responds by calling on words from
the Scriptures, words which all Israelites would have known. It is
important to see that historical time acts as a catalyst when it makes
contact with Jesus’ mission, which has always existed, even before all time:
as it (Jesus’ mission) unfolds through historical 
time, it enters increasingly into history. It 
awaits God’s signal for its fulfillment not only 
from within: it also awaits it from without, 
because the mission will be fulfilled essentially 
in a fulfillment of history; the Father’s will is 
encountered in history no less than in interior 
inspiration.31
This sign from God to begin its fulfillment probably manifested itself in the 
person and work of John the Baptist. Historical knowledge, therefore, is
29 Idem.
30 Ibid, p. 177.
31 Ibid, p. 178.
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essential for Jesus’ carrying out of his mission. For history provides the
necessary ingredient to allow Jesus to understand more fully his mission:
Jesus undergoes an historical learning process 
with regard to his fellow men and their tradi­
tion, but essentially this is paralleled by an 
inward learning whereby he is initiated more and 
more deeply into the meaning and scope of his 
mission ...things now become explicit that were 
hitherto only obscurely and indirectly felt or 
left entirely to the Father’s guidance.32
In other words, Jesus understands more the more he lives and experiences 
life and God, and in the process, he turns intuitive knowledge into explicit 
concepts as he continues to understand more and more about his person
and mission.
As we have seen, von Balthasar holds that Jesus was always
implicitly aware of his destiny, though specifics were left to the Father
alone. In this relationship, Jesus’ readiness to complete his mission
eventually shows itself in his need to obediently accept the Father’s will
concerning his passion, suffering and death:
The all-embracing ambience of his con­
sciousness remains his readiness to respond to 
whatever concerns the Father (even to the 
extent of losing all tangible contact with him, 
all experience of his will to forgive), his readi­
ness to pay all that is necessary so that he may 
proclaim this forgiveness to men.33
32 Ibid., p. 179-180.
33 Ibid., p. 182.
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This mission of Jesus’ saturates his whole existence and is manifested in
poverty, chastity and obedience, all three of which illuminate the others, 
and were designed from the very beginning in the existence of the Triune 
God: "together they effect his perfect readiness to undertake the task, a 
task proposed by the Father in the Spirit and taken up in total freedom by 
the Son."34 This mission is not completely available at any one given time 
to Jesus, but mediated through the Spirit: "a mission that is not given once 
for all but is revealed and can be realized in a new and surprising way by 
the Holy Spirit at every moment.”35
The third aspect of Jesus’ consciousness that von Balthasar discusses 
is its relationship to the Triune God. In short, God the Father gives Jesus 
the Son the mission through the Holy Spirit. Jesus accepts the mission in 
total freedom, committing himself to total obedience to God the Father’s 
will. Highlighting Jesus’ obedience, von Balthasar points out that in the 
incarnation, the Spirit is active (conceiving the Son to be bom of the 
Virgin Mary) while the Son is passive, which shows that his obedience to 
God the Father starts at the incarnation itself. Positing himself between 
St. Thomas’ assertion that "the hypostatic union precedes the Son’s 
endowment with habitual grace, since this is an effect of the sending of the
34 Ibid., pp. 182-183.
35 Ibid., p. 182.
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Spirit (S. Th. Ill, 7, 13),’,36 and Walter Kasper’s view of the incarnation 
in which the Spirit’s role overshadows the Son’s, von Balthasar points out 
that the Spirit does play a crucial role in the incarnation, but that Jesus 
already had to have been obedient to entrust himself to the Spirit’s activity
in the incarnation.
Thus the obedient Son had a soteriological purpose and the Spirit
made his obedience possible by communicating the Father’s will to the Son.
The Spirit’s role in this process is twofold:
he is breathed forth from the one love of Fa­
ther and Son as the expression of their united 
freedom...but, at the same time, he is the objec­
tive witness to their difference-in-unity or unity- 
in-difference.36 7
In the first aspect, the Spirit shows us the freedom of the Son and God the 
Father by illustrating that the identity of Jesus’ mission-consciousness and
his 'T’-consciousness are manifestations of an obedience that was bom from
the Triune God’s decision from before all time that would make possible 
the salvation of the world. The second aspect of the Spirit has the 
"function of presenting the obedient Son with the Father’s will in the form 
of a rule that is unconditional and, in the case of the Son’s suffering, even 
appears rigid and pitiless."38 The Spirit is, in this sense, the enforcer of
36 Ibid., p. 185.
37 Ibid., p. 187.
38 Ibid., p. 188.
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the supratemporal decision of the Triune God, not allowing the plan to
fail.
The final aspect von Balthasar examines concerns Jesus’ mission as 
the factor that measures his knowledge and freedom. Under this topic 
heading, von Balthasar sets forth his christology of consciousness as it 
relates to the Church Fathers’ and Scholastics’ fully developed doctrine of 
Jesus’ omniscience. In this doctrine, the omniscience of Jesus was stressed
to the detriment of some of his more ’’human" characteristics. Jesus’
obedience was overlooked, due to the fact that it required a lack of direct 
consciousness of God and complete, explicit knowledge.
Von Balthasar points out that Hermann Schell39 was the first to 
treat the topic of mission christology in explicit form. Schell explained 
Jesus’ knowledge as something that grew and developed. In addition, 
Schell contends that it is actually more perfectly human not to have all 
knowledge complete in the womb. It is the work of Schell that brings von
Balthasar to the assertion that Jesus’ mission on earth is the measure of his
knowledge. This entire concept opposes the view that Jesus had some sort
of beatific immediate vision of God while on the earth.
Following in the footsteps of Schell, von Balthasar stresses the need 
to place the "triune God’s free decision and purpose prior to the Incama-
39 Ibid., p. 193; Schell, Hermann, Kath, Dogmatik III / I, 104-50.
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tion, in such a way that the extension of Jesus’ mission and self-conscious­
ness (that is, knowledge) coincide in it.”40 If this assertion is made, then 
without difficulty we can make this assertion:
Jesus knew of his identity as the Son of God 
right from the start...while acknowledging that 
the awareness of this identity only came to him 
through his mission, communicated by the 
Spirit.41
This would mean, in turn, that there was no need for an uninterrupted, 
direct beatific vision. Jesus had a mission that by its very nature included 
some knowledge of his relationship to God: "it (his mission) is so 
universal...that the consciousness of this mission must include his knowledge 
of Sonship.42
Concerning Jesus’ work in the world, sometimes he is given
complete knowledge of an entire situation while sometimes, for the sake
of his obedience, he knows very little:
With respect to the extent or the limits of 
Jesus’ knowledge concerning God’s salvific 
work in the world, if we take his mission as the 
point of reference, it will allow every possible 
variation, as the particular situation de­
mands.43
40 Ibid., p. 195.
41 Idem.
42 Ibid., p. 196.
43 Idem.
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Next, von Balthasar speaks about Jesus’ freedom, centering on the 
question of whether Jesus was just carrying out what he had to do (as an 
outsider), or could he have used his free will in any way he chose? To 
begin to answer this question, he goes on to posit that the Triune God’s 
unanimous plan for salvation and Jesus’ earthly decisions cannot be viewed 
in a before I after scenario. Instead the relationship between the two can 
be likened to the phenomenon of inspiration.
Von Balthasar looks at natural inspiration and supernatural 
inspiration as he searches for the best analogy. In the natural realm, he 
suggests that an artist is most free when he or she is possessed by an idea 
that then in turn controls him or her. On the supernatural side of 
inspiration, he contends that in a prophet, Isaiah for instance, "sublime 
inspiration awakens in the person a deeper freedom than that involved in 
arbitrary choice."44 When someone like this is supernaturally inspired, he 
is able to more fully possess himself, thus fulfilling his mission, which was 
always within him in the heart of his personal freedom.
In similar fashion, Jesus is not following the orders of some alien 
"other", but instead he is laying claim to a mission that has always been his, 
because he has been inspired by the Holy Spirit (which is the Spirit of the 
Triune God, and thus his own). This mission, then, was always Jesus’, but
44 Ibid, p. 198.
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it did not pre-exist as such: "he must fashion it out of himself in utter 
freedom and responsibility; indeed, in a sense, he even has to invent it."45 
In this relationship between finite and infinite freedom, von Balthasar 
asserts that finite freedom only finds fulfillment in infinite freedom, and 
this is done through obedience to the mission that is constitutive of your 
"self*. This freedom manifests itself in Jesus’ relationship to God the
Father:
Thus the incarnate Son, in his freedom (which 
is now a human freedom too), does not em­
brace his own will as God but primarily the 
Father’s will, to which he has always consented.
It is precisely in embracing his Father’s will that 
Jesus discovers his own, most profound identity 
as the eternal Son.46
Jesus’ opportunity to use his free will manifests itself as well in his
ability to be tempted, which is possible because of the lack of a beatific
vision and the presence of his Father’s commission, indirectly given to him
through the Holy Spirit. This temptation forces him to use his freedom to
implement his mission in detail. Through his reaction to temptation, he is
the perfect example for how we all should face temptation:
His merit is that he himself anticipates nothing; 
thus no particular success can obscure the 
mission’s universality. In this way, Jesus is the 
perfect example not only of the fundamental
45 Idem.
46 Ibid., p. 200.
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Christian virtue of patience but also, equally, of 
faith and hope.47
We end our discussion of von Balthasar with three respects he lists 
in which the ’’Christology of consciousness..., taking ’’mission” as our guide, 
provides the basis for the development of a theodramatic theory."48 
Firstly, Jesus is the perfect character in the theo-drama through his identity 
of person and mission: "thus...he is not only the main character but the 
model for all other actors and the one who gives them their own identity 
as characters."49 Secondly, "it is the identity of character and mission that 
really makes the world drama into a theo-drama."50 This identity is only 
possible for Jesus who has (and is) his universal mission, which in turn 
draws forth the Spirit’s mission. Finally, in establishing that von Baltha­
sar’s christology of consciousness (with mission as its guide) is the basis for 
the theodramatic theory, he points out that it refers back to the earlier 
assertion concerning Christ’s mission and person:
(Jesus) is the "last Adam", the one who gives 
meaning to the entire play; as such he embodies 
mankind’s whole dramatic situation in its rela­
tionship to itself and to God. Not only, through 
his personal destiny (in Cross and Resurrec­
tion), does he become what he is and has
47 Idem.
48 Ibid., p. 201.
49 Idem.
50 Idem.
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always been; it is through the whole world 
drama that he actually becomes the Omega that 
-- precisely because he is the Alpha -- he always 
is. Only when the last enemy, death, is van­
quished, when he has fulfilled his mission in the 
world in every last detail, can he lay at the 
Father’s feet the kingdom he has thus won 
back, so that the Father may be all in all (I Cor 
15: 24ff).51
View Two: Raymond E. Brown
For an adequate picture of Raymond E. Brown’s view on the 
consciousness of Jesus of his mission and identity, a close examination is 
needed of his Jesus God and Man52 as well as his Responses to 101 
Questions on the Bible53. A close look at these texts will serve to give 
insight into the biblical christology of Brown, and how, within that context, 
he understands the knowledge Jesus had of his mission and identity.
Brown begins his discussion of the knowledge of Jesus with the 
oppositions which arose to the Council of Nicea’s (325 A.D.) assertion that 
Jesus was divine and the Council of Chalcedon’s (451 A.D.) definition of 
Jesus’ full humanity in all things save sin. In the struggle to maintain both 
truths in their fullest sense, Brown asserts that modern biblical criticism 
plays a crucial role: "the belief that Jesus is God and man involves a whole
51 Ibid, pp. 201-202.
52 Brown, Raymond E, Jesus God and Man: Modem Biblical 
Reflections, New York: The Macmillan Co, 1967.
53 Brown, Raymond E, Responses to 101 Questions on the Bible, New 
York: Paulist Press, 1990.
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complex of understanding, a complex in which the biblical evidence has a 
very important formative role."54
Toward understanding Jesus’ divinity, Brown sets out to discuss the 
contribution of the biblical evidence to the end of understanding historical 
consciousness: "(which is) the awareness that there is a constant interplay 
between human knowledge and the times and conditions in which that 
knowledge is gained."55 This consciousness stands in opposition to the 
type of fundamentalism that believes all dogma was in the apostolic deposit 
of faith and was simply drawn forth from it by later individuals. This 
historical consciousness also allows us in the modern day to understand 
that the problematic of situation and context was different in the New 
Testament times than that of Nicea, of Chalcedon, and today.
Brown also discusses the contribution made by the biblical evidence 
in a discussion of the humanity of Jesus. Brown’s assertion points out that 
this section that primarily occupies our purpose: "Nowhere does the 
problem about the reality and fullness of Jesus’ humanity appear more 
clearly than in the question of how much knowledge Jesus possessed."56 
This is the case because, for the most part, theologians (and most 
Christians in general) are not willing to admit the possibility of ignorance
54 Brown, Raymond E., Jesus God and Man, p. x.
55 Idem.
56 Ibid., p. xiii.
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in Jesus and thus read omniscience back into the New Testament texts.
Although this reasoning has been (and is currently being) challenged, 
Brown places his position as one of bringing the truth of the biblical
evidence to the discussion:
Without attempting to solve this problem -- 
which goes far beyond the field of Scripture -- 
I have gathered the biblical evidence and 
discussed it in terms of modem critical exegesis, 
so that all may see the a posteriori situation. 
Hopefully, this biblical evidence will not only 
serve as the raw material from which to formu­
late a solution but will also color and shape the 
solution.57
Before moving into Brown’s discussion of how much knowledge 
Jesus possessed, it is first important to examine his assertions concerning 
the New Testament, and whether or not it maintains that Jesus was God. 
Brown points out from the very beginning that he takes for granted the 
truth that Jesus was in fact man and God, thus he places his trust in the
Council of Nicea’s claim that Jesus was true God from true God. For
Brown, the point of discussing the New Testament’s messianic titles is not 
to question the validity of that truth, but instead, "there still remains the 
question, to what extent and in what manner of understanding and 
statement this truth is contained in the New Testament."58
57 Idem.
58 Ibid., p. 1.
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Because of the great amount of variety represented in the New
Testament texts, Brown confines himself to only those instances in which
the word ”God”59 is used to describe Jesus. In doing so, he wishes to
examine three types of texts concerning Jesus’ divinity:
(I) texts that seem to imply that the title "God" 
was not used for Jesus; (II) texts where, by 
reason of textual variants or syntax, the use of 
"God" for Jesus is dubious; (III) texts where 
Jesus is clearly called God.60
The key point to Brown’s examination of texts which seem to imply 
that the term "God" was not used to describe Jesus is that, by and large, in 
the New Testament, "God" is usually reserved for God the Father and 
usually there is a clear distinction between God the Father and Jesus the 
Son. The main reason for this was the ancient Hebrews’ inability to 
understand how God could possibly be anything other than singular. As an 
example, Brown cites Mk 10:18, in which Jesus replies to one who has 
called him "good teacher" by pointing out that only the one God is good. 
Another pertinent example which posits a distinction between God and 
Jesus is in Mk 15:34 and Mt 27:46, in which Jesus cries out to God, asking 
why he had been forsaken. To this point, Brown asserts that Jesus was 
calling out to something other than himself.
59 The term "God" here refers to the Greek "theos".
60 Brown, Raymond E. Jesus, God and Man, pp. 5-6.
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Finally, Brown brings our attention to Jesus’ statements that God
was greater than himself (Jn 14:28), that he did not know the hour (Mk
13:32), and perhaps most clear is Phil 2:5-11:
...Christ Jesus, Who, though he was in the form 
of God, did not regard equality with God 
something to be grasped. Rather he emptied 
himself, taking the form of a slave, coming in 
human likeness; and found human in appear­
ance, he humbled himself, becoming obedient 
to death, even death on a cross. Because of 
this, God greatly exalted him and bestowed on 
him the name that is above every name, that at 
the name of Jesus every knee should bend, of 
those in heaven and on earth and under the 
earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus 
Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Fa­
ther.61
In this passage of Scripture, there is a clear distinction and even a
subordination of Jesus to God the Father.
Next, Brown discusses some texts in which the use of the term "God"
to describe Jesus is unclear. The main issue in these texts, asserts Brown, 
comes in the form of two different problems. First, there are obscurities 
caused by textual variants, which have unclear interpretations because of 
the nature of the Greek language in which they are written, and because 
of different manuscripts of the same texts. The second reason for the lack 
of clarity in some New Testament texts which speak of Jesus is due to 
problems in syntax. This, once again, can be caused because of differing
61 Philippians 2:5-11, NAB.
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translations of the Greek text, especially when it is unclear to whom certain 
grammatical cases and cases refer. In a few examples (Col 2:2, 2Th 1:12, 
Tit 2:13, 1 Jn 5:20 and others), Brown shows how, in sentences which 
discuss God and Jesus, the Greek is unclear to whom certain attributes 
belong (ie, whether or not the text is referring to two different entities or 
one entity - Jesus who is God).
Finally, as Brown leads up to his discussion of the knowledge of 
Jesus, he points out a few texts in which the New Testament clearly calls 
Jesus "God". While discussing these examples, Brown wants to point out 
that nowhere in the New Testament does Jesus call himself God, nor is 
Jesus clearly called God in the Synoptic Gospels. According to Brown, 
there are only three texts in which there is no doubt: First, there is Heb 
1:8-9, in which Psalm 45 is quoted, calling Jesus "O God" while referring 
to God the Father as "Your God". The other two examples Brown cites 
come from the Gospel of John. The first is Jn 1:1, in which Jesus is the 
Word, which was with God and was God. The second, and for Brown "the 
clearest example in the New Testament of the use of "God" for Jesus,"62 
is Jn 20:28, in which Thomas calls Jesus "My Lord and my God."
To this evidence, Brown replies that even though the earliest 
followers of Jesus Christ may not have explicitly called him "God", "at the
62 Brown, Raymond E. Jesus, God and Man, p. 28.
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beginning of the second century Ignatius freely speaks of Jesus as God."63
As for the development of the term "God" from the earlier Gospels to
John, and then to Ignatius, Brown contends that:
the most plausible explanation is that in the 
earliest stage of Christianity the Old Testament 
heritage dominated the use of "God"; hence 
"God" was a title too narrow to be applied to 
Jesus. It referred strictly to the Father of Jesus, 
to the God to whom he prayed. Gradually (in 
the 50’s and 60’s?), in the development of 
Christian thought, "God" was understood to be 
a broader term. It was seen that God had 
revealed so much of Himself in Jesus that 
"God" had to be able to include both Father 
and Son.64
Opening his discussion on the knowledge of Jesus, Brown points out
the inherent difficulties in talking about the limitations of Jesus, and what
he perceives his role in the discussion to be:
It is hard to participate in such a discussion 
without seeming insufferably arrogant and 
without offending against the respect, nay 
adoration, that the figure of Jesus Christ calls 
forth. Nevertheless, the discussion is going on, 
and for the exegete not to participate would be 
a neglect of duty.65
Brown’s discussion of the knowledge possessed by Jesus is broken down 
into his knowledge of ordinary things in life, his general knowledge of
63 Ibid., p. 31.
64 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
65 Ibid., p. 39.
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religion, his knowledge of the future and finally, his knowledge of himself
and his mission.
Brown, as an exegete, points out that he would start the discussion 
with Heb 4:15, which identifies Jesus as one who has all of the human 
characteristics we do, except for sin. However, as Brown is quick to 
remind us, it has not been an exegetical discussion until relatively recently. 
Discussing openly the concept of ignorance in Jesus lies in direct opposi­
tion to the fact that:
the modem discussion that theologians have 
taken up was already oriented by the medieval 
theory that Jesus possessed different types of 
extraordinary knowledge that prevented limita­
tion.66
Although Protestant authors have done most of the exegetical work on the 
knowledge of Jesus, Brown asserts the necessity for Catholic exegetes to 
jump into the field, which was previously somewhat dangerous for fear of 
repercussions from the hierarchy because it was viewed as compromising 
Jesus’ divinity.
Before delving into Jesus’ knowledge of ordinary affairs, Brown 
posits three reasons why Catholic exegetical work is necessary on the 
question of Jesus’ knowledge: The first is that it is their theological 
responsibility, since theologians who are addressing the issue of Jesus’
66 Ibid., p. 40.
Callahan - 135
knowledge ’’must have available to them competent critical surveys of the
New Testament evidence in order to see how their theories can be best
reconciled with this evidence."67 The second reason Brown sets forth is 
that the Catholic public is receiving different types of unsubstantiated 
statements concerning Jesus’ knowledge that need to be laid against the 
measuring stick of biblical exegesis. The third and final reason Catholic 
exegetical work is necessary is that, "many problems in the history of New 
Testament thought can be solved only if we know to what extent Jesus’ own 
knowledge of these problems was limited."68 For Brown, it is essential to 
examine whether or not the biblical evidence allows Jesus to have igno­
rance, development of thought, or complete clarity about the things around
him.
There are two types of biblical evidence Brown uses, the first are 
what he considers to be the actual words of Jesus (ipsissima verba). The 
second type are segments that are most likely not the actual words of Jesus, 
but are important because, "the statements attributed to Jesus tell us about 
the evangelists’ attitude toward his knowledge."69
Brown’s discussion of Jesus’ knowledge of the ordinary consists of 
two different types of scriptural references:
67 Ibid., p. 42.
68 Ibid., p. 43.
69 Ibid., p. 44.
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texts...that seem to indicate that Jesus shared 
normal human ignorance about the affairs of 
life...(and) other texts that attribute to him 
extraordinary and even superhuman knowledge 
about such affairs.70
For Brown, the best example of Jesus’ ignorance is when, in Mk
5:30-33, he is touched by the woman with a hemorrhage and turns to ask
who it was that touched him. Two other important examples are found in
the Gospel of Luke (2:46 & 2:52), in which Jesus is asking questions of the
teachers in the Temple and is said to be growing in wisdom. While these
events are historically unverifiable, for Brown, they still hold importance:
it is clear that the evangelist did not think it 
strange that Jesus should ask questions or grow 
in knowledge...(which) is an important consider­
ation precisely because Luke’s infancy narrative 
presents Jesus as God’s Son from the first 
moment of his conception.71
In later Gospels, especially the Book of John, Brown suggests that 
Jesus was not shown as one who had to grow in ordinary knowledge, and 
thus is portrayed as having superhuman knowledge of ordinary things. 
Jesus’ asking Philip how to feed the crowd in order to test him (Jn 6:5-6), 
and Jesus’ knowledge of which of his disciples would believe him, not 
believe him, and betray him (Jn 6:64; 6:71; 13:11; 10:48), are for Brown 
two examples of "the Johannine tendency to picture Jesus without any
70 Ibid., p. 45.
71 Ibid., p. 46.
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element of human weakness or dependence."72 In addition to these
examples which show Jesus having extraordinary knowledge, Brown lists
references to Jesus’ ability to know what others are thinking (Mk 2:6-8; Jn
2:24, 6:19 & 30), and to know what is happening in places other than where
he is (Jn 1:48-49 -- Jesus told Nathaneal what he had been doing; Mk 11:2,
Mk 14:13-14, Lk 22:10 - Jesus tells his disciples what they will find when
they go to prepare the Passover feast). As Brown points out, however,
even if these events are historical in nature,
we should still be careful about any theological 
assumption that would trace such knowledge to 
the hypostatic union or to the beatific vi- 
sion...the Old Testament attributes this type of 
knowledge to many prophets.73
The most important things these examples show us is that, even in 
the Gospel tradition, there are a variety of ways in which the authors 
understood the knowledge of Jesus on ordinary matters.
Next, Brown discusses the knowledge Jesus had of religious matters, 
which unlike knowledge of ordinary matters, is thought by most dogmatic 
theologians to be incapable of any form of ignorance. Brown asserts that 
one of the difficulties in determining Jesus’ knowledge of the Scriptures is
whether or not the texts we have now are the actual words of Jesus
72 Ibid., p. 47.
73 Ibid., p. 49.
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{ipsissima verba) or are actually references added by the Gospel writers to 
create a more easily understandable context to which their fellow Jews
could relate.
In support of the thesis that Jesus’ humanity allowed some degree 
of ignorance, Brown gives examples of Jesus’ mistaken citing of certain Old 
Testament passages (ie. in Mk 2:26, Jesus says that the high priest when 
David ate the Temple bread was Abiathar when it was actually Ahime- 
lech), examples of Jesus’ citations in which he ascribed to the mistaken 
religious concepts of his time (ie. in Mk 12:36, Jesus attributes the writings 
of the Psalms to David, with which contemporary scholarship disagrees), 
and examples of Jesus using an unacceptable hermeneutic (ie. in Mk 12:36, 
Jesus refers to Ps 110 as foretelling the Messiah when, "few modem 
scholars...would think that there was an expectation of "the Messiah" when 
Ps 110 was composed."74).
Finally, before discussing Jesus’ knowledge of the future, Brown 
illustrates that Jesus’ understanding of some of the religious concepts of his 
day, such as demonology, the afterlife and the apocalypse, are inadequate 
according to contemporary scholarship. In conclusion, Brown asserts that 
this seemingly lack of knowledge on some general religious concepts does 
not apply to his understanding of himself and his mission:
74 Ibid., p. 53.
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Jesus seems to draw on the imperfect religious 
concepts of his time without indication of 
superior knowledge and without substantially 
correcting the concepts... (but) we must empha­
size that there is an important religious area 
where the teaching attributed to Jesus was 
unique, outdistancing the ideas of his time - 
the area of his own mission and the proclama­
tion of the kingdom of God.75
Brown’s discussion of Jesus’ knowledge of the future is the last step 
in our journey to discover his ideas concerning Jesus’ knowledge of his 
identity and mission. For an examination of what Jesus knew of the future 
leads logically into a discussion of what he understood his role and mission 
in life to be. And, as von Balthasar has shown us, if we begin to under­
stand Jesus’ concept of mission, we will also uncover what Jesus knew of 
his own identity since the two are inseparable. To that end, let us briefly 
examine Brown’s biblical evidence concerning Jesus’ knowledge of the 
future before laying out his view of Jesus’ knowledge of mission and 
identity.
Brown points out in the beginning of this discussion that since Jesus 
was considered by some to be a prophet, and since in that historical period 
the fore-knowledge of the prophet was though to be their most important 
aspect, the assertion that Jesus was a prophet is strong evidence that they 
believed that he knew the future. On the other hand, since all of the
75 Ibid., p. 59.
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Gospels were written after the events of Jesus’ life, death and resurrection, 
Brown ponders the prophecies attributed to Jesus: "how much represents 
the ipsissima verba and how much represents clarification by the evangelist 
in light of the subsequent event?"76 Another question that needs to be 
posed concerns the difference between knowledge of the future and 
intuition toward the way things are going to go: "Genuine detailed fore­
knowledge is superhuman; unshakable conviction is not necessarily beyond 
human powers."77 Before moving to our goal, we shall first examine the 
two most important categories Brown looks at in the context of Jesus’ 
foreknowledge: 1. of his own passion, crucifixion and resurrection, and 2.
of the Parousia.
Although Jesus’ foreknowledge of his passion, death and resurrec­
tion are present in all of the Gospels, Brown points to the potential 
problem that the disciples seemed to be surprised when Jesus died and was 
resurrected: "One may attribute this failure to the slowness of the
disciples, but one may also wonder if the original predictions were as exact 
as they have now come to us."78 Concerning the genuineness of the three 
Synoptic reports of Jesus’ foretelling of his passion, death and resurrection 
(ie. Mk 8:31, 9:31, 10:33-34), Brown points out some of the problems
76 Ibid., p. 60.
77 Idem.
78 Ibid., p. 61.
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suggest they were not the ipsissima verba of Jesus: 1. as was mentioned 
before, the non-understanding of the disciples, 2. the fact that they are not 
found in the ”Q" tradition, and 3. it may be that the sayings were taken in 
part from Daniel 7.
Another issue of Jesus’ foreknowledge Brown raises is his admoni­
tion to the Scribes and Pharisees to destroy the Temple that he would raise 
again in three days (Jn 2:19). The problem with that being proof of 
foreknowledge is that the verb Jesus uses is not "to raise", but "to rebuild," 
thus the way we have it here may simply be John’s way of explaining words
Jesus said which made no sense to him.
Under this category as well, Brown mentions Jesus’ recalling of the 
sign of Jonah in Matthew as a direct reference to his resurrection. Further 
examination, however, shows that since this reference to Jonah was also 
made in Lk 11:29-30, 32 without the reference to being in the belly of the 
whale for three days and nights, the Matthean saying probably added that 
last clause. This is further supported by the fact that the other Synoptic 
portrayal of this scene emphasizes the sign of Jonah as one of repentance,
not a future reference to Jesus’ resurrection.
Finally, Brown discusses the biblical evidence concerning Jesus’ 
foreknowledge of Judas’ betrayal, which even if they are original, their 
intent can be interpreted in different ways:
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one may still wonder whether this prediction 
represents supernatural foreknowledge or only 
a penetrating insight into Judas’ character and 
into the direction in which events were leading 
(especially if the prediction was made when the 
treason had already been committed).79
Brown’s general summary of the foreknowledge Jesus had of his passion, 
death, and resurrection asserts that while the words cannot be scientifically 
traced to Jesus, we must keep in mind "the general agreement of the 
Gospel tradition that Jesus was convinced beforehand that, while his life 
would be taken from him, God would ultimately vindicate him."80
Brown points out that some contemporary theologians argue that 
Jesus’ knowledge developed psychologically throughout the course of his 
life. While that is an attractive premise, Brown contends that it is neither 
supported nor negated by the Scripture itself. The main problem with the 
assertion of development is that, even if we can isolate the genuine 
statements of Jesus, we do not know in what order the sayings actually took 
place, thus it is virtually impossible to know which way to trace the 
development.
Brown’s discussion of Jesus’ foreknowledge of the Parousia 
represents a very different set of factors to consider since it has not taken 
place yet. First, Brown turns his discussion to the anticipation in the New
79 Ibid., p. 65.
80 Idem.
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Testament writings that the Parousia would be immediate. Brown asserts 
that the narrative in Mt 10:23 and Mk 6:7, in which Jesus tells his disciples 
that they will not be finished preaching in all the towns of Israel before the 
Son of Man comes, is an example of Jesus’ belief that the Parousia may 
occur during his ministry. Other Scriptural references seem to place the 
Parousia immediately after Jesus’ death; (Jn 14:3; Mk 14:25, 62; Lk 23:42- 
43) through his assurance that he will come back to take his disciples with 
him, and his assertion that they would see the Son of Man seated on the 
right hand of God, coming with the clouds. The importance to our 
discussion of Jesus’ knowledge of mission and identity comes in Brown’s 
insightful assertion: "all of this (that the Parousia immediately followed 
Jesus’ death) would fit in with a theory that Jesus did not know precisely 
what form his victory over death would take."81
Another possibility Brown puts forth is that there may have been an 
anticipation that there would be an interval between the death of Jesus and 
the Parousia. Brown classifies these numerous texts into three categories: 
1. an expectation of the Parousia within the lifetime of Jesus’ followers, 2. 
an expectation of the Parousia following apocalyptic signs, and 3. an 
expectation of the Parousia which is unknown. In support of the first 
category, Brown lists the texts in which Jesus assures some that they will
81 Ibid., p. 72.
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not die before they see the Son of Man coming into his kingdom or the 
kingdom of God come with power (Mt 16:28, Mk 9:1). When the death of 
the apostolic generation was underway, these sayings had to be reinterpret­
ed to portray a time further into the future.
Brown suggests Jesus’ eschatological speeches (Mk 13, Mt 24-25, Lk 
21) as support for the second expectation, that of the Parousia following 
the apocalypse, which was most likely ’’from the Palestinian church, using 
the language of the Jewish apocalypse and seeking to console itself when
the master did not return."82
In support of the third category, an unknown time of Parousia, 
Brown cites Mk 13:32, in which Jesus tells his disciples that not even he 
knows when the hour will be, but only the Father. Because this saying is 
in the Gospel and it runs in opposition to what the Church believed about 
the possibility of ignorance in Jesus, Brown asserts that "most authors 
would accept the saying as authentic."83
Brown ends his discussion of the foreknowledge of Jesus concerning 
the Parousia with the question of how we can reconcile so many different
views and come to the real view of Jesus. It is here that Brown’s own view
becomes obvious concerning Jesus’ knowledge: "with all of these allowanc­
82 Ibid., p. 75.
83 Ibid., p. 76.
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es, one finds it difficult to believe that Jesus’ own position was clear."84 
In addition, when discussing the variety of answers to the question of when 
the Parousia would occur, Brown offers a conclusion: "such confusion 
could scarcely have arisen if Jesus both knew about the indefinite delay of 
the Parousia and expressed himself clearly on the subject."85 Finally, as 
an introduction to the issue of Jesus’ knowledge of self and mission, Brown 
questions whether theologically it really matters if Jesus was in fact 
ignorant of the exact time of the Parousia:
That God would make Jesus victorious and 
would eventually establish His own reign was a 
basic conviction of Jesus’ life and mission. 
Because there is evidence, nay even a state­
ment, that Jesus did not know when the ulti­
mate victory would take place, many Catholic 
theologians would propose that such knowledge 
was not an essential of Jesus’ mission. Could 
theologians then also admit that Jesus was not 
protected from the confused views of his era 
about the time of the Parousia? An exegete 
cannot solve such a question; he can only point 
out the undeniable confusion in the statements 
attributed to Jesus.86
Raymond Brown begins his discussion of Jesus’ knowledge of self 
and mission with the precaution that this is the most theologically sensitive 
area: "an area with theological repercussions for the understanding of the
84 Ibid., p. 77.
85 Idem.
86 Ibid., p. 78-79.
Callahan - 146
hypostatic union and an area where the Church has shown herself 
consistently opposed to a minimalist solution."87 To deal with this delicate 
topic, he chooses a plan which involves the examination of two titles used 
to describe Jesus. These two titles taken together answer the question of 
what knowledge Jesus had of who he was and what his mission entailed: 
""Messiah," that might be a key to Jesus’ knowledge of his salvific mission 
to men, and..."Son of God," that might be a key to Jesus’ knowledge of his 
relationship to Yahweh."88
First, then, Brown addresses the question of Jesus’ knowledge of his 
mission as the Messiah. He points out the necessary distinction between 
what the biblical evidence illustrates to be the early Christian beliefs about 
Jesus’ Messiahship and his own understanding. Brown asserts that even 
though the early Christians obviously accepted the Messiahship of Jesus, 
"there are conflicting indications as to what facet of Jesus’ career brought 
men to confess him as Messiah."89 In addition, while one popular way to 
examine the variety of New Testament christologies is to place them in 
order of increasing complexity, Brown contends that there is really no way 
to prove that there was any real development as opposed to the theory that 
the divergent concepts arose at the same time.
87 Ibid., p. 79.
88 Idem.
89 Ibid., p. 80.
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Although development cannot be traced with scientifically verifiable 
proof, Brown lists two examples from the Book of Acts which are thought 
to be the oldest and most primitive New Testament christologies. The first 
example is Acts 3:20-21, in which Jesus becomes the Messiah when he 
returns in the Parousia. This is thought to be the oldest New Testament 
christology because of its congruence with Jewish theology: "The earthly 
ministry of Jesus was only a preparation for his coming as the Messiah 
expected in Jewish thought, ie., a Messiah coming to earth in power and 
glory."90 The other example is from Acts 2:36, which portrays a Jesus who 
becomes Messiah through the action of his rising to the right hand of God 
the Father. For Brown, the christology of the Gospels sees Jesus as the 
Messiah during his ministry on earth, with the most prominent example 
being the confession of Peter.
This diversity evident in the New Testament proclamations concern­
ing Jesus causes some to conclude that Jesus must have not made his 
mission clear to his followers: "(this) standard explanation, however, has
been that his lucid claims were not understood because of the obtuseness
or hardness of heart of his hearers."91 This assertion can only be validat­
90 Idem.
91 Ibid., p. 82.
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ed by examining the biblical evidence concerning Jesus’ own knowledge of
his mission as the Messiah.
Unfortunately, as von Balthasar has pointed out as well, when we 
turn to the New Testament, we find little direct evidence concerning Jesus’ 
own knowledge of his mission as Messiah. Brown asserts that even the 
infancy narratives do not tell us what Jesus understood concerning his 
mission, though they tell us (from the omniscient third person) what his 
mission was. Next, Brown addresses the claim that Jesus recognized that 
he was the Messiah at his baptism, which, according to Brown, "faces two 
formidable objections from modern biblical science."92
The first objection is directed at the assertion that Jesus accepted 
the Jewish understanding of Messiah as an acceptable title for his mission. 
The biblical evidence to support this objection begins with the oldest 
recorded telling of Peter’s confession, in which Jesus ordered Peter to be 
silent and turned the conversation into one of suffering. Also, when Jesus 
is asked if he is the Messiah, his answer in Matthew (26:64) is the dubious 
"you have said so," and in Luke (22:67), he responds by speaking about the 
Son of Man and not the Messiah.93 Brown shows that the only time in
92 Idem.
93 However, as Brown points out, in Mark (14:62) Jesus’ answer is the 
affirmative, "I am." In this case, though, Brown asserts that biblical 
scholarship shows "that the vague answer is older than the clear affirma­
tive." See Ibid., Footnote 67, p. 83.
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the Gospels that Jesus clearly accepts the title Messiah (his conversation 
with the Samaritan woman Jn 4:25-26) contains the qualification that it is 
not the typical Jewish understanding of the politically powerful Messiah, 
but a Samaritan understanding of Messiah, which is not so nationalistic. 
Brown’s point in giving these examples is not to claim that Jesus com­
pletely refused the title "Messiah,” but instead to illustrate that Jesus might 
have understood the title in a different way:
an intelligent case can be made out for the 
thesis that Jesus never really accepted Messiah 
as a correct or adequate designation for his 
role, even though he would not categorically 
refuse the title.94
The second objection directly deals with the ambiguity of Jesus’ 
baptism itself. To this point, Brown argues that even in Mark, which is the 
only Gospel account in which the voice and vision are directed to Jesus, 
there is no reported reaction from Jesus, which thus makes it impossible 
to speculate what Jesus might have understood from the incident. Another 
strong point that Brown makes is that, in actuality, the baptismal scene in 
all of the Gospels does not have the purpose of telling Jesus who he is and 
what his mission is, but instead to tell the audience who the author believes 
Jesus to be. Before discussing Jesus’ knowledge of his identity, Brown 
concludes his discussion of Jesus’ mission-knowledge: "it is dubious
94 Ibid., p. 84.
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whether we should speak in any strict sense of "messianic" knowledge on 
Jesus’ part since he may never have really identified his role as that of the 
Messiah."95
Brown begins his discussion of Jesus’ knowledge of identity by 
asserting that the question should not be directed at whether Jesus knew 
he was God, but whether Jesus knew he was the Son of God. This 
distinction is necessary because it is only in the latter books of the New 
Testament that Jesus is called God, because the Jewish concept of God as 
One took time to develop into a more broad understanding.96 Thus, on 
the question of Jesus’ knowledge of being God, Brown is clear: "when we 
ask whether during his ministry Jesus, a Palestinian Jew, knew that he was 
God, we are asking whether he identified himself and the Father -- and, of 
course, he did not."97 From the biblical evidence, then, Brown discusses 
Jesus’ knowledge of his divinity as the Son of God and not God the Father.
Even in limiting himself to a discussion of Jesus’ knowledge of 
himself as the Son of God, Brown contends that he has not rid the 
discussion of all ambiguity, since the term Son of God "often...does not
95 Ibid., p. 86.
96 See pages 122-123 of this thesis for an explanation of God’s 
singulamess in the Jewish tradition.
97 Ibid., p. 87.
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mean real divine filiation but only a special relationship to God."98 For 
this reason, Brown focuses on the very specific issue of Jesus’ knowledge 
of himself as the unique Son of God, different from any other human 
being. Brown is quick to assert that this is not an easy distinction to make 
since many times when Jesus is speaking about God the Father, he uses 
"my" and "your" quite often, connoting no unique Sonship. Jesus’ use of 
"Abba" for God is unique, even though he offers his followers an opportu­
nity to take part in this relationship through the Our Father and his 
references to "your Father in heaven." Brown asserts that, while Jesus’ 
understanding of his relationship to God could be unique in that he is the 
first to claim God as Father, it is also prudent to examine the biblical 
evidence in which Jesus speaks of himself as Son if we are to more fully 
understand Jesus’ knowledge of his identity.
Brown suggests three possibilities in which Jesus might have 
understood himself as the unique Son of God, the first found in Mt 11:27 
and Lk 10:22: "All things have been handed over to me by my Father, and 
no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son 
wishes to reveal him." Although, as Brown points out, the definite article 
for Son is in the parabolic sense, which indicates a generic situation, this 
could be an example of Jesus’ knowledge of his unique identity as the Son
98 Idem.
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of God. The second passage is Mk 13:32, in which Jesus tells his disciples 
that no one except the Father knows the hour, not even the Son. The 
third is the parable of the Vinedressers (Mk 12:6; Lk 20:13; Mt 21:37), in 
which Jesus may be equating himself with the ’’uniquely beloved" Son in the 
parable.
Before positing his idea of what a better approach to the issue of the
knowledge of Jesus might be, Brown explains three important points
concerning Jesus’ knowledge of himself as the Son of God. The first point,
which leads to the latter two, is Brown’s contention that purely scientific
attempts at biblical exegesis run the risk of missing the forest for the trees:
One could argue for a convergence of prob­
abilities that Jesus did claim to be God’s unique 
Son. It is when we stand before such a ques­
tion that we realize the frustrating limitations 
imposed on research by the nature of the 
material we work with - material magnificently 
illuminated by post-resurrectional faith, but for 
that very reason far from ideal for scientific 
study.99
This difficulty causes Brown to forego two entire bodies of biblical 
evidence which otherwise could provide the answer to the question of 
Jesus’ knowledge. The first body of evidence he had to overlook was the 
Gospel of John’s assertion of Jesus’ overtly clear claim to this unique 
Sonship with God. Brown states that while he believes the Gospel of John
99 Ibid., pp. 91-92.
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to contain some historically true events, he "also recognizes that this 
material has been rethought in the light of late first-century theology," and 
that "the Gospel of John was written to prove that Jesus is the Son of God 
(2O:31)."100 Therefore, he believes that the historical words of Jesus run 
the risk of being too integrated with the author’s theological purpose, thus: 
"the use of Jn to determine scientifically how much Jesus knew of himself 
during his lifetime is far more difficult than the use of the other Gos­
pels."101
The second body of biblical evidence that Brown dismisses contains 
the infancy narratives which claim that Jesus was bom of the Virgin Mary, 
which if historically true would verify Jesus’ unique identity as the Son of 
God, since God begot him. Brown points out that if this really happened, 
Mary would have told Jesus, thus he would have that knowledge of his 
divine origin. Instead, however, Brown asserts that much of contemporary 
scholarship dismisses the infancy narratives as non-historical because they 
appear to be traceable to ancient Jewish stories and because of inconsisten­
cies apparent in the ministry of Jesus, such as the anticipation the 
appearance of the star was to have created, yet in Jesus’ ministry it seems 
as though no one remembers.102
100 Ibid., p. 92.
101 Idem.
102 See Ibid., footnote 86, p. 93.
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Brown next puts forth his idea of what may be a better approach to 
this entire issue. To this end, he makes two distinctions which he believes 
can serve to better clarify the issue of Jesus’ knowledge. The first 
distinction he makes is theological, and concerns the difference between 
the concept of consciousness and that of knowledge. Brown contends that 
when the question of Jesus’ knowledge of his identity is asked, theologians 
by and large describe this as Jesus’ self-consciousness. As Brown points 
out, however, "consciousness is not always the same as express knowl­
edge."103 And while he makes it clear that he does not wish to dive into 
all of the psychological aspects of the issue, he does want to make a 
necessary clarification:
consciousness is often an intuitive awareness 
and thus is distinct from an ability to express by 
formulating concepts and words, which is gener­
ally what people mean when they speak of 
knowledge. In human experience, especially in 
artistic matters or in one’s own awareness of 
oneself, there may be a lag between conscious­
ness and express knowledge - one may be 
vividly conscious of something long before one 
finds a reasonably adequate way to express that 
consciousness.104
103 Ibid, p. 93.
104 Ibid, p. 94.
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This is probably the most clear key to Brown biblical christology concern­
ing what he believes Jesus to have known about his own identity and
mission.
For Brown, this distinction between consciousness and awareness 
(knowledge) can explain an important aspect of Jesus’ understanding of his
mission:
in the Gospels there is insufficient evidence 
that Jesus claimed the title (of Messiah) or that 
he fully accepted it when it was offered to him.
But this would not necessarily imply that he had 
no consciousness of a salvific mission to men...it 
could simply mean that he found Messiahship, 
as the term was understood in his time, an 
inadequate way to give expression to the 
mission of which he was conscious.105
In addition, Brown asserts that Jesus, while on earth, may have never fully
understood who he was and what his mission was: "this does not necessarily
mean that he was not conscious of the reality behind the relationship we
call Son ship.”106 Brown goes even further to suggest that, if theology can
agree that Jesus’ intellect was actually human and thus was activated by
human experiences, then it is clear that:
it would have taken Jesus time to formulate 
concepts, and he might have found some of the 
concepts of his day inadequate to express what 
he wanted to say...One would then be able to
105 Ibid., p. 94.
106 Ibid., p. 95.
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say that his knowledge was limited, but such 
limitation would not at all exclude an intuitive 
consciousness of a unique relationship to God 
and of a unique mission to men.107
If this is the case, then once again we can compare Brown’s conclusion with 
von Balthasar’s emphasis that Jesus’ mission was at the center of who he 
was, constitutive of his identity. Mission as the central element of the 
person of Jesus comes through in Brown when he states that, "the struggle 
of (Jesus’) life could have been one of finding the concepts and the words 
to express that relationship and that mission.”108 Thus turning his 
inspiration I consciousness into understandable expressions was at the 
center of Jesus’ life as seen by both authors’ christologies.
Finally, Brown suggests his second distinction to give more clarity 
to the issue of Jesus’ knowledge. This time, however, the distinction is 
exegetical. Brown suggests that, since there is so much confusion when we 
begin with the question of Jesus’ understanding of his identity and mission 
through examining titles and such, perhaps we need to address the issue 
from a different angle. This angle is simply to begin with what are 
considered to be the most ancient and reliable texts, and see what Jesus 
has to say concerning his relationship to God and his mission. In other 
words, begin from the bottom instead of from the top. What this process
108 Idem.
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leads to, contends Brown, is an historically irreducible portrayal of Jesus: 
"he claimed to be the unique agent in the process of establishing God’s 
kingship over men...He proclaimed that in his preaching and through his 
deeds God’s kingship over men was making itself felt."109
In his presentation of the Kingdom of God, Jesus was completely 
unique, not only in the way he presented it, but also in the way he acted 
it out through miracles, breaking the Sabbath, binding the devil, and 
forgiving sin. Brown holds that in his role of bringing about God’s 
kingdom, Jesus had no equal. This gives us good insight into what Jesus 
understood his mission to be and his authoritative identity to present the 
mission in such a way: "the certainty with which Jesus spoke and acted 
implies a consciousness of a unique relationship to God."110
It is his presentation of the Kingdom of God that eventually gets 
him killed, but it is important to point out this assertion of Brown’s: "in 
considering this very important evidence for Jesus’ consciousness of 
himself, we should emphasize that there is no indication in the Gospels of 
a development of Jesus’ basic conviction."111 And even though Brown 
concedes that Jesus may have not known in detail how the Kingdom was
109 Ibid., pp. 96-97.
110 Ibid., p. 97.
111 Ibid., p. 98.
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to be established, Jesus’ own mission was clear and, like von Balthasar,
constitutive of his identity:
there is not the slightest evidence that his own 
role in the kingdom had to be revealed to him.
So far as Scripture is concerned, the awareness 
or consciousness that God’s rule over men 
would be established through him could have 
sprung from his innermost being, for the first 
moment he speaks, he has this con­
sciousness.112
In closing, Brown once again points out that the biblical evidence he 
has explained is supposed to help theologians be informed when they speak 
about this, one of the most delicate topics in christology, the knowledge of 
Jesus of his mission and identity. He goes on to suggest that some 
theologians who cannot posit ignorance in Jesus will simply explain away 
the biblical evidence as an example of an all-knowing Jesus simply 
conforming to the times so as not to appear out of place. When that objec­
tion is answered through an emphasis on Jesus’ humanity and need for 
ignorance to be truly human, the objection will come, Brown admits, that 
there is only a divine person in Christ and that cannot know any imperfec­
tion. Brown answers that, however, by citing Cyril of Alexandria, who 
admitted that Christ had one Person with two Natures, but also embraced 
the fact that ’’for love of us he (Jesus) has not refused to descend to such
112 Ibid., pp. 98-99.
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a low position as to bear all that belongs to our nature, INCLUDED IN 
WHICH IS IGNORANCE."113
In the final estimation of Jesus’ knowledge of his mission and
identity, Jesus had to be fully human and fully divine to be able to relate
to us while still having the capacity to show us what God is like. For
Brown, then, the question of Jesus’ knowledge is at the center of all
christology, theology and Christianity as we know it:
A Jesus who walked through the world knowing 
exactly what the morrow would bring, knowing 
with certainty that three days after his death his 
Father would raise him up, is a Jesus who can 
arouse our admiration, but still a Jesus far from 
us... On the other hand, a Jesus for whom the 
future was as much a mystery, a dread, and a 
hope as it is for us and yet, at the same time, a 
Jesus who would say, "Not my will but yours" ~ 
this is a Jesus who could effectively teach us 
how to live, for this is a Jesus who would have 
gone through life’s real trials.114
Here, once again, we see echoes of von Balthasar’s discussion of Jesus’ 
obedience to God the Father, his freedom to choose, his example of 
complete faith in God, and his total humanity.
Our final task before concluding this thesis is to briefly examine, in 
more subjective terms, Raymond Brown’s understanding of Jesus’
113 Ibid., p. 102. Quoted from Cyril of Alexandria, PG 75, 369,
(Capitalization is Brown’s).
114 Ibid., pp. 104-105.
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knowledge of his mission and his identity, as seen in his recent publication, 
Responses to 101 Questions on the Bible. The reason for this brief
summary is to present Brown’s ideas in perhaps a more readable and direct
fashion.
Only seven of the 101 questions in this work are germane to our 
purposes here, #70 - # 76. Because we have gone into such detail already 
describing Brown’s assertions concerning this topic, only brief answers 
which add something to the discussion or short summaries will be offered
here. When asked about whether or not Jesus knew he was God, Brown 
answers in like manner as we have already established: he contends that 
the question should be rephrased because of the ancient Jewish under­
standing of the singularity of God; that the Gospel of John is not as helpful 
as the others because it served a more explanatory role in hindsight; that 
there is no evidence that Jesus discovered his identity (it was always with 
him); that the simple answer to that question is "yes," Jesus did know who 
he was, but his use of authority concerning the Kingdom of God is the
main clue.
When asked about the possibility for Jesus’ knowledge to develop 
(#71), Brown asserts that Jesus, like all of us, knew who he was from the 
very first moment he could think, but that he could not find an explicit
manner in which to convert his consciousness into immediate awareness.
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As well, Brown contends that Jesus could know his identity and still grow
in knowledge, but there is another equally important point:
No one knows the mysterious depth of the 
incarnation and its effects on Jesus intemal- 
ly...the Gospels were written to tell us what w 
should know of Jesus, not what he knew of 
himself.115
Next, Brown is asked to give his thoughts on the premise that if 
Jesus was God, and God is all-knowing, then Jesus had to be all-knowing. 
To this question, Brown asserts that the claim that the above stated 
premise is built upon is not correct, since in Jesus there were both types 
of knowledge, divine and human, but the divine knowledge did not 
manifest itself (in fact, could not manifest itself) in Jesus’ human nature. 
He is also quick to point out that he does not wish to go any further into 
systematic theology, but that he thinks "it is fair to say: By being who he 
was, Jesus knew who he was."116
When pushed to answer whether or not Jesus had any more 
knowledge than any other human being (#73), Brown retreats a bit and 
asserts that Jesus, through "his immediate knowledge of his identity, his 
knowing who he was, ... had the profoundest and most intimate knowledge
115 Brown, Raymond E., Responses to 101 Questions on the Bible, p.
100.
116 Ibid., p. 101.
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of God’s will."117 This, in turn, gave Jesus his authority when he spoke 
about and, through actions, brought about the Kingdom of God.
Next, Brown answers a question concerning what type of factual and 
practical knowledge Jesus possessed (#74). On this point, Brown sees no 
biblical evidence that Jesus had factual knowledge of earthly things beyond 
what he would have learned from his parents and his environment.
Finally, Brown is asked if Jesus knew he was going to die (#75) and
if he would rise from the dead (#76). He responds to these queries by
asserting the difference between detailed foreknowledge and strong beliefs
that some things were going to occur. Because of the turbulence Jesus was
causing, he could have probably known from human logic that he would die
a prophet’s death. In the same way, the biblical evidence assures us that,
while certainties may not have been clear, Jesus did have a strong belief
that he would ultimately be vindicated. Brown asserts that the question
depends upon what one thinks about the possibility of ignorance in Jesus.
In his response, we find the position of Brown on the issue of Jesus’
knowledge elucidated concisely:
Thus one may argue that both biblically and 
theologically the position of limited knowledge 
seems defensible. It is worth emphasizing that 
to deny the full humanity of Jesus is just as 
serious as to deny the full divinity, and one may 
argue that it is truly human to be limited and
117 Idem.
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time-conditioned in our knowledge. Thus we 
may have in Jesus the strange combination of 
absolute surety about what God wants of us if 
God’s kingdom is to come, and a limited human 
way of phrasing that message.118
A Critical Comparison
Now we turn to the heart and focus of our topic, and compare the 
two views of von Balthasar and Brown as they would address certain 
common issues and problems of the issue of Jesus’ knowledge of his 
mission and identity. As laid out in the Introduction of this thesis, we will 
be using criteria from the International Theological Commission’s 
document, "The Consciousness of Christ concerning Himself and His 
Mission," written in 1985. Once again, however, before we begin it is 
important for me to point out the limitations of the following conclusions 
based on the specifications of my research. In other words, by limiting 
myself primarily to von Balthasar’s Theo-Drama, Vol. Ill, and Brown’s 
Jesus, God and Man and 101 Responses, I have left out other works which 
may have been very helpful and poignant, but chose not to study for the 
sake of practicality.
Having pointed out the limitations of my conclusions, let us now 
move through the issues laid out by the I.T.C. and compare and contrast 
the views of Brown and von Balthasar. In the Introduction to this thesis,
118 Ibid., p. 105.
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we went into great detail on the commentaries that the I.T.C. had on each 
of their four propositions. Rather than redo work that was already done, 
here we are simply going to lay out each proposition as it appears in the 
I.T.C. document and follow it with a comparison of Brown’s and von 
Balthasar’s conclusions concerning each. In addition, I should point out 
that in this section, we are not attempting to make new assertions or bring 
in new material, but instead to tie together (and re-package in an 
understandable, concise way) the positions of the two authors which we 
have already established. For this reason, we will not go into tremendous 
detail, but instead give the basic conclusion of each author and direct the 
reader back to the sections in this chapter which will give more detailed 
explanations.
The first proposition of the I.T.C. we will examine is:
The life of Jesus testifies to his consciousness of a 
filial relationship with the Father. His behavior and 
his words, which are those of the perfect "servant”, 
imply an authority that surpasses that of the ancient 
prophets and belongs to God alone. Jesus drew this 
incomparable authority from his unique relationship 
with God, whom he calls "my Father". He was 
conscious of being the only Son of God and in this 
sense of being God himself. 119
119 International Theological Commission, Texts and Documents: 1969- 
1985, p. 308.
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The most basic assertion this proposition makes is that Jesus knew he was 
the Son of God in a unique way. In other words, Jesus was aware of his 
identity.
On this topic, von Balthasar asserts that mission and person are 
identical in Jesus and they cannot be separated. Jesus’ mission, which 
surpassed that of all those who came before (and after) him, sets the stage 
for his understanding of his identity as the One Sent from the Father. 
Jesus’ awareness of this identity developed as he grew in wisdom through 
his contact with Mary and through his relationship with the Father. His 
contact with Mary was what enabled his self-consciousness to develop as 
it did, since Mary acted as the "Thou" in Jesus’ life which helped him grow 
in self-consciousness by her hands-on guidance in the religious tradition of 
their day and her physical nurturing of Jesus as he grew up. Von Balthasar 
asserts that Mary knew because of her virgin conception and birth (at least 
to some degree) that Jesus was in a very special relationship to God. Thus 
much of what Jesus knew historically came through the influence of Mary
and others.
His awareness of his unique identity and relationship with the 
Father grew through prayer and faith: "the more the Son unites himself 
with the Ground from which his person and mission simultaneously spring
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forth, the better he understands both his mission and himself.”120 To this 
proposition, then, von Balthasar would assert that Jesus was aware of his 
identity as part of the Triune God, at least on some level of his conscious, 
even though it only became available into expressible concepts as he grew.
To this first proposition, Raymond Brown would assert that even 
though most will not accept the possibility of ignorance in Jesus, the 
biblical evidence shows obvious instances in which Jesus was ignorant of 
certain things (ie. "the hour", who touched his garment, and obvious 
limitations in his citation of the OT). In addition, Brown points out that 
the NT does call Jesus "God", but usually reserves that title ("theos") for 
the specific entity of God the Father. Brown asserts that Jesus did 
understand his unique relationship to God in some ways, but that he did 
distinguish between himself and God. It is important to point out here that 
Brown does admit that the Gospel of John and the infancy narratives do 
in fact answer the question of Jesus’ awareness of his identity very clearly,
but that these sources are not as reliable as the earlier sources. The
Gospel of John is not as reliable, contends Brown, because it was written 
to convince people that Jesus was the Son of God and contained a lot of 
theological interpretation of the events of Jesus’ life. The infancy 
narratives are not as reliable because of the logical inconsistencies that if
120 Balthasar, Hans Urs von. Theo-Drama, Volume III, p. 169.
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they were true, Mary would have simply told Jesus who he was and people 
would have been expecting him because of the star, etc.
For Brown, Jesus’ awareness of his divinity in the NT is not 
available through studying Jesus as God, but instead Jesus as the Son of 
God. Along this line, Brown does assert that Jesus’ use of "Abba" is 
unique and does show Jesus’ sonship to God as being unique and 
foundational. A distinction Brown makes enables us to see his position 
more clearly. He discusses a lag between Jesus intuitive awareness 
(consciousness) of identity and his express knowledge which is conveyable.
He asserts that Jesus could have been conscious of the fact that he was the
Son of God without being able to express it in conceptual language.
It is at this point that Brown’s christology comes together with that 
of von Balthasar’s. Earlier, we discussed von Balthasar’s understanding of 
inspiration as that which God gives through the Holy Spirit, but which we 
cannot perceive or convey in an explicit manner. In the same way, we now 
see Brown explaining the difference between consciousness and knowledge 
in a model that is very similar to von Balthasar’s inspiration model121, 
except for the important difference that they use different terms and 
understand the reality from two different viewpoints. Ironically, both 
authors use the example of an artist to explain how inspiration / conscious­
121 See pp. 126-128 of this thesis.
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ness can be within an individual without that individual being able to 
explicitly express its contents. The difference comes with the fact that, for 
von Balthasar, this inspiration is what enables Jesus to more fully grasp 
himself and exercise his true freedom in answering "yes" to the plan that 
from before all time the Triune God ordained. This inspiration gives Jesus 
his mission, even though at any one point in time he is not completely 
aware of it in its entirety. In similar fashion, Brown posits Jesus to be 
conscious of his mission and his identity, but unable to fully express this 
information. This, then, is the main issue to which von Balthasar and 
Brown come with such a similar mode of understanding, their positions are 
justifiably reckoned to be congruent.
The second proposition of the I.T.C. we will examine is:
Jesus was aware of the purpose of his mission: to 
announce the Kingdom of God and make it present 
in his own Person, in his actions, and in his words, 
so that the world would become reconciled with 
God and renewed He freely accepted the Father's 
will: to give his own life for the salvation of all 
mankind He knew the Father had sent him to 
serve and to give his life "for many" (Mk 14:24).l22-
The basic assertion here is that Jesus had knowledge of what his mission 
was: to establish God’s Kingdom through his life and obedience to God.
122 Ibid., p. 309.
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As mentioned above, von Balthasar ties the identity of Jesus’ 
knowledge of his mission and person so closely together that they are not 
distinguishable. This makes it hard to pick comments specific to Jesus’ 
knowledge of his mission of this the I.T.C. document refers. Basically, von 
Balthasar would assert that Jesus did know what his mission was, and that 
this knowledge came in the form of an awareness of being sent. In this 
way, since Jesus knew he was sent and knew that there must be a sender, 
Jesus knew not only his mission, but also his identity. For von Balthasar, 
mission is the guiding concept of his christology of consciousness. Jesus’ 
mission was not given to him from outside, but it was always his and part 
of him. Jesus was implicitly aware of his eschatological and universal 
mission. Von Balthasar contends that it is impossible that Jesus did not 
know. The details of the mission were left up to God through Jesus’ total
obedience to God’s will in the context of his total freedom which was most
free in God.
In this way, Jesus has complete freedom whether or not to execute 
his mission, but since it is himself and is gently reinforced by the Holy 
Spirit who reminds Jesus that this was a decision made by the Triune God 
before all time. Jesus has faith (which in this instance is an assurance and 
strong conviction), though the entire mission is not available for his gaze 
in its complete form. Jesus knows he will be ultimately vindicated and 
victorious, but he could not see the entire mission as God could.
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Whereas von Balthasar’s idea of Jesus’ mission is built strongly 
around the mission christology of the Gospel of John, Brown would answer 
this proposition from a different angle since he does not see the Gospel of 
John as being as reliable as some of the earlier texts. Brown asserts that 
there is a big difference between superhuman detailed foreknowledge of 
one’s mission and an unshakably strong conviction of ultimate vindication. 
About this point, von Balthasar and Brown agree. To directly answer the 
question of Jesus’ knowledge of his mission as posed by this proposition, 
Brown examines the use of the title ’'Messiah.” Since Jesus did not really 
accept the title "Messiah" in the way others used it (the only place he 
explicitly accepts it is talking with a Samaritan woman, whose concept of 
Messiah was not so political: Jn 4:25-26), Brown contends that Jesus knew 
what his mission was, but it was not exactly what "Messiah" meant at the
time.
Further, while Jesus did not have express knowledge of his mission 
in detail (and in this way was ignorant), he did have a consciousness of 
what it (his mission) was in reality. Once again, this is very congruent to 
von Balthasar’s assertions. Finally, Brown asserts that the authoritative 
way Jesus presented the Kingdom of God illustrates very clearly that Jesus 
was aware of a very unique relationship with God.
The third proposition the I.T.C. sets forth is:
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To realize his salvific mission, Jesus wanted to unite 
men with the coming of the Kingdom and to gather 
them around himself. With this end before him, he 
did certain definite acts that, if taken altogether, can 
only be explained as a preparation for the Church, 
which will be definitively constituted at the time of 
the Easter and Pentecost events. It is therefore to 
be affirmed of necessity that Jesus willed the foun­
dation of the Church.123
This proposition (as is the fourth) is a little further away from the focus of 
our work here, but nonetheless worth briefly examining. This third 
proposition, concerning Jesus’ knowledge of (and will concerning) the 
foundation of the church, asserts that Jesus and the Church are insepara­
ble. Both authors seem to agree with that premise.
Von Balthasar’s concept of inclusion in Christ seems to be relevant 
here, for it is within this concept von Balthasar posits that all people are 
determined by the Person of Jesus Christ because he began the drama of 
which we are all actors. In addition, by imitating Christ’s mission, we can 
participate fully in the drama with him. Jesus calls us to participate with 
him in his mission. In this way, Jesus calls us forth to follow him and take 
up his mission of presenting the Kingdom of God, which seems to me to 
be the basic meaning of the I.T.C.’s third proposition. In such a way, Jesus 
did will the foundation of the church by calling people to himself and 
presenting them with a part in the work of his mission.
123 Ibid., p. 311.
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Brown would address this third proposition by disagreeing with 
anyone who asserts that the NT gives evidence that Jesus knew about and 
willed the foundation of the church in an explicit way, just as an architect 
hands blueprints to the builders. He contends that there is no biblical 
evidence to that point. However, he does hold that scripturally, Jesus did 
found the church by calling together his followers in community and calling 
them to work in the Spirit.124 This is very similar to von Balthasar’s
answer above:
(followers) understand that their calling believ­
ers together into a community was the direct 
continuation of what Jesus had done when he 
called them together and sent them out to 
continue his work. For that reason, I insist on 
retaining the notion that Christ founded the 
church.125
The fourth and final proposition the I.T.C. establishes concerning
the knowledge Jesus had of his mission and identity is:
The consciousness that Christ had of being the 
Father's emissary to save the world and to bring all 
mankind together in God's people involves, in a 
mysterious way, a love for all mankind so much so 
that we may all say: "The Son of God loved me and 
gave himself up for me" (Gal 2:20).126
124 See Raymond Brown’s Biblical Exegesis and Church Doctrine, NY: 
Paulist Press, 1985, p. 60.
125 Brown, Raymond E. Responses to 101 Questions on the Bible, p.
106.
126 Ibid, p. 314.
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This fourth proposition asserts that Jesus’ knowledge of his identity and 
mission involved a soteriological collective love of all humankind and an 
individual love of each and every human being.
To this fourth proposition, von Balthasar asserts that Jesus’ mission 
was both eschatological and universal. Since within this mission, we are all 
included because of Jesus’ foundation of the drama, we are loved both 
collectively and individually. Jesus bore all evil and God-forsakenness
because he loved us and his mission called him to do so. Jesus must have
known why he was giving up his life in total self-sacrifice: "it is impossible 
to suppose that God could use this death to reconcile the world to himself 
if the one who died was unaware of its significance."127 In this way, then, 
Jesus mission as God’s emissary did involve a knowledge of who he was
and what he was. This mission was carried out in love for each one of us.
Raymond Brown would address this proposition by reminding us that 
we can take part in Jesus’ ultimate vindication of his death on the Cross 
and his Resurrection by participating in the mission to which he has called 
each and every one of us. While Jesus may not have known explicitly what 
his salvific mission was, he did possess some inexpressible consciousness of 
his salvific mission to all people.
127 Balthasar, Hans Urs von. Theo-Drama, Vol. Ill, p. 164.
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Now that we have addressed some specific conclusions of von 
Balthasar and Brown in a comparative manner, let us conclude this work 
with some brief afterthoughts.
CONCLUSION
The creation of this thesis has been a long, but rewarding journey. 
It is my only hope that there is some insight within worthy of shedding light 
on the wonderful mystery of the Incarnation of the Word of God. In 
examining these two brilliant authors, we have seen that, though their use 
of sources and premises are quite different, through their common goal to 
elucidate the person of Jesus Christ, they in part share their conclusion 
concerning his knowledge of his identity and mission.
There are so many factors that come into play in a scholarly 
discussion of this issue. How does one define identity? consciousness? 
knowledge? mission? or the Hypostatic Union? By thoroughly examining 
the basic theological tenets and the specific christological assertions of 
these two authors, we have attempted (as much as our abilities allowed and 
grace abounded) to explore how two scholars from such different 
geographic areas, theological backgrounds, and scholarly areas of research 
can come together on an issue and assert that Jesus did know who he was - 
- with qualifications.
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What we have seen in these two authors, I echo in my own 
christological thought. Jesus did understand his identity and mission - but 
the extent to which that understanding soared, as Brown so aptly put it, 
"No one knows."128 In the deep and unreachable consciousness of Jesus 
there was knowledge of what he was and of the mission he, as part of the 
Triune God, had ordained from before all time. This knowledge, however, 
was not present in Jesus’ immediate awareness as explicit knowledge that 
he could explain or clearly proclaim. Through the experiences of living 
and learning, Jesus understood more and more about who he was, just as
we all do.
In the final estimation, as has already been shown, we cannot 
discover what Jesus actually did understand of himself and his mission as 
the Incarnate Word of God. In this situation, informed speculation 
manifests our most noble capability. Is it worth the trouble, then? I would 
not be so pessimistic as to answer in the negative. On the one hand, is this 
quest for understanding what Jesus knew of himself and his mission 
necessary for us to have in our salvation? Probably not, but that certainly 
does not mean that the issue is moot. No, as we have seen in both von 
Balthasar and Brown, the knowledge Jesus possessed concerning his 
identity and mission is at the center of our understanding of who God is.
128 See footnote # 115.
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Finally, we must take recourse to the beauty and truth of the Councils of 
Nicea and Chalcedon: For Jesus Christ to make a difference in my life and 
communicate real understanding of the situations I encounter in this world, 
he must be fully human, in all things save sin. At the same time, for Jesus 
Christ to truly represent the Incarnate Word of God and offer God’s grace, 
salvation, and an intimate, eternal relationship with God the Father, Jesus 
must be true God from true God, begotten not made, One in being with
the Father.
Through the Scriptures, the Traditions of the Church, and our own 
understanding and hunger for knowledge through theological study, we can 
come a step closer to understanding who Jesus Christ is and who he 
believed himself to be. However, in the end, my tired and stretched mind 
takes refuge in the fact that it is ultimately a mystery that, while on this 
earth, we will never fully understand, but have been given the grace to 
accept and believe, through faith, that Jesus is as human as we are in all 
things save sin, and true God from true God, the Incarnate Word.
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